Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

hich perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the remembrance of what has been done. That it is so, however, this is an argument, that memory frequently does not know what the things are of which desire participates, though they still reside in it.

XXIX. Shall we, therefore, ascribe memory to the sensitive power, and will the sensitive power be the same thing with us as that which remem¬ bers ? If, however, the image of the soul remenir bers, as we have said, the sensitive power will be twOfold. And if the sensitive power does not re¬ member, but something else, this something else will have the power of remembering in a twofold respect. Farther still, if the sensitive power is capable of apprehending disciplines, it will also apprehend the objects of the dianoetic power, [i. e. the discursive power of reason], or something else will apprehend the objects of each of these. Shaltp. 390 we, therefore, by admitting that the power which apprehends is common, attribute to it the remem¬ brance of both these ? If, however, one and the same thing apprehended sensibles and intelligibles, something to the purpose would perhaps be asserted. But if it is divided in a twofold respect, there will nevertheless be two things. And if we ascribe both to each soul, four things will be pro¬ duced. In short, what necessity is there that we

* should remember through the same power by which we perceive, and that both sensible perception and recollection should be effected by the same pow'er, and also that we should remember dianoetic ob¬ jects through the power by w?hich we energize dia= noetically ? For the same persons do not excel in dianoetically energizing and remembering, and those whose sensible perceptions are equally acute, do not remember equalty. Some also excel in sensible perception, but others in memory whose sensations are not acute. Again, however, if each is different, it will be requisite that the power also should be different which remembers what sense had before perceived, and it will be necessary to perceive that which it is requisite to remember. Or may wo not say that nothing hinders a sensiblep. 391 perception from being a phantasm to him who re» members, and that memory and retention may belong to the power of the phantasy, which is some¬ thing different from memory. For it is this power in w hich sense ends ; and when sense no longer energizes, the sensible spectacle is present with the phantastic power. If, therefore, the imagination of an absent object is present with this, it will now remember it.

different from memory. For it is this power in w hich sense ends ; and when sense no longer energizes, the sensible spectacle is present with the phantastic power. If, therefore, the imagination of an absent object is present with this, it will now remember it. And if it remains, indeed, but for a little time, the remembrance will be little ; but if for a long time the remembrance will be greater* in consequence of this povrer being stronger, so that not being easily perverted, it will not be com¬ pelled to lose its remembrance. Memory, there¬ fore, belongs to the power of the phantasy, and to remember will consist of things of this kind. We say, however, that souls are differently disposed with respect to memory, either through differently possessing the powers of it, or by frequently or not frequently exercising it ; or by corporeal tempera¬ ments being or not being inherent, and producing or not producing a change in quality, and causing as it were perturbation. These things, however, must be elsewdiere discussed.

p. 392

XXX, What, however, shall we say of the conceptions of the dianoetic power? Does the phantastic power pertain also to these ? If, indeed, imagination followed every intellection, perhaps this imagination remaining, and being as it were an image of the dianoetic conception, there will thus be a remembrance of the thing known ; but if not, something else must be investigated. Perhaps, however, memory will be a reception into the phan¬ tastic power of reason following the conception. For a conception is impartible, and not yet having proceeded as it were outwardly, it latently remains within. But reason evolving and educing into the phantastic power from each conception, exhibits the conception as it were in a mirror : and thus the apprehension, permanency, and remembrance of it are effected. Hence, since the soul is always moved to intelligence, when it perceives intellec· tually, then the apprehension of what it perceives

* is produced in us. For intelligence is one thing, and the apprehension of intelligence another. And we always indeed perceive intellectually, but we do not always apprehend that we do so. This, however, is because the recipient not only receivesp. 393 intellections, but also the senses, and this alter-

XXXI. If, however, memory pertains to the phantastic power, but each soul is said to remem¬ ber, there will be two powers of the phantasy. The two souls, therefore, being separate, each will possess a phantastic power.

ns, but also the senses, and this alter-

XXXI. If, however, memory pertains to the phantastic power, but each soul is said to remem¬ ber, there will be two powers of the phantasy. The two souls, therefore, being separate, each will possess a phantastic power. But since they are with us in the same thing, how will they be two, and in which of them will memory be ingenerated ? For if in both, there will always be twofold imagi¬ nations. For it must not be said, that the remem¬ brance of intelligihles pertains to the one, but of sensibles to the other ; since thus there will in every respect be two animals, having nothing in common with each other. If, therefore, there is memory in both what will be the difference ? In the next place, what should hinder us from knowing this ? Shall we say that we are then ignorant of the dif¬ ference, when the one powder is in "symphony with

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the other ; the phantastic powers not being sepa¬ rate, but that which is the more excellent of the two prevailing, one phantasm is produced, since the one follows the other like a shadow, and is subservient to it like a less to a greater light.

p. 394

When, however, there is a contest and dissonance between the two, then the one shines forth through itself ; but it is concealed in the other, because in short that there are two souls is concealed from us» For both coalesce in one, and the one is diffused

^ + "* I but not the other* The one, therefore, sees all things, and possesses some things indeed, proceed¬ ing from it, but dismisses others, as pertaining to the other power. Just as when we have some¬ times conversed with persons of a viler character, and afterwards betake ourselves to those who are more worthy, we remember but little of our con¬ versation with the former, but much of it with the latter.

XXXII. What, however, ought we to say con¬ cerning the remembrance of friends, and children, and wives ; and also of our country, and other things which it is not absurd to recollect ? Shall we say that the image of the soul will remember each of these accompanied with passion, but that the superior soul will recollect these impassively? For passion, perhaps, was from the first in this image. And such of the passions as are of an elegant nature, are in the worthy [i. e. the superior]

p. 395

soul* so far as it communicates with the other. It is fit, however, that the inferior soul should also desire the recollection of the energies of the other soul, and especially when it has likewise become itself elegant and worthy.