Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

hole nevertheless continues to be the whole. If, therefore, a part in the whole soul and other souls is to be thus assumed, the whole soul, of which things of this kind are parts, will not be the soul of a certain thing, but will itself subsist from itself. Neither, therefore, will it be the soul of the world, but will be a certain soul, and will rank among those that are of a partial nature : hence all the parts being of a similar species, are the parts of one soul. But how is one the soul of the world, and another the soul of a part of the world ?

III. Are parts, therefore, so to be assumed, as if some one should say, that the soul which is in the finger of a certain animal, is a part of thep. 326 whole soul which is in the whole animal ? This assertion, however, either leaves no soul indepen¬ dent of body, or admits every soul not to be in body, and contends that what is called the soul of the universe is external to the body of the world. But this must be considered ; and now must be investigated by an image. For if the soul of the universe imparts itself to all partial animals, and thus each soul is a part [of the whole soul] ; for if this soul were divided, it would not impart itself to each ; in this case, in consequence of imparting itself wholly, it will be every where the same, being one and the same at once in many animals. After this manner, however, one soul will no longer rank as a whole, and another as a part, and especially in those things in w^hich the same powder is present. For where the employment of one thing is different from the employment of another, as in the eyes and ears, there it must not be said that one part of the soul is present to the sight, and another to the ears, (for such a division as this belongs to other things) but the same part, though a different power ener¬ gizes in each. For all the powers of the soul are in both the parts ; but the apprehensions are dif¬ ferent in consequence of the organs being different.

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Nevertheless, all the powers rank among forms, and are reduced to a form which is capable of being fashioned according to all things. This is evident from the necessity that all things should arrive at one thing, [and concur in it] ; but the nature of the instruments through which the con¬ currence is effected, is not able to receive all things, and the passions become different in the different instruments of sensation. The judgment, however, is from the same thing, as from a judge directing his attention to what is said and done.

which the con¬ currence is effected, is not able to receive all things, and the passions become different in the different instruments of sensation. The judgment, however, is from the same thing, as from a judge directing his attention to what is said and done. But it has been shown, that it is every where one thing which energizes in different actions. And if the apprehensions are as sensations, it is not possi¬ ble for each of the senses to understand, but the whole soul. But if intelligence is appropriate, each intellectual perception subsists through itself. And when the soul is rational, and is rational in such a way as to be denominated wholly so, then that which is called a part is the same with the whole, and is not a part of it.

IV. What, therefore, shall wre say, if it is thus one, when any one inquires, in the first place doubting, whether soul can after this manner be at t „p. 528 once one in all things ? And in the next place, when one soul is in body, but another not, [how this takes place ?] For perhaps it follows that every soul is always in body, and especially the soul of the universe. For this soul does not, as ours is said to do, leave the body ; though some say that even this soul abandons its body, and yet is not entirely out of the body. But if the soul of the universe is entirely out of the body, how is it that one soul leaves the body, but another does not, though both are [essentially] the same ? In intel¬ lect, therefore, which is separated from itself by difference, according to parts especially distin¬ guished from each other, but which always subsist together at once, the essence of intellect being im¬ partible, no such doubt can arise. But in the soul which is said to be divisible about bodies, how this which is one certain thing can be all souls, is at¬ tended with many doubts ; unless that which is one is established in itself, without falling into body, and afterwards all souls proceed from it, both the soul of the universe, and others to a certain extent ; existing as it were together with it, and being one in consequence of not belonging to any thing else [i. e. of not being consubsistent with something ofp. 329 a nature subordinate to themselves]. They must*

% likewise, be suspended from their boundaries, and conspire with each other in their tendencies to su¬ pernal natures, by the projecting energies of intel¬ lect ; like a light which is now on the earth, and is distributed in different habitations, yet is not divided into parts separated from the w hole, but is nevertheless one.

other in their tendencies to su¬ pernal natures, by the projecting energies of intel¬ lect ; like a light which is now on the earth, and is distributed in different habitations, yet is not divided into parts separated from the w hole, but is nevertheless one. Hence, the soul of the universe is always transcendent, because it does not belong to it to descend, and be converted to these inferior realms. But our souls are subordinate, because a certain part of their essence is limited to this ter¬ rene abode, and to a conversion to body which requires solicitude and care. The soul of the w orld, therefore, in its most inferior part, resembles a great vegetable soul, which without labour and silently governs the plant of which it is the soul, [i. e. in the same manner as worms are generated in wounds], But the government of the inferior part of our soul, resembles the worms that are generated in the putrified part of a plant. For thus the animated body of the universe subsists. Another soul, however, which is similar in species to the superior part of the soul of the w orld, resem¬ bles in its government the husbandman whosep. 330 attention is directed to the worms that are generated from putrefaction in a plant, and who is solicitously employed in the cultivation of the plant. Or as if some one should say that a man who is well, and is with other men that are in health, is with those persons with whom he co-operates either in acting or contemplating ; but that a diseased man, and who is employed in procuring remedies for the body, is with the body, and becomes corporeal through his attention to it.

V. How, therefore, any longer will this be your soul, that the soul of some other person, and that again of another ? Shall we say that it is the soul of this person according to its inferior part, but not of this according to its supreme part, but of some other person ? Thus, however, Socrates will indeed exist, w hen the soul of Socrates is in body ; but he will perish when he is especially in the most ex¬ cellent condition [i. e. when he is in the intelligible world]. But no being perishes, since the intellects which are in the intelligible do not perish, because they are not corporeally distributed into one thing, but each remains possessing in difference a same¬ ness of subsistence, in which its very being consists.