Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
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which is in the intelligible, is more excellent [than of that which is in the sensible world ?] The maker, however, Prometheus, was afterwards bound, because in a certain respect he comes into contact with the thing generated by for he wishes the soul always to abide on high : but .the jnfe» rior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend, Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made9 And what else is this than the irrational soult which is of a feminine characteristic f For as it was necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was impos¬ sible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium ; hence she becomes united with it through the irrational souL But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift» And this signi·» iies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive, take place through the celestial bodies/* 3 a Fieinus, in what is here said of Prometheus, appears to have entirely mistaken the meaning of Plotinus, and also not to have attended to what is asserted in the fable itself. For the translation of Ficinus is : “ Quod a lit, cm Epimetbeus ei donum dederit nullum/* But the Greek is : o Se π γομηθεν$ €ΐ7τοποιονμςνο$ το Βωρον αυτόν & See the Works and Days of Hesiod.
s For the irrational soul is an immaterial bodyr or in other words, vitalized extension , inch as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy or imagination ; and the celestial bodies are of /this·· kind, „p. 358 him. A bond, also* of this kind is external, and the solution of it is by Hercules ; because he possesses a liberating power* Of these things, however, any one may form whatever opinion he pleases* But it is evident that the gifts imparted to the world are indicated by this fable, and that it accords with what has been before said.
XV. Souls, therefore, fall from the intelligible world, in the first place indeed, into the heavens, and there receiving a body, they now proceed through it into more terrene bodies, so far as their progressions are more extended in length. And some of them indeed, proceed from the heavens into inferior bodies, but others pass from certain bodies into others ; these being such as have not a power sufficient to raise themselves from hence, on account of the great weight and oblivion which they have attracted, and which draw them downward by their oppressive influence.
but others pass from certain bodies into others ; these being such as have not a power sufficient to raise themselves from hence, on account of the great weight and oblivion which they have attracted, and which draw them downward by their oppressive influence. But souls become different from each other, either through the diver¬ sity into which they are introduced, or through the difference of their fortunes and educations ; or again, they have a difference from themselves ; or they differ in all these respects, or in some of them.
p. 359
And some of them, indeed, entirely fall under the dominion of the fate which is here ; but others, at one time are subject to fate, and at another are dependent only on themselves* Others again grant that such things as are necessary must indeed be endured, but that such things as are their own works belong to themselves, and that living accord» ing to another legislation which comprehends in itself all beings, they give themselves to another more sacred law* This legislation, however, is a contexture consisting of all the reasons and causes that are here, of psychical motions and the laws derived from thence· It also accords with these, thence receives its principles, and weaves together with them whatever is of a consequent nature· And such things indeed, as are able to save them¬ selves according to their proper habit, it preserves unshaken ; but it conducts other things to that con¬ dition of being to which they are naturally adapted, so as to be the cause in their descent of the different situations of different things.
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XVI. The punishments, therefore, which are inflicted with justice on the wicked, it is proper to refer to the order which leads every thing in a becoming manner. Such things* however, as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life. For these things are woven together, and are pre-signified, so that they are also produced according top. 1 reason. Or shall we say that these are not effected according to physical reasons, nor to he ranked among things which have a precedaneous subsist¬ ence* but among such as are consequent to them ? As if some edifice should fall, the animal upon which it falls would be killed, whatever it might be. Or as if two certain things moving with an orderly motion, or even one thing thus moving, that which happens to fall at the time, should be broken or trampled on.
some edifice should fall, the animal upon which it falls would be killed, whatever it might be. Or as if two certain things moving with an orderly motion, or even one thing thus moving, that which happens to fall at the time, should be broken or trampled on. Or it may be said, that this un¬ just circumstance is not an evil to him who suffers it, and is useful to the connexion of the whole of things. Or that neither is it unjust, things having a just retribution from antecedent transactions. For it is not proper to think that some things are co-ordinated, but that others are to be referred to the impulse of arbitrary will. For if it is necessary that things should be generated according to causes and physical consequences, and according to onep. 361 reason and one order, it is also necessary to think that the smallest things are co-ordinated, and woven together. Hence the unjust conduct of one man towards another, is indeed unjust to the doer, and the agent is not without blame, yet being co-ordi¬ nated in the universe, it is not unjust with reference to it, nor to him who suffers the injury, but it was thus fit that it should take place. But if he who is injured is a worthy man, the end of these things is good to him.® For it is necessary to think, that this co-ordination of things is not without divinity, and is not unjust, but is accurate in the retribution of that which is appropriate ; but that it has im ma¬ nifest causes, and on this account is the occasion of j . ' - - blame to the ignorant.
XVII. That souls, however, first descend from
< Conformably to this, it is divinely said by Plato in the Republic : u Whatever comes from the Gods to the man who is beloved by the Gods, will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage. Hence, if the just man happens to be in poverty, or disease, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things issue t© him in some» thing good either whilst alive or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the Gods, who inclines earnestly to endea¬ vour to become just, and practises virtue, as far as it is pos·» sible for man to^resemble God.”
p. 562
the intelligible into the heavens, may be rationally inferred from the following considerations. If the heaven is in the sensible place that which is most excellent, it will be proximate to the extremities of intelligibles. Hence, the celestial bodies are first animated from thence, and participate of them, as being more adapted to participation.