Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

also, I think that the divine Plato, [in the Timseus] having formed the same conception rightly says, that the tilings which enter into and depart from matter, are imitations of be¬ ings ; the words entering into and departing , not being used by him in vain. For he wished to direct our attention to the mode in which matter partici¬ pates of forms. It also appears that the doubt how this participation is effected, is not what many prior to us conceived it to be, viz. how forms pro¬ ceed into matter, but rather how they subsist in it. For it seems to be truly wonderful, how these forms being present with matter, it nevertheless remains impassive ; especially since the forms which enter into it suffer from each other. According to Plato, however, the entering forms expel those which en¬ tered prior to them, and passion is in the composite from matter and form ; yet not in every composite, but in that which is in want of the acceding or depart¬ ing form ; and which indeed in its composition is defective by the absence of a certain form, but is perfect by the presence of it. But matter does not possess any thing more whatever as an accession to its composition, by the entrance of any thing into it. For it does not then become that which it is through the form that enters, nor is it less by the departure of this form. For it remains that which it was at first. To the natures, indeed, which re¬ quire ornament and order, it is useful to be adorn¬ ed ; and to these ornament may accede without transmutation, as is the case with things which we surround with decoration. If, however, any thing is so adorned as to have the ornament connascent, it will be requisite that what was before void of beauty, should be changed in quality, become dif¬ ferent from what it was, and from being deformed be beautiful. If, therefore, matter being deformed is rendered beautiful, it is no longer that base thing which it was before ; so that in being thus adorned, it loses its subsistence as matter, and especially if its deformity is not accidental. But if it is so de¬ formed as to be deformity itself, it will not partici¬ pate of ornament. And if it is so evil, as to be evil itself, it will not participate of good. Hence it does not participate in such a way as some fancy it does, viz.

accidental. But if it is so de¬ formed as to be deformity itself, it will not partici¬ pate of ornament. And if it is so evil, as to be evil itself, it will not participate of good. Hence it does not participate in such a way as some fancy it does, viz. by being passive, but after another manner, which is that of appearing to participate, Perhaps,p. 153 too, according to this mode the doubt may be solved, how, since matter is evil, it can aspire after good, because it does not through the participation cease to be what it was. For if what is called the participation of matter subsists after this manner so that it remains as we say the same, unchanged in quality, and is always that which it is, it will no longer be wonderful, how being evil it participates of good. For it does not depart from itself. But because it is indeed necessary it should participate, it participates after a certain manner as long as it exists. In consequence, however, of remaining that which it is, and the mode of participation preserv¬ ing it [in its own proper nature] it is not injured in its essence by that which thus imparts something to it. And it appears not to be less evil on this account, viz. because it always remains that which it is. For if it truly participated of, and was truly changed in quality by the good , it would not be naturally evil. So that if some one should say that matter is evil, he will assert what is true, if he says it is impassive to the good , which is the same thing as to say, that it is entirely impassive.

XII, But Plato having formed this conceptionp. 154 of matter, and not admitting that participation in it, is as if form was generated in a subject, and im¬ parted to it morphe, so as to become one compo¬ site, the things which it participates being co-transmuted, and as it were co-mingled, and co-passive, —Plato, therefore, not being willing to adopt such a mode of participation as this, but desiring to show how matter remaining impassive possesses forms, investigated a paradigm of impassive participation, without which it is not easy to show what those things especially are, which when present preserve the subject one and the same. He likewise excites many doubts, while hastening to obtain the object of his enquiry, and besides this, washing to repre¬ sent to us the vacuity of subsistence in sensibles,

# and that the region of the resemblance of reality is very ample.

one and the same. He likewise excites many doubts, while hastening to obtain the object of his enquiry, and besides this, washing to repre¬ sent to us the vacuity of subsistence in sensibles,

# and that the region of the resemblance of reality is very ample. Supposing, therefore, that matter by figures produces passions in animated bodies, while at the same time it has itself none of these passions, he indicates by this the stability of matter ; ena¬ bling us to collect by a syllogistic process that matter neither suffers, nor is changed in quality by these figures. For in these bodies indeed [which are the objects of sense,] and which receive one figure after another, perhaps some one may say ap. 155 change in quality is effected, asserting that the mu¬ tation of figure is an homonymous alliation.1 Since matter, however, has neither any figure, nor any magnitude, how can it be said that the presence of figure, in whatever way this may take place, is alliation, though it should homonymously be said to be so ? If, therefore, some one adopting this conception of Plato as legitimate, should assert that the subject nature [i. e, matter] does not possess any thing in such a way as it is thought to possess it, he will not speak absurdly. In what manner, however, does matter possess forms, if you are not willing to admit that it possesses them as figures? But the hypothesis of Plato indicates as much as possible the impassivity of matter, and the apparent presence of images in it, which are not [in reality] present.

Perhaps, however, we ought first to speak fur¬ ther about the impassivity of matter. Plato, therefore, teaches us that we ought to be led by usual appellations to the consideration of its passi¬ vity, as when he says it becomes dry, or ignited, or moist, and receives the forms of air and water.

* i. c, Λ change in quality.

p. 156

For the assertion that it receives these forms, miti¬ gates the force of the other assertion, that matter is ignited and becomes moist. He likewise manifests when he says that matter receives forms, that it is not itself invested with morphe, but that the morphse are in the same state as when they entered into matter ; and that the term ignited is not properly applied to matter, but rather fire in genera¬ tion, or becoming to be. For it is not the same thing for fire to be in generation, and for a thing to be ignited. For to be ignited is indeed effected in another thing, in which there is also passivity.