Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

s energy should be directed to some¬ thing else, or that something else should proceed from it, assimilated to it : just as fire, which is first in itself, and has the energy of fire, and thus is ena¬ bled to produce the vestigie of itself in something else. For again, intellect indeed, is energy in it¬ self; but soul is so in proportion as it tends as it were internally to its own intellect. But so far as it departs from intellect, so far it tends to that which is external. And partly indeed, it is assi¬ milated to that from whence it came ; but partly, though it becomes dissimilar, yet here also it retains a similitude to it, whether it acts, or produces. For when it acts, at the same time it contemplates ; and when it produces, it produces forms, which are as it were intellections derived from first intelligibles. Hence, all things are vestigies of intelligence and intellect, proceeding conformably to their archetype ; those that are near to it, imitating it in a greater degree; but such things as are last preserving only an obscure image of it.

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p. 422

VIII. What kind of intelligible, however, does

/ intellect see, and what does it perceive itself to be ? With respect to the intelligible indeed, it is not proper to investigate such a thing as colour or figure in bodies : for i n tell igi hies are prior to these. And the reason [or productive principle] in seeds which produces these, is not these. For these seminal principles also, are naturally invisible, and still more so are intelligibles. There is likewise the same nature of them and of the things that possess them, after the same manner as the reason which is in seed, and soul which participates of these. The vegetable soul however does not see the things which it possesses : for neither did it generate these,1 but both itself, and the reasons it contains are an image. But that from whence it came is manifest and true, and primary. Hence, also, it is of itself, and with itself· The vegetable soul however, unless it pertained to, and was in another thing, would not remain what it is. For it belongs to an image, since it is of another thing, to be generated in something different from itself, un¬ less it is suspended from it. Hence, neither does

* T«vra is omitted in the original,·p. 423 it see as not having sufficient light for this purpose» And if it should see, since it is perfected in another thing, it would behold another thing, and not itself.

ss it is suspended from it. Hence, neither does

* T«vra is omitted in the original,·p. 423 it see as not having sufficient light for this purpose» And if it should see, since it is perfected in another thing, it would behold another thing, and not itself. Nothing, however, of this kind takes place with pure intellect ; but vision is there, and that which is visible is consubsistent with it. Such also is the visible, as is the vision ; and the vision as the visi¬ ble. Who is it therefore, that will speak of the visible such as it is ? He who sees it. But intel¬ lect sees it; since in the sensible region also, sight being light, or rather being united to light, sees light ; for it sees colour. There, however, sight does not perceive through another thing, but throughitself, because there is nothing external to it. With another light, therefore, and not through another, it sees another light. Hence, light sees another light; and therefore itself beholds itself. This light however, when it shines forth in the soul illuminates it, i. e. it causes it to be intellectual. And in consequence of this, the soul is in itself, similarly with supernal light. If such, therefore, is the vestige of light ingenerated in the soul, by con¬ ceiving supernal light1 to be of this kind, and to be

8 io e. Intelligible light.

still more beautiful and clear, you will approach nearer to the nature of intellect and the intelligible. For this when it shines forth, imparts to the soul a clearer, but not a generative life. For on the com trary it converts the soul to itself, and does not suffer it to be dissipated, but causes it to love and joyfully receive the splendor which is in it. Nei¬ ther does it impart a sensitive life. For this looks to externals, but does not on this account perceive more acutely. He, however, who receives that light which is the fountain1 2 of truth, beholds as it were more acutely visible objects ; but the contrary is not true/ It remains, therefore, for the soul to assume an intellectual life which is a vestige of the life of intellect. For there realities subsist. But the life and energy which are in intellect, are the first light primarily shining in itself, and a splen¬ dor directed to itself, which at one and the same time illuminates, and is illuminated. This also is that which is truly intelligible, is intellect, and the

1 ΪΙηγην is omitted in the original, but is added from the version of Ficinus.

^ .· . . V 1 . . , ' ·. . '·· · . . - ; · , .

e and the same time illuminates, and is illuminated. This also is that which is truly intelligible, is intellect, and the

1 ΪΙηγην is omitted in the original, but is added from the version of Ficinus.

^ .· . . V 1 . . , ' ·. . '·· · . . - ; · , . '

2 Instead of αλλα τουναντίον, it is necessary to read αλλ’ ου τουναντίον. The meaning of Plotinus is, that intelligible light is not seen more acutely by the perception of visible objects.

p. 425

object of intellect, and is seen by itself. Nor is it in want of another thing in order that it may see, but for the purpose of perceiving is sufficient to itself For that which sees is itself the thing which is seen. This very thing also takes place with us, so that the knowledge of it by us, is effected through it. Or whence should we be able to speak concerning it ? For it is a thing of such a kind as to have a clearer apprehension of itself, and we likewise more clearly perceive ourselves through it. Through arguments, however, of this kind, we should elevate our soul to it, considering also that our soul and its life are an image ; a resemblance, and an imitation of it ; and likewise that when it sees intellectually, It becomes deiform, and has the form of intellect. And if some one should inquire what the nature is of this perfect intellect, whicli is every intellect, and primarily knows itself, such a one should first be¬ come established in intellect, or should yield that energy of his soul to intellect, which is employed about things of which he retains the memory in himself. But it will be possible for the soul thus disposed, to show that it is able through itself as an image to behold after a certain manner that pure intellect, through [a life] more accurately assimip. 426lated io it, as far as a part of the soul is capable of arriving at a similitude to intellect.

If

IX. It is necessary, therefore, as it seems, that the soul in order that it may see the most divine part of soul, ought to consider what that is which intellect may know. Perhaps, however, this may be effected, if you first separate body from the man, viz. from yourself. And if after this, you separate the soul which fashions the body, and as much as possible take away sense, desire and anger, and other trifles of this kind, as very much verging

\ to the mortal nature.