Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ceive a surrounding splendor, proceeding indeed from this cause, but from it in a permanent state, like a light from the sun shining, and as it were running round it, and being generated from it, the cause itself always abiding in the same immoveable condition. All

1 For povXrjdeyTos here, it is requisite to read β ουλευθεντος»

p. 269

beings, likewise, as long as they remain, necessarily produce from their own essence, about themselves, and externally from the power which is present with them, a nature whose hypostasis is suspended from them, and which is as it were an image of the arche¬ type from which it proceeded. Thus fire emits from itself indeed heat, and snow not only retains cold within itself [but imparts it to other things]. This, however, such things as are fragrant espe¬ cially testify. For as long as they exist, something proceeds from them, of which whatever is near them partakes. All such things, likewise, as are now perfect generate ; but that which is always perfect, always generates, and that which it pro¬ duces is perpetual. It also generates something less than itself. What, therefore, is it requisite to say of that which is most perfect ? Shall we say that nothing proceeds from it ; or rather that the greatest things posterior to it are its progeny ? But the greatest thing posterior to it, and the second, is intellect. For intellect sees it, and is in w?ant of it alone. But this most perfect nature is not in want of intellect. It is also necessary that the thing generated from that which is better than intellect, should be intellect. And intellect is superior to all things after the first, because other things are pos¬ terior to it. Thus, for instance, soul is the reason of intellect, and a certain energy of it, just as intel¬ lect is of that first God [who is beyond intellect]. But the reason of soul is indeed obscure. For as it is the image of intellect, on this account it is necessary that it should look to intellect. Afterp. 9 t »

the same manner also, it is necessary that intellect should look to the highest God, in order that it may be intellect. It sees him, however, not sepa-

* rated from him, but because it is after him, and there is nothing between ; as neither is there any thing between soul and intellect. But every thing desires its generator. This also it loves, and espe» dally when that which is generated and the gene¬ rator are alone.

m him, but because it is after him, and there is nothing between ; as neither is there any thing between soul and intellect. But every thing desires its generator. This also it loves, and espe» dally when that which is generated and the gene¬ rator are alone. When, however, that which — .*··'·· * generates is the most excellent of things, the thing begotten is necessarily present with it in such a manner, as to be separated by otherness 1 alone.

1 In the original ετεροτητι, which is derived from erepos another . And this word is properly used when we speak of two things only. Hence, ετεροτης must not be considered in this place as merely signifying difference ; for universally one thing is separated from another by difference, but as denoting the greatest proximity and alliance.

p. 271

VII. But we say that intellect is the image of this most excellent nature. For it is necessary to speak more clearly. In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that intellect should in a certain respect be generated, and preserve [in itself] much of its generator ; and also that it should have such a similitude to it, as light has to the sun. Its gene» rator, however, is not intellect. How therefore did he generate intellect, [so far as it is intellect ?] May we not say, because intellect, by conversion, looks to him ? But the vision itself is intellect* For that which apprehends another thing, is either sense or intellect. And sense indeed may be com» pared to a line, but the other gnostic powers of the soul to a circle. A circle, however, of this kind is as it were partible. But this is not the case with intellect. Or may we not say that this also is one? But the one here is the power of all things. Hence intelligence surveys those things of which it is the power, divided as it were from the power ; for otherwise it would not be intellect. For intellect now possesses from itself a co-sensation as it were of the great extent of its power ; in which power, its essence, consists. Intellect, therefore, through itself defines its own being, by a power derivedp. 272 from him [i. e. from the first God,] and perceives that essence is as it were one of the parts of and from him, and that it is corroborated by him, and perfected by and from him into essence. It sees, however, itself derived from thence, as something which is as it were partible from that which is im¬ partible ; and not only itself, but life, and intellec¬ tion, and all things, because the first God is no¬ thing of all things.

m him into essence. It sees, however, itself derived from thence, as something which is as it were partible from that which is im¬ partible ; and not only itself, but life, and intellec¬ tion, and all things, because the first God is no¬ thing of all things. For on this account all things are from him, because he is not detained by a cer¬ tain form. For he is one alone. And intellect, indeed, in the order of beings is all things. But he on this account is none of the things which are in intellect ; and all things which have a subsist¬ ence among beings are derived from him. Hence also these are essences* For they are now definite, and each possesses as it were a form. Being, however, ought not to be surveyed in that which is as it were indefinite, but as fixed by bound and per¬ manency. But permanency in intelligibles is cir¬ cumscription and form, in which also they receive their hypostasis. This intellect, therefore, which deserves the appellation of the most pure intellect, and which is of the genus of intelligibles, originates from no other source than the first principle. Andp. 273 being now generated, it generates together with it¬ self beings, all the beauty of ideas, and all the intelligible Gods. Being, likewise, full of the things which it generates, and as it were absorbing its progeny, it again contains them in itself, and does not suffer them to fall into matter, nor to be nou¬ rished by Rhea, as the mysteries and the fables about the Gods obscurely indicate. For they say that Saturn the most wise God was born prior to Jupiter, and that he again contains the things which he generates, in himself, so far as he is full, and an intellect characterized by purity. But after this they say that he generated Jupiter, who was now a boy [i. e. pure and full]. For intellect, being a perfect intellect, generates soul. For being per¬ fect it is requisite that it should generate, and since it is so great a power that it should not be unprolific. Neither here, however, is it possible that the thing generated should be more excellent than the generator ; but being inferior, it is necessary that it should be an image of it. In a similar manner it is requisite that it should be indefinite, but bounded, and as it were invested with form by its generator. But the progeny of intellect is a certain reason, and an hypostasis which energizes Plot . Sp. 274 dianoetically. This, however, is that which is moved about intellect, is the light of intellect,1 and a vestigie suspended from it.