Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

by one and the samep. 233 power. This will also be the case, if many things enter through many organs of sense, or there are many qualities about one thing, and likewise when there is a variegated appearance such as that of the face, through one thing. For one thing does not perceive the nose, and another the eves, but the same thing perceives at once all the parts of the face. And though one thing proceeds through the eyes, but another through the ears, yet it is necessary there should be one thing at which both these arrive. Or how could the soul sav that these

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* are different, unless the perceptions of sense at once terminated in the same thing ? It is necessary, therefore, that this should be as it were a centre, that the senses should on all sides be extended to this, like lines from the circumference of a circle, and that a thing of this kind which apprehends the perceptions of sense should be truly one. For if it were any thing divisible, and the informations of the senses arrived at this as at the two extremities of a line, they must either again concur in one and the same thing as a middle, or there would be ano¬ ther thing there and another, and each would have a sensible perception of each ; just as if I should perceive one thing, but you another, even thoughp. 234 the object of sense should be one thing, such as the Face ; or they must be collected into one. And this indeed appears to be the case. For visible forms are collected in the pupils of the eyes ; or how through these could the greatest things be seen ? Hence5 in a still greater degree the forms which arrive at the ruling part of the soul, become as it were conceptions ; and therefore this part also must be impartible. For if it had magnitude, it would be co-divided with the object of sensible perception. Hence, one part of it would perceive a part of the sensible object, and nothing in us would have the apprehension of the whole of a sen¬ sible thing. But the whole is one thing. For how can it be divided ? For in the division, equal can¬ not be adapted to equal, because the ruling part is not equal to every sensible thing. Into how many parts, therefore, must the division of it be made ? Must it be divided into as many parts, as the sen¬ sible perception which is introduced to it, is divided into ? And will each of the parts of the soul, there¬ fore, perceive the parts of the sensible object ? Or shall we say that the parts of the soul will not have a sensation of the parts of the thing perceived ? This however is impossible.

it, is divided into ? And will each of the parts of the soul, there¬ fore, perceive the parts of the sensible object ? Or shall we say that the parts of the soul will not have a sensation of the parts of the thing perceived ? This however is impossible. But if any part whatp. 235ever perceives the whole of the sensible object, since magnitude is adapted to be divided infinitely, it will happen that infinite sensible perceptions will be produced about each part ; so that, for instance, there will be infinite images of the same thing in

ο O r our ruling part. Moreover, if that which perceives is body, it will not be able to perceive in any other way, than as if certain images were impressed from wax in a seal ; whether the sensible forms are im¬ pressed in blood, or in air. And if, indeed, they e are impressed as in moist bodies, which it is reason¬ able to suppose they will be, if as in water, they \vill be confounded, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions remain, either it will not be possible for others to be impressed while they re¬ main, so that there will be no other sensible per¬ ceptions, or if others are produced, the former w ill be destroyed, so that there will not be a remem¬ brance of any thing. But if it is possible to remember, and to have a sensible perception of other things after others, the former not impeding the latter, it is impossible for the soul to be body,

VII. The same thing also may be seer» from pain and the sensation of pain ; when a man is saidp. 236 to have a pain in his finger or about his finger. For then it is manifest that the sensation of pain is pro¬ duced about the principal or ruling part ; a portion of the spirit being pained, but the ruling part having a perception of the pain, and the whole soul in con¬ sequence of this suffering the same thing. How, therefore, does this happen ? They will say by suc¬ cession, the psychical spirit about the finger suffer¬ ing in the first place, but imparting the passion to that which is next to it, and afterwards to some¬ thing else, until the passion arrives at the ruling part. Hence, it is necessary if that which is pri¬ marily pained perceives, that there should be ano¬ ther sensation of that which is second, if sensation is produced according to succession.

fterwards to some¬ thing else, until the passion arrives at the ruling part. Hence, it is necessary if that which is pri¬ marily pained perceives, that there should be ano¬ ther sensation of that which is second, if sensation is produced according to succession. And likewise, that there should be another sensation of that which is the third in order ; that there should be many and infinite sensible perceptions of one and the same pain ; and that afterwards all these should be perceived by the ruling part, and besides these, that it should have a perception of its own passion. In reality, however, each of these does not perceive the pain that is in the finger ; but one sensation perceives that the part of the palm of the hand which is next to the finger is pained, and anotherp. 237 more remote sensation perceives the pain which is in a more remote part. There will also be many pains, the ruling part not perceiving the passion which is in the finger, but that which is present with itself. And this it will alone know, but will bid farewell to the others, not perceiving that the finger is pained. If, therefore, it is not possible that sensible perception of a thing of this kind should subsist according to succession, and it does not belong to body, since it is a bulk, that one part of it suffering, another part should recognize the suffering ; for in every magnitude this is one thing, and that another ; — if this be the case, it is neces¬ sary that the power which perceives should be a thing of such a kind, as to be every where itself the same with itself. But this pertains to any thing else rather than to body.

VIII. Moreover, that neither will it be possi¬ ble to perceive intellectually if the soul is body, may be demonstrated as follows. For if to per¬ ceive sensibly is, for the soul using the body to apprehend sensibles, intellectual perception will not be an apprehension of the objects of such per¬ ception, through body. For unless this is admitted,p. 238 intellectual will be the same with sensible percept tion. Hence, if to perceive intellectually is to apprehend without body, by a much greater priority it is necessary that the nature which thus perceives should not be body. Farther still, if sense indeed is the perception of sensibles, intellection is the perception of intelligibles. If, however, they are not willing to admit this, yet there will be in us intellections of certain intelligibles, and apprehen¬ sions of things without magnitude.