Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

motions and permanencies both universal and particular, are among the number of things which are in the intelligible world. Instead of time, however, eter¬ nity is there. But place is there intellectually, being the [impartible] subsistence of one thing in another. Hence, since all things there exist simul¬ taneously, whichever of them you assume is essence, is intellectual, and participates of life. Sameness, also, and difference, motion and permanency, that which is moved, and that which is stable, essence and quality, are there, and all things there arep. 302 essence. For each thing is being in energy, and not in capacity ; so that quality is not separated from each essence. Are, therefore, those things alone these which the sensible world contains, or are there likewise many other things ? Prior to the discussion of this, however, the things pertaining to art must be considered. For there is no paradigm of evil there. For evil here happens from indi¬ gence, privation, and defect. And evil is the pas¬ sion of matter frustrated of form, and of that which is assimilated to matter.

XI. With respect, therefore, to things per¬ taining to the arts, and the arts themselves, the arts that are imitative, such as painting, statuary, danc¬ ing and pantomime, since they derive their subsis¬ tence from sensibles, and employ and imitate a sensible paradigm, and also transfer [to their ori¬ ginals] the forms, motions and symmetries which they perceive, cannot properly be referred to intelligibles, except so far as the forms in the human soul may be called intelligible. If any one, how¬ ever, considers the habit in all animals arising from the symmetry of their formation, this will be a part of the power which in the intelligible world surveysp. 303 and contemplates the symmetry of all things that are there. Moreover, with respect to all music which is conversant with harmony and rythm, so far as its conceptions are employed about rythm and harmony, it will subsist after the same manner as the music which is conversant with intelligible rythm. With respect to such arts as are produc¬ tive of sensible things conformably to art, as the builder's and the carpenters art,— these, so far as they employ symmetry, will derive their principles from intelligibles, and from the wisdom which is there. But as they mingle these with a sensible nature, the whole of them wull not be in intelligi¬ bles, except so far as they subsist in man, [i. e. in the human soul].

symmetry, will derive their principles from intelligibles, and from the wisdom which is there. But as they mingle these with a sensible nature, the whole of them wull not be in intelligi¬ bles, except so far as they subsist in man, [i. e. in the human soul]. Neither will the agriculture be there which is conversant with a sensible plant ; nor the medicine which surveys the health of the body, or which contributes to strength and a good jcorporeal habit. For there is another power, and another health there, through which all animals are sufficiently corroborated. With respect to rhetoric also, and the military art, economics, and the art pertaining to regal government, if some of these partake in actions of the beautiful, and make it the object of their contemplation, —in this case,p. 304 they have a scientific allotment from the science which is there. But geometry, which is conversant with intelligibles, must be arranged in the intelli¬ gible world ; as likewise must the highest wisdom wdfich is conversant with real being. And thus much concerning the arts, and things pertaining to the arts.

XII, If, however, the idea of man is there, the ideas of the rational and the artificial are also there, and likewise the arts which are the progeny of in¬ tellect. It is also requisite to assert, that the forms of universals are there, i. e. not of Socrates, but of man ; though it must be considered with respect to man, whether the form of a particular man is there, not because he is the same with ano¬ ther man, but because one man has a flat, and another an aquiline nose. These nasal differences, howrever, must be placed in the form of man, [as certain differences of forms] just as there are diffe¬ rences of animals. But that one man has an aqui¬ line nose of this, and another of that kind, originates from matter. With respect to the differences of coLours, also, some of them exist in their produc¬ tive principles, but others are produced by matter and difference of place.

p. 305

XIII. It remains to consider whether what the sensible world alone contains is in the intelligi¬ ble world, or whether as man himself is different from the sensible man, so with respect to soul, soul itself is different from the soul which is here, and intellect itself from the human intellect In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that it is not proper to think that all things which are here, are images of archetypes ; or that the human soul is the image of soul itself, but that here also one soul differs from another in dignity.

llect In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that it is not proper to think that all things which are here, are images of archetypes ; or that the human soul is the image of soul itself, but that here also one soul differs from another in dignity. Perhaps., however, soul, so far as it is here, is not soul itself. But since each [rational] soul has a real subsistence, as likewise have justice and temperance, there is also in our souls true science, and not images only, nor merely the similitudes of intelligibles, as in the sensible region. For true science, justice, and temperance themselves exist here, though after another manner than in the intelligible world. For they are not defined in a certain place. So that where the soul emerges from the body, there also these subsist. For the sensible world, indeed, is in one place only ; but the intelligible world is every where. Such things, therefore, as a soul of this kind possesses here, these things also are there. Plot . U

p. 306

So that if the things which are in the sensible world, are assumed to be those which are in the number of visible objects, not only the natures which are in the regions of sense are there, but also more than these. But if among the natures which are said to be in the world, soul, and what soul contains are comprehended, then all such things are here as subsist there.

XIV. Is this nature, therefore, which compre* hends all things in the intelligible, to be considered as the first principle of things? But how is this possible, since that which is truly the principle is one , and entirely simple, but multitude subsists in beings? After what manner, however, this all-comprehending nature subsists besides the one , how multitude exists, and how all these subsist, and why and whence intellect is all these, must be shown by beginning the discussion from another principle. With respect, however, to things gene¬ rated from putrefaction, and to things artificial,1p. 307 whether there are forms of these, and also of mud and clay in the intelligible world, it must be said, that such things as intellect derives from the first principle, are all of them most excellent. But the above-mentioned particulars are not among the number of these, nor does intellect consist of the forms of such particulars.

* Instead of χαλεπών here, it is evidently necessary from what afterwards follows to read τεχνικών or τεχνών. Ficinus, from not seeing the necessity of this emendation, has made nonsense of the passage. For he translates ircpc be των ck ση-