Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

quisite, therefore, admitting the subsistence of these, that we should investigate what that is which is changed. For by asserting that these things take place about the soul, we are in danger of falling into the same absurdity as if we should admit that Plot . Ip. 130 the soul is red, or becomes pale, not considering that these passions are produced indeed on account of the soul, but subsist about another composition [than that of the soul.] And shame, indeed, in the Soul, arises from an opinion of baseness ; the body, (that we may not err in our conceptions) being as it were contained in the soul, and not being the same with that which is inanimate. The animated body, therefore, when it is moved with facility, un¬ dergoes a change in the blood, from the shame which subsists in the soul. And with respect to what is called fear, the principle of it, indeed, is in the soul; but the paleness produced by it, arises from the blood retreating in vrardly. In pleasure, also, the sensible diffusion of it subsists about the body ; but that which takes place about the soul is no longer passion. The like also must be asserted with respect to pain. For the principle of desire latently subsisting in the soul, that wdiich proceeds from thence is recognized by sense. For w hen we say that the soul is moved in desires, in reasonings, and in opinions, we do not say that it produces these in consequence of being agitated, but that motions are generated from it ; since also, when we assert that life is motion, we do not conceivep. 131 that it is a change of quality. But the natural energy of each part of the soul, is life not departing from itself. In short, it will be sufficient if we do not admit that energies, lives, and appetites, are mutations in quality ; that recollections are not types impressed in the soul ; and that imaginations are not configurations described as it were in wax. For every where, in all passions and motions, the soul must be acknowledged to subsist with invaria¬ ble sameness in its subject and essence ; and that virtue and vice are not produced in it after the same manner as black and white, or heat and cold about the body. But it must be admitted that The soul subsists with reference to both these, and in short, about all contraries, according to the above mentioned mode.

IV.

vice are not produced in it after the same manner as black and white, or heat and cold about the body. But it must be admitted that The soul subsists with reference to both these, and in short, about all contraries, according to the above mentioned mode.

IV. Let us, however, direct our attention to what is called the passive part of the soul ; though we have already after a manner spoken concerning this, when we discussed all the passions which are produced about the irascible and epithymetic part, and showed how each of them subsists. Never¬ theless, it is requisite to discuss it more amply ; in the first place assuming what that which is passive in the soul is said to be. It is said, therefore, to be that about which the passions appear to subsist. But these are things to which pleasure and pain are consequent. Of the passions, however, some ori¬ ginate from opinions, as when some one being of opinion that he shall die, is terrified, or fancying that he shall obtain some good is delighted ; the opinion indeed, being in one thing, but the exciting passion in another. But other passions are such as, existing involuntarily, produce opinion in that which is naturally adapted to opine. And we have already observed that opinion permits the nature which opines to remain immoveable. Un¬ expected fear, however, when it accedes, will be found to originate from opinion, affording as it were a certain perception to the part of the soul which is said to be afraid. For what does this being afraid effect ? Perturbation it is said, and astonish¬ ment from the expectation of evil. It is evident, however, that the phantasy is in the soul, both the first 1 which we call opinion, and the second which

1 The phantasy or imagination is the highest of the gnostic irrational powers of the soul. But this in its summit is united to opinion , or that gnostic rational power which knows that a thing is, but docs not know xvhy it is ; and in its other extrep. 133is derived from the first, and is no longer opinion {truly so called,] but is conversant with that which is beneath, being as it were obscure opinion, and an unadvised and rash imagination, such as the energy which is said to be inherent in nature, according to which it produces every thing without phantasy. But a sensible perturbation from these is produced about the body ; viz. a trembling and concussion, paleness, and an inability of speaking. For these effects are not in the psychical part ; since if they were, we should not say that they are corporeal.

hantasy. But a sensible perturbation from these is produced about the body ; viz. a trembling and concussion, paleness, and an inability of speaking. For these effects are not in the psychical part ; since if they were, we should not say that they are corporeal. For if they pertained to the soul, that power of it whose province it is to transmit these, w^ould no longer perform its office, in consequence of being detained by passions, and departing from itself. This passive part, therefore, of the soul, is not in¬ deed body, but a certain form. Nevertheless, it is in matter, as are also the epithymetic, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers, the three latter of which are the root and principle of the epithymetic and passive form. It is requisite, howmity it is conjoined with sense. So far, therefore, as it is united to opinion, it may be said to be the same with it. See my Introduction to, and translation of Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.

p. 134

ever, that no perturbation, or in short passion v' ·'· t .< '«· ’ V *■ should be present with any form ; but it is neces-

*·* * ·* ‘ . ■ sary that form should remain permanent, and that the matter of it should be conversant with passion, when passion is produced through the presence of the exciting power of form. For the vegetable power does not itself vegetate when it causes other things to vegetate; nor is increased when it in¬ creases other things ; nor in short when it moves, is moved according to the motion with which it moves, but is either not moved at all, or has ano¬ ther mode of motion or energy. Hence it is neces¬ sary that the nature itself of form should be energy ; and should produce by being present, just as if harmony should of itself move the chords [of a musical instrument] The passive part of the soul, therefore, will be indeed the cause of passion, whether the motion is produced by it from the sen¬ sitive phantasy, or also without the phantasy. This, likewise, must be considered, whether opinion originating supernally, that which is passive in the soul subsists alone in the form of the harmony ; but the motive causes are analogous to the musi¬ cian ; and the things which are struck through pas¬ sion have the relation of chords. For in a musical instrument also, harmony does not suffer, but the chord. And the chord is not moved, though the musician wishes that it should be, unless harmony commands it to be moved.

V.