Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

hing have a subsistence ? Nothing except beings ; 1 just as neither would an image have any existence, unless there was a mirror, or something of this kind. For that which is naturally adapted to subsist in another thing, cannot exist when that thing is not. For this is the nature of an image to be in something different from itself. For if any

1 Th£ words ovtev π\ην τα οντα are omitted in the original ; hut from the version of Ficinus evidently ought to be inserted.

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thing departs from the producing causes of its exist¬ ence, it may indeed subsist without being in another thing. But since [true] beings remain, if there is a representation of them in something else, it is necessary there should be another thing imparting a seat to that which does not truly accede.1 And this by its presence and audacity, and as it may be said, mendicity and poverty, is as it were compelled to receive. It is however deceived, by not receiv¬ ing [truly,] in order that its poverty may also remain, and that it may always be a mendicant. For according to the fable, after it once had a sub¬ sistence, it began to beg ; the fable indicating by this the nature of it, which consists in being desti¬ tute of good. It does not, however, beg to receive those things which the giver has to bestowq but is satisfied with whatever it may receive ; so that this also indicates that what is apparent in it is different [from reality.] Its name, likewise, [which is Penia or Poverty] signifies that it is not filled. And the assertion that it w^as connected with Plenty,4 does z For πορρω here, it is necessary to read πορρ; See the speech of Diotima in the Banquet of Plato.

1 Instead of τταρε'χει τψ ουκ eXOovrt in this place, it is neces¬ sary to read, παρεγων τ<ρ όντως ovic εΧθοντι.

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not signify that this connection was with [real] be¬ ing, nor with satiety, but with a certain artificial thing, i. e. with the wisdom of a phantasm. For since it was not possible for that to be entirely with·* out the participation of being, which is in any re¬ spect external to it ; for it is the nature of being to produce beings ; but that which is entirely non-being is unmingled will being this being the case, an admirable thing is effected, which participates, and yet in a certain respect does not participate of being, and which also in a certain respect possesses something from proximity to being ; though by its own nature it is incapable of being as it were con» glutinated with it.

is effected, which participates, and yet in a certain respect does not participate of being, and which also in a certain respect possesses something from proximity to being ; though by its own nature it is incapable of being as it were con» glutinated with it. Hence it becomes defluous, as gliding away from a foreign nature which it has re¬ ceived, like echo from smooth and equable places, because it does not abide there, though it appears to be there, and to proceed from thence. If, how¬ ever, matter so participated and received, as some one may think it does, that which proceeds into would be absorbed by it. But now it appears, that it is not absorbed, since matter remains the same, having received nothing, but impeding progression like some repercussive seat. It is also the recep¬ tacle of forms acceding to, and mingled in it ; just

16*4 as those who are desirous of enkindling a light from the sun, place some smooth substance opposite to it, which they also fill with water, in order that the flame being impeded by that which is inward, and of a contrary nature, may not pass through, but may stop externally. Matter, therefore, thus be¬ comes the cause of generation, and the. forms which consist in it, are constituted after this manner.

XV. In things, therefore, which collect fire from the sun about themselves, as they receive flame from a sensible fire, they become themselves objects of sense. Hence also they are apparent, because the objects are external, successive and proximate, touch each other, and have two extremities. But the productive principle in matter, has the external after a different manner. For difference of nature is sufficient, not being indigent of a twofold boun¬ dary ; but being much more alienated than every boundary by a diversity T of essence which is desti¬ tute of all alliance, it possesses a power repugnant to mixture. And this is the cause of its remaining in itself, because neither that which enters into it enjoys it, nor does it enjoy that which enters ; just

1 For ερωτητι here, it is necessary to read ετεροτητι.

p. 165

as opinions and imaginations in the soul are not mingled with each other, but each again departs, as being alone that which it is, neither attracting, nor leaving any thing, because it was not mingled, and having the external, not because it is super¬ jacent, and is visibly different from that in which it is, but because reason distinguishes the one from the other.

alone that which it is, neither attracting, nor leaving any thing, because it was not mingled, and having the external, not because it is super¬ jacent, and is visibly different from that in which it is, but because reason distinguishes the one from the other. Here, therefore, imagination is as it were an image, (the soul not being an image natu¬ rally,) though it appears to be the leader of many things, and to lead them where it pleases. The soul, nevertheless, uses the imagination as matter, or as that which is analogous to matter. The ima¬ gination, however, does not conceal the soul, since the soul by its energies frequently expels the phan¬ tasy ; nor would it ever be able to conceal it, though it should be wholly diffused through it, though this by the imagination appears to be some¬ times effected. For the soul contains in herself energies and reasons contrary to those of the phan¬ tasy by which the acceding [phantasms] are re¬ pelled. Matter, however, is much more imbecile than the soul, and contains nothing of beings whe¬ ther true or false, w;hich is properly its own. Neither has it any thing through which it may bep. 166come apparent, being a solitude of all things. It is, however, the cause to other things of their appa¬ rent subsistence ; but is not able to say even this of itself, I am here, [though I am by no means visible.] And if at any time a certain profound reason discovers where it is concealed among be¬ ings, it exclaims that it is something deserted by all beings, and by things which appear to be posterior to beings, that it it is likewise attracted to all things, and as it seems follows, and again does not follow them.

XVI. Moreover, a certain reason acceding and extending matter as far as it proceeds into it, causes it to be great, investing it from itself with greatness, w hich is not in matter. But matter does not through this become quantity ; for if it did, that which is great in it would be magnitude. If, therefore, some one takes away this form, the sub¬ ject no longer is, nor w ill appear to be great. But if that which is generated was great, man and horse, and together with horse the magnitude of horse which accedes, would depart on the departure of horse. If, however, it should be said, that horse is generated in a certain great bulk and of a certainp. 167 extent, and that the magnitude remains, we reply that it is not the magnitude of the horse, but the magnitude of the bulk which there remains.