Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

een well said by them, respecting the immortality of the soul, the intelligible world, and the first God ; as also, that it is necessary the soul should fly from an association with the body, and that a separa¬ tion from the body is a flight from generation top. 81 real essence. For if they were clearly to assert these things, which are admitted by Plato, they would do well. No one , however , will envy their wishing to dissent from these dogmas ; nor their endeavours to establish their own opinions among their auditors , by d faming and insolently attack¬ ing the doctrines of the Greeks., But they ought to demonstrate that their own peculiar opinions, which are different from those of the Greeks, are right ; and should benevolently and philosophically adduce the opinions of the ancients. Justly, also, looking to truth when they oppose the ancients, they ought not to aim at renown by censuring those who from a remote period have been celebrated by no contemptible men, nor assert that they are bet¬ ter than them. For what the ancients have said concerning intelligibles, is much better, and more replete with learning than what they say ; and is easily known to be so by those who are not deceived by the fraud which at present invades mankind . Indeed, the additions which the Gnostics have made to what they received from the ancients, will be found to be by no means appropriate ; and hence in their oppositions to them, they introduce manifold generations and corruptions. They like- Plot. Fp. 82 wise find fault with this universe, reprobate the communion of the soul with body, and blame the governor of the world. They also confound the demiurgus with soul, and ascribe the same passions to the soul of the world as to partial souls.

That this world, therefore, never began, nor will ever cease to be, but will continue in exist¬ ence, as long as intelligibles have a subsistence, has been elsewhere shown by us. And that the com¬ munion of our soul with the body, is not better for the soul, has been asserted prior to them. But that the soul of the universe should receive any thing from ours, is just as if some one adducing the tribe of potters or braziers, in a well-governed city, should blame the whole city [on their account.] It is necessary, however, to be persuaded that the soul of the universe governs in a way very different from ours ; and not bound to body as our souls are.

tribe of potters or braziers, in a well-governed city, should blame the whole city [on their account.] It is necessary, however, to be persuaded that the soul of the universe governs in a way very different from ours ; and not bound to body as our souls are. For besides ten thousand other differences which we have elsewhere enumerated, this also ought to be considered, that we are bound by the body, the bond being now in reality produced. For the na¬ ture of body being bound in the whole soul, binds together with itself whatever it may comprehend ;

p. 83

but the soul of the universe is not bound by the things which it binds. For it has dominion over them. Hence it is not passively affected by them. We, however, are not the lords of these. But so much of the soul of the world as is raised to the divine nature which is above it, so much of it re¬ mains entire and simple, and without impediment ; and so much of it as imparts life to the body whth which it is connected, receives nothing from it. For, in short, that which is in something different from itself, necessarily receives the passive proper» ties of that in which it is. But this no longer im¬ parts any thing of itself to that which possesses its own proper life. Just as if one thing should be centrically inserted in another, and which is co¬ passive with that in which it is inserted ; but the latter being decayed, should permit the former to have its own life ; since, neither when the fire which is in you is extinct, is the wholeness of fire extinguished. Nor if the whole of fire should perish, this would not affect the soul of the universe, but the composition of the mundane body. And if in each of the remaining elements there should be a certain world, this would not affect the soul of the universe, since the composition of the world isp. 84 different from that of each of the animals which it contains* For the soul of the world stands as it were over its body* and orders it to abide ; but here the elements secretly as it were withdrawing themselves, are bound in their proper order by a secondary bond. In the former case, however, they have no place into which they can fly. Hence, it is neither necessary to contain them internally, nor by external compression to impel them inwardly ; but each remains where nature from the first in¬ tended it should remain. And if any one of them is naturally moved, those things to which motion is not natural are affected by it.

o contain them internally, nor by external compression to impel them inwardly ; but each remains where nature from the first in¬ tended it should remain. And if any one of them is naturally moved, those things to which motion is not natural are affected by it. The bodies, however? which are naturally moved, are moved in a beautiful manner, as being parts of the w hole ; but certain things are corrupted, in consequence of not being able to sustain the order of the whole. Just as if in a great dance, which is conducted in a be¬ coming manner, a tortoise being caught in the middle of the progression, should he trod upon, not being able to escape the order of the dance ; though if the tortoise had arranged itself with the dance, it would not have suffered from those that composed it.

p. 35

To enquire, however, why the world was made, is the same thing as to ask why soul is ; and why the demiurgus made it ? For this indeed, in the first place, is the enquiry of those who suppose there is a beginning of perpetuity. In the next place, they fancy that the demiurgus became the cause of the fabrication of the world, through being changed from one thing to another. Hence, they are to be taught, if they are equitably disposed, what the nature of these things is, that they may cease to revile what is honourable, which they will easily do, if they become properly cautious respect¬ ing such like particulars. For no one can rightly blame the administration of the universe, since in the first place it demonstrates the magnitude of an intelligible nature. For if it proceeds into life in such a way, as not to have an indistinct and con¬ fused life, such as the smallest natures in it possess, which are perpetually generated night and day through the abundant life it contains ; but is con¬ tinued, clear and abundant, and is every where a liie exhibiting an inestimable wisdom., how is it possible not to assert that it is a perspicuous and beautiful statue of the intelligible Gods ? But if though it imitates the intelligible paradigm it is not the same with it, this is conformable to nature ; since if it were the same with, it would no longer imitate it. The assertion, however, is false, that it imitates this paradigm in a dissimilar manner. For nothing is omitted, which a beautiful and natural image can possibly possess ; since it was indeed necessary that this imitation should exist, but yet that it should not be an imitation resulting- from the discursive energy of reason, and an artificial care.