Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

and full, and every where without interval, is the eternity which we investi-

7 *j gate.

IV. Nor must we think that this [eternity] happens externally to that nature, [viz. to being itself,] but that it is in it, and from it, and subsists together with it. For it is seen to be profoundly inherent in it. For perceiving all such other things as we say are there, to be inherent, we assert that all of them are from, and subsist together withp. 184 essence. For it is necessary that things which have a primary subsistence, should exist together with first essences, and should be contained in them ; since the beautiful also is in and from them, and truth also is inherent in them. And in a cer¬ tain degree, indeed, the whole itself is as it were in a part, and the things which are there are as parts in a whole, as if in reality this were an all not col¬ lected from parts, but itself generating parts, in order that through this it may be truly all. The truth also which is there, is not a concord with something else that is intelligible, but of each thing itself of which it is the truth. It is necessary, therefore, that the whole of this which is true, if it is truly all, should not only be every thing so far as it is all things, but likewise that the all should sub¬ sist in such a way, as not to be in any thing defi¬ cient. But if this be the case, nothing will accede to it. For if something will be added to it, it was prior to the accession of this deficient. Hence, prior to this it was not every thing. But what can happen to it preternaturally ? For it suffers nothing. If, therefore, nothing can accede to it, it neither is about to be, nor will be, nor was. If, indeed, you take away from generated natures, the it will be ,p. 185 since they subsist in perpetual acquisition, non-existence is immediately present with them. But to things which are not such as these, if you add the it will he , a departure from the seat of exist¬ ence is the consequence of such an addition. For it is evident that existence is not connascent with them, if they are in any respect indebted to futurity for their subsistence. For in generated natures, indeed, essence is seen to be an extension from the beginning of generation, to the extremity of the time in which they no longer exist. This it is, therefore, for them to be ; and if any one should deprive them of this extension of being, their life would be diminished. So that it is necessary that the existence of the universe also, should be an ex¬ tension of this kind.

no longer exist. This it is, therefore, for them to be ; and if any one should deprive them of this extension of being, their life would be diminished. So that it is necessary that the existence of the universe also, should be an ex¬ tension of this kind. Hence, it hastens to be in futurity, and is not willing to stop, since it attracts existence to itself, in performing another and ano¬ ther thing, and is moved in a circle through a cer¬ tain desire of essence. So that we have found what existence is in such natures as these, and also what the cause is of a motion which thus hastens to be perpetually in the future periods of time. In first and blessed natures, however, there is not any desire of the future ; for they are now the whole,p. 186 and whatever of life they ought to possess, they wholly possess, so that they do not seek after any thing, because there is not any thing which can be added to them in futurity. Hence, neither does that happen to them in which there is the future. The all-perfect and total essence therefore of being, is not only total in its parts, but is not in any thing deficient, and is that to which nothing pertaining to non-being can happen ; for it is not only necessary that all beings should be present with the all , and the whole , but likewise that nothing should be added to it of that which sometimes is not. Hence this disposition and nature of the all -perfect essence of being, will be eternity. For eternity is denomi¬ nated from that which always is.

V. He, however, will know that eternity T thus

* subsists, who by the projecting * energies of intel¬ lect is able to speak concerning it : or rather, he who sees it to be a thing of such a kind, that s Instead of nvt here, it appears to me to be necessary to read τω αιωνι.

* The visive energies of intellect are thus denominated, be¬ cause such an energy is an immediate darting forth as it were to the object of its intuition.

p. 187

nothing in short has ever been generated about it ; for otherwise it would not be perpetual being, or would not always be a certain total being. Is it therefore now perpetual ? It is not, unless a nature of such a kind is inherent in it, as to procure credi¬ bility concerning it, that it thus subsists, and no longer in any other way. So that if again you survey it by the projecting energies of intellect, you will find that it is such a thing as this.

ture of such a kind is inherent in it, as to procure credi¬ bility concerning it, that it thus subsists, and no longer in any other way. So that if again you survey it by the projecting energies of intellect, you will find that it is such a thing as this. What then, if some one should never depart from the contemplation of it, but should incessantly perse¬ vere in admiring its nature, and should be able to do this through the possession of an unwearied

* nature, such a one perhaps running to eternity, would there stop, and never decline from it, in order that he might become similar to it, and eter¬ nal, surveying eternity and the eternal by that which is eternal in himself. If, therefore, that which thus subsists is eternal, and always being, which does not decline in any respect to another nature, but the life which it possesses is now all, neither having received, nor receiving, nor being about to receive any thing in future ; — that which thus subsists, will indeed be perpetual. And perp. 188petuity is such a collocation as this of a subject, subsisting from it, and being inherent in it. But eternity is the subject in conjunction with a collo¬ cation of this kind presenting itself to the view. Hence eternity is venerable, and as our intellectual conception of it says, is the same with deity. But it says that it is the same with that God [whom we call by the appellation of being and life.] And eternity may be properly denominated a God un¬ folding himself into light, and shining forth, such as he essentially is, viz. as immutable and the same, and thus firmly established in life. It ought not, however, to be considered as wonderful, if we say that it consists of many things. For every thing in the intelligible world is many, on account of the infinite power which it possesses ; since the infinite receives its appellation from a never-failing essence. And this properly, because nothing pertaining to it is consumed. Hence, if some one should thus denominate eternity, calling it life which is now infinite, because it is all, and nothing of which is consumed, because nothing pertaining to it is either past or future, since otherwise it would not be all things at once ; — if some one should thus denomi-

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nate it, he will be near to the true definition 1 of it. For what is afterwards added, viz. that it is all things at once, and that nothing of it is consumed, will be an exposition of the assertion, that it is now infinite life.

VI.