Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

it is necessary first to assume those asser¬ tions which especially deserve attention, and to consider if what we say is concordant with some one of them. But perhaps the assertions concerning time, ought in the first place to receive a three¬ fold division. For time may be said to be either motion, or that which is moved, or something per¬ taining to motion. For to say that it is either permanency, or that which is stable, or something pertaining to permanency, will be perfectly remote from the conception of time, since it is in no re¬ spect the same, [and therefore, can never accord with that which is stable.] Of those, however, who sav that time is motion, some indeed assert that it is every motion ; but others, that it is the motion of the universe. But those who say it is that which is moved, assert it to be the sphere of the universe. And of those who say it is somep. 195thing pertaining to motion, or the interval of mo¬ tion ; some assert that it is the measure of motion, but others that it is an attendant on it, and either on every motion, or on that which is arranged/

VIII. It is not, indeed, possible, that time should be motion, neither if all motions are assumed, and one as it were is produced from all of them, nor if that motion is assumed which is orderly. For each of these motions is in time. If, however, some one should say that motion is not in time, much less will motion be time ; since that in which mo¬ tion is, is one thing, and motion itself another a

1 Archytas the Pythagorean defined time to be the universal interval of the nature of the universe, in consequence of sur» veying the continuity in the productive principles of that na¬ ture, and their departure into division. Others still more ancient defined time to be, as the name manifests, a certain dance of intellect ; but others defined it to be the periods of soul ; others, the natural receptacle of these periods ; and others, orderly circulations ; all which (says Iamblichus, from whom this information is derived) the Pythagoric sect com¬ prehends. Both Archytas also and Aristotle appear to have admitted time to be a continued and indivisible fux of nows . See a treasure of the conceptions of the ancients on this sub¬ ject, in the Additional Notes to my translation of Aristotle’s Physics.

For a\y ov here, it is necessary to read άλλον.

p. 196

thing. Since, however, there are besides these other assertions, it may be sufficient to observe, that motion may indeed cease and be interrupted, but time cannot.

s to my translation of Aristotle’s Physics.

For a\y ov here, it is necessary to read άλλον.

p. 196

thing. Since, however, there are besides these other assertions, it may be sufficient to observe, that motion may indeed cease and be interrupted, but time cannot. But if some one should say that the motion of the universe is not interrupted, yet this motion, if it is admitted that the circulation [of the world] is in a certain time, will itself be carried round to the same point from whence it began ; and not to that point in which the half of it only is accomplished. And this motion, indeed, will be the half, but the other will be double, each being the motion of the universe, both that which proceeds from the same to the same, and that which arrives only at the half. The assertion, also, that the motion of the outermost sphere is most vehement and rapid, bears witness to what we say * so that the motion of it is one thing, and time another. For that motion is the most rapid of all, which in the least time passes through the greatest interval. But other motions are slower, which are performed in a longer time, and pass through a part only of the same space. If, therefore, time is not the motion of the outermost sphere, much less will it be that sphere itself, which in conse* quence of being moved is conceived to be time.

p. 197

Is, therefore, time something belonging to motion ? If indeed it is interval, in the first place, there is not the same interval of every motion, nor of uni¬ form motion. For the motion which is in place is swifter and slower, and both the intervals may be measured by another third interval, which may with greater rectitude be denominated time. But of which of these motions will time be the interval ? Or rather, will it be the interval of any one of them, since they are infinite ? And if time is the interval of orderly motion, it is not the interval of every motion, nor of every motion of this kind. For these are many. So that there will also be at once many times. But if time is the interval of the uni¬ verse, if indeed it is the interval in motion itself, what else will it be than motion, viz. so much ; and this quantity of motion will either be measured by place, because the place which it passes through is so much in quantity, and the interval will be this. This, however, is not time, but place. Or motion by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing, but being always assumed, possesses interval. But this will be the multitude of motion.

t passes through is so much in quantity, and the interval will be this. This, however, is not time, but place. Or motion by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing, but being always assumed, possesses interval. But this will be the multitude of motion. And if some one looking to motion should assert that it is much, just as if it should be said that heat is much, neitherp. 198 will time here also present itself to our view, nor become obvious ; but motion again and again will occur, like water repeatedly flowing, and also the interval which is beheld in it. The again and again also will be number, as the duad or the triad ; but the interval will belong to bulk. Thus, therefore, the multitude of motion will he as the decad, or as the interval which is beheld as it were in the bulk of motion, which is not attended with a conception of time. But this quantity of motion will be gene¬ rated in time ; for otherwise, time will not be every where, but will be in motion as in a subject. It will, likewise, again happen that time will be said to be motion For the interval is not external to motion, but is motion not at once collected toge¬ ther. But if it is not at once collected, if an atonce-collected subsistence is in time, in what re¬ spect does that which is not at-once-collected differ from that which is P Shall we say that they differ in time ; so that the separating motion, and the inter¬ val of it, are not time itself, but subsist in time ? If, however, some one should say, that the interval of motion is time, by the interval not meaning the peculiarity of motion, but that with which motion has an extension* as if running together with it, yetp. 199 what this is, k not unfolded. For it is evident that time is that in which the motion was generated* This, therefore, is that which was investigated from the first, viz. what that existing thing is which is time ; since this is just as if some one being asked what time is, should say that the interval of motion is in time. What, therefore, is this interval, which he calls time, who supposes it to be external to the proper interval of motion ? For again, he who places temporal interval in motion itself, will be dubious where he should place the interval of rest. For as much as a certain thing is moved, so much also will something else have been quiescent. And you may say that the time of each is the same, though its relation to the one, is different from its relation to the other.