Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

pain/ in order that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies.] It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminish¬ ing its power, in consequence of [the rational part] not being co-passive with it. And besides this also,

1 Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, says, that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and satisfy the indigence of nature, but perfect uo energy of the rational part of the soul.

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in taking away anger to the utmost of our ability , and if possible, entirely ; but if not, the rational part must not at the same time be angry, but the anger must be the passion of another part, and un¬ accompanied with deliberation. And this sudden impulse must be small and imbecile. Fear, how¬ ever, must be entirely removed ; for the purified soul will fear nothing. Here, also, the energy must be unattended with deliberation, except it be re¬ quisite to admonish. With respect to desire, it is evident that there must not be a desire of any thing base. And as to the desire of meats and drinks for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself will be without it. This likewise will be the case with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is de¬ sirous of connection, it will be I think in the natu¬ ral way, and this not unattended with deliberation* If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it will only be so far as it is accompanied with a pre¬ cipitate * imagination. But, in short, the [rational]

* In the original προτύπους ; but it should doubtless be as in the above translation, προπετονς. For this is the word used by Marinus, in his Life of Proclus, when speaking of the cathartic virtues of that philosopher, and alluding to this pas¬ sage in Plotinus.

p. 13

soul herself will be purified from all these. She will also wish to render the irrational part pure, so that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the agitation may not be vehement, but small, and im¬ mediately dissolved by proximity to the rational part. Just as if some one being near to a wise man, should partake of his wisdom by this proxi¬ mity, or should become similar to him, or through reverence should not dare to do any thing which the good man is unwilling to do. Hence, there will be no contest. For reason being present will be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence, so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet wrhen its master is present ; and it will on this account blame its own imbecility.

VI.

eason being present will be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence, so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet wrhen its master is present ; and it will on this account blame its own imbecility.

VI. In conduct of this kind, therefore, there is no sin, but a correction of the man. Nevertheless the endeavour is not to be without sin, but to be a God. Hence, if any thing among the above men¬ tioned particulars should be done without delibera¬ tion, such a one will be both a God and a daemon, being a twofold character ; or rather, having ano¬ ther with him, possessing another virtue. But ifp. 14 nothing is done unadvisedly, he will be a God alone. He will however be a God in the number of those that follow the first ; for he it is who came from thence. And if he becomes by himself such as he came, he is still there. But coming hither, he will associate with intellect ; and will assimilate this to himself/ according to the power of it. Hence, if possible, he will not be agitated, nor do any thing which may be displeasing to the master [intellect.] What, therefore, is each of the virtues to such a man as this ? Wisdom, indeed, will consist in the contemplation of what intellect contains. But he will possess intellect by contact. Each of the virtues, however, is twofold ; for each is both in intellect and in soul. And in intellect, indeed, each is not [properly] virtue, but virtue is in soul. What, then, is it in intellect? The energy of intellect, and that which is. Bu$ here that which is in another, is virtue derived from thence. For justice itself, and each of the virtues, are not in intellect such as they are here, but they are as it were paradigms. But that which proceeds from

8 For avro here, it is accessary to read cti ιτγ, conformably to the version of Ficinus.

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each of these into the soul, is virtue. For virtue pertains to a certain thing. But each thing itself pertains to itself, and not to any thing else. With respect to justice, however, if it is the performance of appropriate duty, does it always consist in a multitude of parts ? Or does not one kind consist in multitude, when there are many parts of it, but the other is entirely the performance of appropriate duty, though it should be one thing. True justice itself, therefore, is the energy of one thing towards itself, in which there is not another and another. Hence justice in the soul is to energize in a greater degree intellectually. But temperance is an in¬ ward conversion to intellect.

one thing. True justice itself, therefore, is the energy of one thing towards itself, in which there is not another and another. Hence justice in the soul is to energize in a greater degree intellectually. But temperance is an in¬ ward conversion to intellect. And fortitude is apathy, according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. But soul is impassive from virtue, in order that she may not sympathize with her subordinate asso¬ ciate.

VII. These virtues, therefore, follow each other in the soul, in the same manner as those paradigms in intellect which are prior to virtue. For there intelligence is wisdom and science ; a conversion to itself is temperance ; its proper work is the performance of its appropriate duty, and justice ; and that which is as it were fortitude is immateriality, and an abiding with purity in itself. In soul, therefore, perception directed to intellect is wisdom and prudence, which are the virtues of the soul. For soul does not possess these in the same man¬ ner as intellect. Other things also follow after, similarly in soul. They are likewise consequent to purification, since all the virtues are purifica¬ tions, and necessarily consist in the soul being purified ; for otherwise, no one of them would be perfect. And he indeed, who possesses the greater virtues, has necessarily the less in capacity ; but he who possesses the less, has not necessarily the greater. This, therefore, is the life which is the principal and leading aim of a worthy man. But whether he possesses in energy, or in some other way, the less or the greater virtues, must be consi¬ dered by a survey of each of them ; as for instance, of prudence. For if it uses the other virtues, how can it any longer remain what it is ? And if also it should not energize? Likewise, it must be consi¬ dered whether naturally the virtues proceed to a different extent ; and this temperance measures, but that entirely takes away what is superfluous.

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And in a similar manner in the other virtues, prudence being wholly excited. Or perhaps the worthy man will see to what extent they proceed. And perhaps sometimes according to circumstances he will energize according to some of them. But arriving at the greater virtues, he will perform other measures according to them.