Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

s in every respect deprived of measure, being matter, is entirely dis¬ similar [to divinity.] But so far as it receives form, so far it is assimilated to him who is without form. But things which are nearer to divinity, participate of him in a greater degree. Soul, however, is nearer to, and more allied to him than body, and therefore participates of him more abundantly, so that appearing as a God, it deceives us, and causes us to doubt whether the whole of it is not divine. After this manner, therefore, these are assimilated,

III. Since, however, Plato indicates that this similitude to God pertains to a greater virtue [than that which is political,] let us speak concerning it ;

in which discussion also, the essence of political virtue will become more manifest, and likewise the virtue which is essentially more excellent, which will in short be found to be different from that which is political. Plato, therefore, when he says that a similitude to God is a flight from terrestrial concerns, and when besides this he does not admit that the virtues belonging to a polity are simply virtues, but adds to them the epithet political, and elsewhere calls all the virtues purifications, evi¬ dently admits that the virtues are twofold, and that a similitude to divinity is not effected according to political virtue. How, therefore, do we call these purifications ? And how being purified, are we espe¬ cially assimilated to divinity ? Shall we say, that since the soul is in an evil condition wThen mingled with the body, becoming similarly passive and con¬ curring in opinion with it in all things, it will be good and possess virtue, if it neither consents with the body, but energizes alone, (and this is to per¬ ceive intellectually and to be wise,) nor is similarly passive with it, (and this is to be temperate,) nor dreads a separation from the body, (and this is to possess fortitude,) but reason and intellect are the leaders, (and this will be justice.) If any one#p. 8 however, calls this disposition of the soul, according to which it perceives intellectually, and is thus im¬ passive, a resemblance of God, he will not err. For divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a kind, that the being which imitates it will possess wisdom.

, calls this disposition of the soul, according to which it perceives intellectually, and is thus im¬ passive, a resemblance of God, he will not err. For divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a kind, that the being which imitates it will possess wisdom. What then ? Is not divinity also disposed after this manner ? Or may we not say that he is not, but that the disposition pertains to the soul ; and that soul perceives intellectually, in a way dif¬ ferent from divinity ? It may also be said, that of the things which subsist with him, some subsist dif¬ ferently from what they do with us, and others are not at all with him. Again, therefore, is intellec¬ tual perception with him and us homonymous ? By no means ; but the one is primary, and that which is derived from him secondary. For as the discourse which is in voice is an imitation of that which is in the soul, so likewise, that which is in the soul, is an imitation of that which is in some¬ thing else, [i. e. in intellect.] As, therefore, ex¬ ternal discourse is divided and distributed, when compared to that which is in the soul, thus also that which is in the soul, and which is the inter¬ preter of intellectual discourse, is divided when compared with it. Virtue, however, pertains to the soul ; but not to intellect, nor to that which is beyond intellect.

IV. It must, however, be enquired whether purification is the same with a virtue of this kind ? Or does purification indeed precede, but virtue fol¬ low ? And whether does virtue consist in purifying, or in the being perfectly purified ? For virtue, while in the act of purifying, is more imperfect than that which consists in complete purification, which is now as it were the end. But to be perfectly puri¬ fied, is an ablation of every thing foreign. Good however, is something else besides this. Or may we not say, that if the soul was good prior to her impurity, purification is sufficient ? Purification, indeed, is sufficient ; but that which remains will be good, and not purification. And what that is which remains, is to be investigated. For perhaps the nature which is left was not good ; since other¬ wise, it would not have been situated in evil. Shall we say, therefore, that it has the form of good ? Or that it is not sufficiently able to abide [perpetually] in good ? For it is naturally adapted to verge both to good and evil. Its good, therefore, consists in associating with its kindred nature ; but its evil inp. 10 associating with the contraries to this.

that it is not sufficiently able to abide [perpetually] in good ? For it is naturally adapted to verge both to good and evil. Its good, therefore, consists in associating with its kindred nature ; but its evil inp. 10 associating with the contraries to this. It is neces¬ sary, therefore, that it should associate with this nature, being purified. And this will take place, through being converted to i|. Will it therefore be converted after purification ? Or may we not say, that after purification it is converted? This, there¬ fore, is the virtue of the soul, or rather that which happens to it from conversion. What then is this ? The vision and impression of that which is seen, inserted and energizing in the soul, in the same manner as sight about a visible object. She did not, therefore, possess these, nor recollect them. Or perhaps she possessed them, yet not energizing, but deposited in an unilluminated state. In order, however, that they may be illuminated, and that the soul may know them to be inherent in herself, it is necessary that she should apply herself to that which illuminates. But she will not possess these, but the impressions of them. It is necessary, there¬ fore, to adapt the impression to the true objects from which the impressions are derived. Perhaps, likewise, she may thus be said to possess them, because intellect i& not foreign, and especially is not so, when it looks to the illuminating cause. But if it does not, it is foreign even when this cause.

p. 11

is present. For sciences also are foreign, if we do not at all energize according to them.

V. We must, however, show how far purifica¬ tion proceeds. For thus it will be evident to whom the similitude is made, and with what God the soul becomes the same. But this is especially to enquire how far it is possible to be purified from anger and desire, and all the other perturbations, such as pain, and things of a kindred nature, and to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps, indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for the soul to collect itself as it were, from different places, so as to become entirely impassive, and to make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be only remedies and liberations from pain/ in order that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies.] It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminish¬ ing its power, in consequence of [the rational part] not being co-passive with it.