Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ing which has quality be surveyed in that which is without magnitude, and without matter? Likewise, if the quality is defined, how can it be matter? But if it is something indefinite, it is not quality, but a subject, and matter which we are now investigating. What hinders, there¬ fore, but that it may indeed be void of quality in consequence of not in its own nature participating any one of other things, and yet through not parti¬ cipating of any thing, it may be endued with quality, entirely possessing a certain peculiarity, and differing from other things, being as it were a certain privation of them ? For he who suffers a privation of any thing, as for instance, a blind man, is [it may be said] a participant of quality. If, therefore, there is a privation of these things about matter, how is it possible it should not be endued with quality ? But if, in short, there is privation about it, it is in a still greater degree a participant of quality, if privation is a certain something that has quality. He, however, who thus objects, what else does he do than make all things to be qualities,p. 55 and the participants of quality ? So that quantity, and also essence, will be quality. And if each of these is such like, quality will be present with it. It is, however, ridiculous to make that which is different from the participant of quality, and which is not such like, to be endued with quality. But if it should be said, this is because a thing that is dif¬ ferent is a participant of quality, we reply, if indeed it is difference itself, it will not subsist as a thing that is such like, since neither is quality the parti¬ cipant of quality. If, however, it is different alone, it is not alone different through itself, but through difference, and is the same through sameness. Neither, therefore, is privation quality, nor the participant of quality, but is destitute of quality, or of something else, just as silence is the absence of sound or of some other thing. For privation is a negation. But a thing endued with quality consists in affirmation. The peculiarity, likewise, of matter is not morphe ; for not to possess quality is not to possess a certain form. It is absurd, therefore, to call that thing quality, which is not a participant of quality, and is just as if it should be said that a thing without magnitude, in consequence of being without, possesses magnitude.

sess quality is not to possess a certain form. It is absurd, therefore, to call that thing quality, which is not a participant of quality, and is just as if it should be said that a thing without magnitude, in consequence of being without, possesses magnitude. The peculiarity,p. 56 therefore, of matter, is not any thing else than that which matter is : nor is its peculiarity adjacent to it, but rather subsists in a habitude to other things, because matter is different from them. And other things, indeed, are not only others, but each of them is a certain thing as having form. Matter, how¬ ever, may be aptly said to be alone that which is another. Perhaps, also, it may be appropriately denominated other things, lest by calling it in the singular number another, you should limit [its boundless nature ;] but by denominating it others , you will indicate the indefiniteness of its subsis? tence.

XIV. That, however, is to be investigated, whether matter is privation, or privation subsists about matter. He, therefore, who says that both are one in subject, but two in definition, ought in justice to teach us what definition of each should be given. And to the definition of matter, indeed, he should adapt nothing of privation ; and to the definition of privation, nothing of matter. For either the one is not in the definition of the other, or each is in the definition of each, or one of them only is in the definition of the other, whichever itp. 57 may be. If, therefore, each is defined separately* and neither of them requires the other, both will he two things, and matter will be different from privation, though privation may happen to it. In the definition of the one, however, it is necessary that the other should not be seen, not even in capa= city. But if they are as a flat nose, and flatness of the nose, thus also each of them is twofold and two. And if they are as fire and heat, heat being in fire, but fire not being assumed in heat, and matter is so privation as fire is hot, —in this case, privation will be, as it were, the form of matter, but the subject will be another thing, which it is necessary should be matter. Neither, likewise, in this way will they be one. Are they, therefore, thus one in subject, but two in definition, privation not signifying that a certain thing is present, but that it is not present, and privation being as it were a negation of beings, as if some one should say non-being ? For negation does not add any thing, but says a thing is not, and thus privation will be as non-being.

that a certain thing is present, but that it is not present, and privation being as it were a negation of beings, as if some one should say non-being ? For negation does not add any thing, but says a thing is not, and thus privation will be as non-being. If, therefore, it is non-being, because it is not being but something else, will there be two definitions ; the one indeed regarding the sub¬ ject, but the other privation, manifesting a habitudep. 58 to other things ? Or shall we say, that the defini¬ tion of matter respects other things, and that this is also the case with the definition of a subject ; but that the definition of privation, if it manifests the indefiniteness of it, will perhaps touch upon its nature, excepting that each is one in the subject, but two in definition ? But if privation in conse¬ quence of being indefinite, infinite, and without quality, is the same with matter, how will there be any longer two definitions ?

XV. Again, it must be investigated, whether if the infinite and indefinite are in another nature accidentally, how this is an accident, and whether privation happens to it. If, indeed, such things as numbers and reasons [or productive principles] are remote from infinity ; for they are boundaries and orders, and arrangement is derived to other things from these ; but these arrange not that which is arranged, nor the orders of things, that which ar¬ ranges being different from that which is arranged ; and end, bound, and reason, arrange ; — if this be the case, it is necessary that what is arranged and bounded, should be infinite. Matter, however, is arranged, and also such things as are not matter,p. 59 by participating or possessing the nature of matter. Hence it is necessary, that matter should be infinite, yet not infinite in such a way as if the infinite was accidental to matter. For in the first place, that which happens to any thing ought to be formative ; but the infinite is not formative. In the next place, to what existing thing will the infinite be an acci¬ dent? Will it be to bound, and that which is bounded ? Matter, however, is neither any thing bounded, nor bound. The infinite, also, acceding to that which is bounded, loses its own nature. Hence, the infinite is not an accident to matter. Matter, therefore, is the infinite ; since in intelligibles alsox matter is the infinite which is there.1

1 “ Power,0 says Proclus, (in Theol. Plat. lib. iii. cap.