Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

gs which are struck through pas¬ sion have the relation of chords. For in a musical instrument also, harmony does not suffer, but the chord. And the chord is not moved, though the musician wishes that it should be, unless harmony commands it to be moved.

V. Why, then, is it requisite to endeavour to render the soul impassive by means of philosophy, if from the first it is without passivity ? Shall we say, it is because a phantasm as it were proceeding into it from what is called the passive part, the con¬ sequent passion produces a perturbation [in this part] and the image of expected evil is conjoined with the perturbation ? Reason, therefore, thinks it fit that a passion of this kind should be extir¬ pated, and that it should not be suffered to be in¬ generated, because where it is, the soul is not yet in a good condition. But where it is not ingenerated, there the soul is impassive, the vision which is the cause of the passion about the soul, having no longer an inherent subsistence. Just as if some one wishing to expel the visions of sleep, should recal the dreaming soul to wakefulness ; or as if he should say that external spectacles produce the passions, and should, assert that these passions bep. 136long to the soul. But what will the purification of the soul be, if it is in no respect defiled ? Or in

• \ what will the separation of it from the body con¬ sist ? May we not say that the purification of it will be, to leave it by itself alone, and not suffer it to associate with other things [that are hostile to its nature,] nor permit it to look to any thing external ; nor again, to have foreign opinions, whatever the mode is, as we have said, of opinions or passions ; nor to behold images, nor fabricate passions from them? If, however, it is converted to supernal from inferior objects, is not this a purification and separation of the soul, which in this case is no longer in body, so as to be something belonging to it, but resembles alight not merged in turbid mire, though at the same time that which is merged in it is im¬ passive ? But the purification, indeed, of the pas¬ sive part of the soul, is an excitation from the vision of absurd images. And the separation of it will consist in not verging downward, and in the imagi¬ nation not being conversant with inferior natures.

m¬ passive ? But the purification, indeed, of the pas¬ sive part of the soul, is an excitation from the vision of absurd images. And the separation of it will consist in not verging downward, and in the imagi¬ nation not being conversant with inferior natures. It will also consist in taking away those things by the ablation of which this part likewise will be separated, when it is not permitted to lie in a spiritp. 137 turbid from gluttony, lest it should be suffocated in flesh, but when that in which it dwells is attenuated, so that it may be quietly carried in it.

VI. That the intelligible essence, indeed, the whole of which is arranged according to form, is necessarily impassive, has been already shown. Since, however, matter also is something incorpo¬ real, though after another manner [than the intelli¬ gible,] concerning this likewise it must be consi¬ dered after what manner it subsists ; whether it is passive, as it is said to be, and in all things mutable, or whether it is necessary to opine that this also is impassive, and if it is so, the mode of its impassi¬ vity must be unfolded. In the first place, there¬ fore, this must be assumed by those who speak concerning the nature of it, and who endeavour to show what it is, that the nature, essence, and exist¬ ence of being, is not such as the multitude conceive it to be. For being which may be so denominated in reality, is truly being ; but this is that which is entirely being ; and this again is that which in no respect is deficient in existence. But since it is perfectly being, it is not in want of any thing in order that it may be preserved and be, but to otherp. 138 things which appear to be, it is the cause of their apparent existence. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it is necessary that it should sub¬ sist in life, and in a perfect life ; for if it were defi¬ cient in this, it wrould not be essence in a more eminent degree. This, however, is intellect and perfect wisdom. Hence it is bounded and definite, and nothing is there in capacity which does not also possess a mighty power ; since otherwise it would be deficient. Hence, too, it is eternal, in¬ variably the same, and unreceptive of any thing. For if it should receive any thing, it would receive something besides itself ; and this would be non-being. It is necessary, however, that it should be perfectly being. Hence it is requisite it should accede to existence, possessing all things in itself, and being at once all things, and one all, if by these peculiarities we define being.

d this would be non-being. It is necessary, however, that it should be perfectly being. Hence it is requisite it should accede to existence, possessing all things in itself, and being at once all things, and one all, if by these peculiarities we define being. But it is necessary that we should thus define it, or intellect and life would not proceed from being, but these would be adventitious to it, though they will not emanate from non-being, and being will be deprived of life and intellect. That which is truly non-being, therefore, will have these in such a way as it is requisite for them to subsist in less excellent nap. 139tures, and in things posterior to being. For that which is prior to being, imparts these indeed to it, but is not itself indigent of these. Hence, if being is a thing of this kind, it is necessary that it should neither be a certain body, nor that which is the subject of bodies, but that existence to these should consist in non-being.

It may, however, be said, how is it possible the nature of bodies and matter should not have a [real] being, in which these mountains and rocks exist, the whole solid earth, and all resisting substances ? Indeed, things which are struck, confess that their essence subsists by compulsion. If, therefore, some one should say, how is it possible that things which neither press, nor are impelled, nor resist, and which in short are not visible, viz. soul and inteb lect should be beings, and truly beings, — we reply, that among bodies, earth is most stable, but that which is more moveable, is also less ponderous, and of this that which is on high is most moveable. And hence, fire flies [as it were] from the nature of body. I am of opinion, however, that things which are more sufficient to themselves, disturb others in a less degree, and occasion them less pain. But things which are more ponderous and terrene,p. 140 because thev are in a defective and fallen condition, and are unable to elevate themselves, strike against others, falling on them through imbecility, and oppressing them by their descending and sluggish weight. For dead bodies cause greater molesta¬ tion 1 when they fall, and strike and injure more vehemently. But animated bodies, as they parti¬ cipate of [real] being, are the more innoxious the more they participate of it. Hence motion, which is a certain life as it were in bodies, and an imita¬ tion of life, is in a greater degree present with those things that have less of body, as if a defect of being rendered that with which it is present, more corpo¬ real.