Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ch other, is not present with the corporeal masses. If each body, likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it is capable of being dissolved into form and matter, from which it is also necessary that simple bodies should have their composition. Moreover, as be¬ ing bodies they have magnitude, and consequently may be cut and broken into the smallest parts, and through this are the recipients of corruption. Hence, if body is a part of us, we are not wholly immortal. But if it is an instrument [of the soul] it is necessary that being given for a certain time, it should be naturally a thing of this kind. That, however, which is the most principal thing, and the man himself, will be that with reference to the body which form is with reference to matter, since this according to form is as body to matter ; or according to that which uses, the body has the relation to it of an instrument. But in each way soul is the man himself.

II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing [soul] ? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite. But if it is not a body, but of another nature, that also must be considered either after the same, or after another manner. In the first place, however, it must be considered into what body this body which they call soul ought to be analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with soul, it is also necessary that this body which is supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or in each of them ; or that one of these should have life, but the other not, or that neither should be vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence, what body will this be which has life from itself? For fire, air, w^ater and earth, are of themselves inanimate; and with whichever of these soul is present, the life which it uses is adventitious. There are not, however, any other bodies besides these. And those to whom it appears that there are other bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they are souls, or that they have life. But if it should be said, that though no one of these bodies posp. 224sesses life, yet the congress of them produces life, he who says this would speak absurdly And if each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bo¬ dies should produce life, and things void of intel¬ lect generate intellect.

the congress of them produces life, he who says this would speak absurdly And if each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bo¬ dies should produce life, and things void of intel¬ lect generate intellect. Moreover, neither will these, in whatever manner they may say they are mixed, generate either intellect or soul.’ Hence, it is necessary there should be that which arranges, and which is the cause of the mixture ; so that this will have the order of soul. For that which is compounded will not be that which arranges and produces the mixture. But neither will there be a simple body in the series of things, without the existence of soul in the universe ; if reason [or a productive principle] acceding to matter, produces body. For reason cannot proceed from any thing else than from soul.

III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by

8 The words η vow , η are omitted in the original ;

but from the version of Ficinus it appears that they ought to be inserted.

p. 225

similitude of passion, and by apposition ; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are without passion and incapable of being united. But soul is co-passive with itself. And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body, they will not say that it has life from itself so far as it is material. For matter is void of quality. But they will rather say that what is arranged in body according to form possesses life. Hence, if they say that this form is essence, soul will not be both, but one of these ; and this will no longer be body. For this will not also consist of matter ; since if it did, we must again analyze it after the same man¬ ner. But if they assert that this form is a passion of matter and not essence, they must inform us what that is from which this passion and life are derived into matter. For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychi- Plot . Pp. 226 cal power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its nature is in [continual] motion.

to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychi- Plot . Pp. 226 cal power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its nature is in [continual] motion. The universe 1 also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies ; though some one of them should be denominated soul. For it would suffer the same things as other bodies, since there would be one matter in all of them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but all things would stop in matter, as there would not be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too, neither would matter have any subsistence what¬ ever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is committed to the connexion of body, and the order of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is committed to any one of them, should not be borne along in a foolish and casual manner? For what order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic substance, which is in want of order from soul ? But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, all these will be subservient to it in order to the composition of the world, and the existence of every animal, a

1 το παν is omitted in tlie original.

p. 227

different power contributing from a different thing to [the perfection of] the whole. If soul, however, is not present to the whole of things, these will neither have a subsistence, nor any arrangement.

IV. Compelled by truth, the authors of the above mentioned hypothesis also testify, that it is necessary there should be a certain form of soul prior to and more excellent than bodies. For they introduce a spirit endued with intellect, and an in¬ tellectual fire, as if it was not possible there could be a better condition among beings without fire and spirit, and without a place in which it might be established, though they ought to have investigated where bodies are to be placed ; for it is necessary that these should be established in the powers of soul. But if they assert that life and soul are nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is, and how it subsists. For they are compelled to fly to this when they admit that there is another efficacious nature besides bodies.