Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ot happen, w hat happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis that a thing is not , are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those we have just enumerated. Such (says Proclus in MS* Commen. in Parmenid.) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific ; and un¬ der which those four powers the definitive and divisive , the demonstrative and analytic , receive their consummate perfection.

The Parmenides of Plato gives a specimen of this method logically and synoptically ; comprehending in eight the above-mentioned four and twenty modes. Plato also adds, that the end of this exercise is the perception of truth. u We must not, therefore,” says Proclus, "con¬ sider him as simply speaking of scientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which, in other words, subsists according to a superessential characteristic. For the whole of our life is an exercise to the vision of this ; and the wandering through dialectic hastens to that as its port.

V

Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uses the word Bioips<r9at to look through: for souls obtain the vision of intelligibles through many media.1'

That the dialectic method, however, may become con¬ spicuous to the reader, the two following specimens of it are subjoined from the above-mentioned admirable Com¬ mentary of Proclus. The first of these, is an investiga¬ tion of the four and twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the effi¬ cacious ; but there will not follow, the subversion of itself, the privation of counsel, the unwilling. That which fol¬ lows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itself with respect to other things, to govern them, to preserve every thing, to possess the be¬ ginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of sensibies. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to supply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cause of disorder. There will follow and not follow, the being present to all things, and an exemption from them ; the knowing, and not knowing them. For it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers co-ordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be [really] injured by any thing.

hem. For it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers co-ordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be [really] injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from fortune, and the being uncoordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good ; for this will partly pertain to them, and partly not. To other things with respect to it there will follow, to be sus¬ pended from it, on all sides to be guarded and benefitedp. 580 by it* There will not follow, an opposition to it, and the possibility of escaping it. For there is nothing so small that it can be concealed from it, nor so elevated that it cannot be vanquished by it* There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of providence; For in one respect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.

But let providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a subsist¬ ence for itself alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assi¬ duous. There will follow and not follow, the unsclicitous, and the undisturbed. For in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energize, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secon¬ dary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things ; for this in a certain respect is possible and not possible. For if it should be said, that through a transcendency exempt fromp. 581 all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hin¬ ders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures ; but yet, considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their nature, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner.

power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their nature, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner. There will not follow, an allot¬ ment with respect to one thing, a distribution according to desert, and a subsistence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good. For so far as they are beings, they must necessarily be good ; and yet, providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence they possess good. But to other things with respect to providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being uncoordinated with respect to it. There will not follow', the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow' and not follow, the being ig¬ norant of it. For it is necessary they should know' that it is not, if it is not ; and it is also necessary they should not know it ; for there is nothing comnion to them with respect to providence?

In the next place, let it be proposed to consider the consequences of admitting or denying the perpetual ex¬ istence of soul.

p. 582

If then soul always is, the consequences to itself with respect to itself, are, the self-motive, the self-vital, and the self-sub sistent. But the things which do not follow to itself with respect to itself, are, the destruction of itself, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itself. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the impartible and the partible, (for in a certain respect it is partible, and in a certain respect impartible), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being. For so far as it communi¬ cates with intellect, it is eternal ; but so far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.

Again, if soul is, the consequences to itself with respect to other things, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is present with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. That which does not follow, is to move externally. For it is the property of animated bodies to be moved inwardly ; and to be the cause of rest and immutability to bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are to be present with bodies, and yet to be present Sepa¬ rate from them. For soul is present with them by its providential energies, but is exempt from them by its essence, because this is incorporeal. And this is the first hex ad.

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