Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

with the body, it is present in the same manner as light is with the air ? For again, this when present is [in reality] not present. And being present through the whole, is mingled with bo part of it. It is also itself permanent, but the air flows by it. And when the air becomes situated out of that in which there is light, it departs po§-

37 3 messing nothing luminous ; but as long as it is under the light, it is illuminated. Hence, here also, it may be rightly said, that air is in light, rather'than light in air. On this account, likewise, Plato [in the Timceus] does not place soul in the

✓ body of the universe, but the body of the universe in soul. And he says, that there is something of soul in which body is contained, and also some» thing in which there is nothing of body ; meaning by the latter those powers of the soul, of which the body is not indigent. The same thing, likewise, must be said of other souls. Hence, we must assert, that the other powers of the soul are not present with the body ; but that those powers are present with it of which it is indigent ; and that they are present, without being established either in the parts, or in the whole of the body. W e must also say, that for the purpose of sensation in¬ deed, the sensitive power is present with the w hole of the sentient [organ] ; but that with respect to energies, a different energy is present with a dif¬ ferent part of the body. But my meaning is as follows :

XXIII. Since the animated body is illuminatedp. 374 by the soul, a different part of the body differently participates of it ; and the power fitted to effect a certain work, is denominated according to the apti¬ tude of the organ to the work. Thus the power in the eves is denominated visive, in the ears acoustic, in the tongue gustic, and in the nostrils olfactive ; but we say that the power of the touch is present with the whole body. For in order to effect this perception, the whole body is present as an instru¬ ment with the soul. Since, however, the instru¬ ments of the touch are in the nerves first, which \ also have the power of moving the animal, this power imparts itself from the nerves. But the nerves beginning from the brain, which is the prin¬ ciple of sense and impulse, and in short of the whole animal, as they are derived from hence to the other parts of the body, that which uses these instruments is considered as subsisting there where the principles of the instruments subsist.

which is the prin¬ ciple of sense and impulse, and in short of the whole animal, as they are derived from hence to the other parts of the body, that which uses these instruments is considered as subsisting there where the principles of the instruments subsist. It is better, however, to say, that the principle of the energy of the power is there ; for from whence the instrument is to be moved, there it is requisite that the power of the artificer, which is adapted to the instrument, should be as it were firmly fixed ; or rather not the power, since power is every where.

p. 375

But the principle of energy 5s there, where the principle of the instrument exists. Since, there¬ fore, the power of sensible perception, and the power of impulse, pertain to the sensitive soul, and the nature of the phantasy, which as being nearer to that which is beneath, have reason situated above them ; — this being the case, where this prin¬ ciple is in the supreme part, there reason w?as placed by the ancients in the summit of the whole animal, viz. in the head ; not as being [immediately] situated in the brain, but in this sensitive power, through which [as a medium] reason is established in the brain. For it is requisite to assign the sen¬ sitive power to the body, and to that which is espe¬ cially the recipient of the energy of the body. But it is necessary that the form of the soul which is able to receive apprehensions from reason, should communicate with reason which has no communi¬ cation with the body. For the sensitive power is in a certain respect judicial ; and the phantastic power is as it were intellectual. Impulse and appetite also follow the phantasy and reason. Hence the reasoning power is there, not as in place, but because that w?hich is [locally] there, enjoys this pow?er [by participation]. But how that which

Is there subsists, has been shown in the sensitive power. Since, however, the vegetative, and also the augmentative and nutritive powers never fail, but each of them nourishes through the blood, and the blood which nourishes is in the veins, but the principle of the veins and the blood is in the liver, in which these powers are firmly fixed ; — this being the case, the ancients assigned this place to a portion of the epithymetic soul. For that which generates, nourishes, and increases, must neces¬ sarily desire these [viz* the veins and blood]. But as attenuated, light, acute, and pure blood, is an instrument adapted to anger, the fountain of the blood, the heart, was considered by the ancients as a fit habitation for anger.

s, and increases, must neces¬ sarily desire these [viz* the veins and blood]. But as attenuated, light, acute, and pure blood, is an instrument adapted to anger, the fountain of the blood, the heart, was considered by the ancients as a fit habitation for anger. For here a blood of this kind is secreted, which is adapted to the efferves¬ cence of anger.

XXIV. Souls, however, still having a body undergo corporeal punishments. But where does the soul dwell on its departure from body ? It will not indeed be here, where there is not any thing to receive it. For it is not able to abide in that which Is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless the recipient has something of an unwise and insanep. 377 nature which attracts the soul to it. But the soul is in such a recipient as this, if it has something besides itself ; and it there follows where this reci¬ pient is naturally adapted to be and to be generated. Since, however, each place is ample, it is necessary that a difference should be produced both from the disposition of the soul, and the justice which ha? dominion in things. For no one can ever fly from the punishment which it becomes him to suffer for

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unjust deeds. For the divine law is inevitable, containing at once in itself the power of accom¬ plishing what it has now judged to be fit. In the mean time, he who suffers is ignorantly led to that which it is proper he should suffer, being every where in his wanderings conducted in a circuitous course 1 by an unstable motion, but at length, like one wearied by the resistance which he has made, falling into a place adapted to him, he undergoes an involuntary suffering through a voluntary mo¬ tion. In the law, however, it is promulgated how much and how long it is necessary to suffer. And again, at the same time a remission of punishment

1 Instead of αιωρονμενος in this place, it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read xeptayouevor. And indeed, the sense of the passage requires this emendation.

p. 378

concurs with the power of flying from those places [in which the punishment is inflicted] through a power of harmony by which all things are detained. But to souls that have bodies, it also pertains to undergo corporeal punishments. Souls, however, that are pure, and attract nothing whatever to themselves of body, are also necessarily unconfined by the body. If \ therefore , they are not at all in body , for neither ham they a body , they are there where essence and beings and that which is divine , subsist, viz . in God .