Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

Open to allPlotinus; trans. MacKenna, Taylor376 segments · 126 pp

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page 60

l, became a blessed animal* It also acquired dignity through soul becoming its in» habitant, since, prior to soul, it was a dead body, viz. earth and water, or rather the darkness of mat¬ ter and non-entity ; and, as some one says, that which the Gods abhor. The power, however, and nature of soul will become still more apparent and manifest, if any one directs his attention to the manner in which it comprehends and leads heaven by its will For it gives itself to the whole of this vast magnitude ; and every interval, both great and small, is animated by it : one body indeed, being situated differently from another, and some bodies being opposite, but others being suspended from each other. This, however, is not the case with soul. For it does not give life to individuals, through a division of itself into minute parts, but it vivifies all things with the whole of itself ; and the whole of it is present every where, in a manner similar to its generator, both according to oneness and ubiquity* Heaven, also, though it is ample, and different parts of it have a different situation, yet is one through the power of soul. And through this the sensible world is a God® The sun, likep. 259wise, is a God, because it is animated. And this is also the case with the other stars. Whatever we too possess, we possess on account of this. For dead bodies are more worthless than dunghills. It is necessary, however, that soul, which is the cause to Gods [i. e. to the mundane Gods] of their being Gods, should be itself a more ancient God. Simi¬ lar to this likewise is our soul. And when it is surveyed in a pure condition, without any thing extraneous adhering to it, this same thing which is soul will be found to be a venerable thing, and more honourable than every corporeal nature. For [perhaps without soul T] all things would be earth® And though fire should then exist, what would there be [venerable] in its burning power, or in the composites from fire and earth, even though you should add to these, water and air ? But if body is an object of pursuit because it is animated, why does any one, neglecting himself, pursue another thing? Since, therefore, you admire soul in another thing, admire yourself.

E It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the words ισω$ avev ought to be supplied in this place®

p. 260

III. Hence, as the soul is so honourable and divine a thing, now confiding in a cause of this kind, ascend with it to divinity. For you will not be very distant from him ; nor are the intermediate natures many.

ev ought to be supplied in this place®

p. 260

III. Hence, as the soul is so honourable and divine a thing, now confiding in a cause of this kind, ascend with it to divinity. For you will not be very distant from him ; nor are the intermediate natures many. In this, therefore, which is divine, receive that part which is more divine, viz. the vici¬ nity of the soul to that which is supernal, to which the soul is posterior, and from which it proceeds· For though it is so great a thing as we have de¬ monstrated it to be, yet it is a certain image of in¬ tellect. And, just as external discourse is an image of the discursive energy within the soul, after the same manner, soul, and the whole of its energy, are the discourse of intellect, and a life which it emits in order to the hypostasis of another thing ; just as in fire, the inherent heat of it is one thing, and the heat which it imparts another. It is necessary, however, to assume there, not a life flowing forth, but partly abiding in intellect, and partly giving subsistence to another life. Hence, since soul is derived from intellect, it is intellectual, and the in¬ tellect of soul is conversant with discursive ener¬ gies. And again, the perfection of soul is from intellect, as from a father that nourishes it, who generated soul, as with reference to himself, not per-

26 1 feet. This hypostasis, therefore, is from intellect, and is also reason in energy when it perceives intel» lect. For when it looks to intellect, it possesses internally, and appropriately, the things which it understands, and the energies which it performs. And it is necessary to call those energies alone the energies of the soul, which are intellectual and dwell with it. But its subordinate energies have an external source, and are the passions of a soul of this kind. Intellect, therefore, causes the soul to be more divine, both because it is the father of it, and because it is present with it. For there is nothing between them, except the difference of one with reference to the other, soul being successive to, and the recipient of intellect ; but intellect sub¬ sisting as form. The matter also of intellect is beautiful, since it has the form of intellect, and is simple. The great excellence, however, of intel¬ lect, is manifest from this, that though soul is such as we have described it to be, yet it is surpassed by intellect.

IV.

The matter also of intellect is beautiful, since it has the form of intellect, and is simple. The great excellence, however, of intel¬ lect, is manifest from this, that though soul is such as we have described it to be, yet it is surpassed by intellect.

IV. This also will be evident to him who ad¬ mires this sensible world ; who surveys its magni¬ tude and beauty, and the order of its perpetualp. 262 motion ; the Gods it contains, some of whom are visible, and others invisible ; and the daemons, animals and plants, with which it is replete ; and who ascends from these to its archetype, and the more true world [of which this is the image.] For there he will behold all intelligibles, which together with the intelligible world are eternal, and subsist in an appropriate intelligence and life. An unde» caying intellect, likewise, and immense wisdom preside over this intelligible world ; and a life which is in reality under Saturn, nourishes there ; Saturn being a God, and a pure intellect. For he comprehends in himself all immortal natures, every intellect, every God, and every soul, all which sub¬ sist in him with invariable stability. For why should he seek after change, since he possesses an excellent condition of being? Or whither should he transfer himself, since he possesses all things with himself ? But neither, being most perfect, will he seek to be increased. Hence, all things that are with him are perfect, in order that he may be entirely perfect, having nothing which does not par¬ take of perfection ; and possessing nothing in him¬ self which he does not intellectually perceive. But lie intellectually perceives, not investigating, butp. 263 possessing.5 Its blessedness* also, is not adventitious to it, but it possesses all things in eternity* And it is itself truly eternity, which time running round soul imitates* omitting some things, but applying itself to others. For other and again other things are about soul ; since at one time the form of Socrates, and at another the form of horse present themselves to its view ; and always one certain thing among the number of beings. But intellect has all things. Hence, it possesses in the same all things established in the same. It likewise alone is, and is always, but is never fu¬ ture; for when the future arrives, it then also is; nor is it the past . For nothing there has passed away, but all things abide in the present now ; since they are things of such a kind, as to be satislied with themselves thus subsisting. But each of them is intellect and being.

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