Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

s a sudden light. For this light is from him, and is him. And then it is proper to think that he is present, when like another God entering into the house of some one who invokes him, he fills it with splendour/ For

* It is necessary here to supply ov.

A Plotinus, in what he here says, doubtless alludes to the following lines in the 19th book of the Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus remove the weapons out of the armory :

• - — 7 rapoiOe be XlaXXcts Αθηγη,

γρνσεον \υχνον eyovaa, (paos π epucaWes οποίοι*

Tore Ύηλομαχοε πρ οσοφωνοον ον πατορ cu\pa9p. 453 unless he entered, he would not illuminate it. And thus the soul would be without light, and without the possession of this God. But when illuminated, it has that which it sought for. This likewise is the true end to the soul, to come into contact with his light, and to behold him through it; not by the light of another thing ; but to perceive that very thing itself through which it sees. For that

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ω 7 τατερ, η μεγα θανμα rob ’ οφθαΧμοισίν ορωμαί ’ εμπης μοί τοιγοι μεγάρων, καΧαι τε μεσούμαί, ειΧατιναι τε boKoi, και κίονες νψοσ εχοντες ψαινοντ οφθαΧμοις ωσει πνρος αιθομενοίο. η μαΧα τις θεός evhov , ol ονρανον ευρυν εχονσι* τον δ’απαμειβομενος προσεφη ποΧνμητις Οδυσσενς, σιγά, καί κατα σον νοον ίσγανε, μηΧ ερεεινε. αντη τοι δίκη εστι θεών οι ΟΧνμι τον εγονσίν.

ί. ec “ Minerva preceded them, having a golden lamp, with which she produced a very beautiful light; on perceiving which, Telemachus thus immediately addressed his father : O father, this is certainly a most admirable thing which pre¬ sents itself to my eyes. For the walls of the house, the beau» tiful spaces between the rafters, the hr beams, and the columns, appear to me to rise in radiance, as if on fire. Certainly some one of the Gods is present who inhabit the extended heaven. But the wise Ulysses thus answered him : Be silent, repress your intellect, and do not speak. For this is the custom of the Gods who dwell in Olympus." Homer, therefore, indicates by this, that to the reception of divine illumination, silence, and a cessation of all mental energy, are requisite.

p. 454

through which it is illuminated, is the very thing which it is necessary to behold. For neither do we see the sun through any other than the solar light. How, therefore, can this be accomplished ? By an ablation of all things.

al energy, are requisite.

p. 454

through which it is illuminated, is the very thing which it is necessary to behold. For neither do we see the sun through any other than the solar light. How, therefore, can this be accomplished ? By an ablation of all things.

p. 455

THAT THE

NATURE WHICH IS BEYOND BEING

IS NOT INTELLECTIVE ; J

AND

WHAT THAT IS WHICH IS PRIMARILY,

AND ALSO

THAT WHICH IS SECONDARILY, INTELLECTIVE,

o ιέ kind of intelligence is the intellectual percep¬ tion of another thing, but another is the perception of a thing by itself, or when a thing perceives it¬ self ; the latter of which flies in a greater degree from duplicity, or doubleness in intellection. But the former wishes also to avoid this diversity, but is less able to accomplish its wish. For it has indeed with itself that which it sees, but it is different from itself. That, however, which intellectually per¬ ceives itself, is not separated essentially from the object of its perception, but being co-existent with it sees itself. Both, therefore, become one being*

p. 456

Hence it perceives in a greater degree because it possesses that which it perceives. It is also pri¬ marily intellective, because that which perceives intellectually ought to be both one and two. For if it is not one, that which perceives will be one thing, and that which is intellectually perceived another. Hence it will not be primarily intellec¬ tive, because in consequence of receiving the intel¬ lectual perception of another thing, it will not pos¬ sess that which it perceives, as something belong¬ ing to itself ; so that the thing perceived v\ ill not be the perceiver itself. Or if it should possess it as itself, in order that it may properly perceive in¬ tellectually, two things will be one. Hence it is necessary that both should be one. Or if there is indeed one thing, but again, this one does not con¬ sist of two things, it will not possess intelligence ; so that neither will it perceive intellectually. Hence it is necessary that the nature which is in¬ tellective should be simple and at the same time not simple. He, however, who ascends from soul will in a greater degree apprehend that an intellective na¬ ture is a thing of this kind. For here [i. e. in soul] it is easy to divide, and duplicity may here be easily perceived.

simple and at the same time not simple. He, however, who ascends from soul will in a greater degree apprehend that an intellective na¬ ture is a thing of this kind. For here [i. e. in soul] it is easy to divide, and duplicity may here be easily perceived. If some one, therefore, should make ap. 457 twofold lights soul, indeed, according to the less pure, but the intelligible of it according to the purer light, and afterwards should cause that which sees to be a light equal to that which is seen, not having any further occasion to separate by differ¬ ence, — he who does this, will admit that these two are one. And this perceives intellectually, in¬ deed, because it is two things ; but it sees because it is now’ one thing. Thus, therefore, such a one will apprehend intellect and the intelligible. Hence we, by a reasoning process, have made two things from one. On the contrary, however, it is two things from one, because it intellectually perceives, making itself to be two ; or rather being two be¬ cause it intellectually perceives ; and because it is one thing [being intellective.]

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II. If, therefore, there is that which is primarily intellective, and also that which is after another manner [i. e. secondarily] intellective, that w’hich is beyond the first intelligent nature, will not perceive intellectually. For it is necessary that it should become intellect in order that it may have intellec¬ tual perception. But being intellect it will also have the intelligible. And if it is primarily intel¬ lective, it will have the intelligible in itself. It isp. 458 not, however, necessary that whatever is intelligible should have that which is intellective in itself, and perceive intellectually. For in this case, it will not only be intelligible, but also intellective. But be¬ ing two things it will not be that which is first. Intellect, likewise, which possesses the intelligible, could not subsist without the existence of an essence which is purely intelligible ; and which with respect to intellect, indeed, will be intelligible, but with reference to itself will be properly neither intellective, nor intelligible. For that which is in¬ telligible, is intelligible to another thing. And intellect which darts itself forward by intelligence would have a vacuum, unless it received and com¬ prehended in itself the intelligible which it intellec¬ tually perceives. For it is not intellective without the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it possesses the intelligible.