Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ngs, and should say I, and this ? 5 Will it not in this case neces¬ sarily be more than two things ? For these two are to be considered as different from each other, and different in a certain respect Hence, there will now be number and many other things. It is ne-

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1 For in this case, it would be at least two things ; since in addition to the impartible it would have speech. And the duad is the first multitude.

* Instead of ei μη here, it is necessary to read αμι*

2 The words και τούτο are omitted in the original.

p. 432

cessary, therefore, that the nature which is intel¬ lective, should receive another and another, and

.· that the objects of its perception being intelligible, should be various ; for otherwise there will not be an intellectual perception of, but a contact with it v \ | '■ - ‘ # ’ ·- '

There will likewise be as it were, an adhesion only ineffable, and without intellection, possessing an energy prior to intelligence, intellects not yet exist¬ ing, in consequence of that which adheres not per¬ ceiving intellectually. It is necessary, however,

\ that the nature which sees intellectually, should not itself remain simple, and especially when it perceives itself. For it will itself divide itself, even though it should be silently intellective. In the next place, that which is entirely simple will not be in want of a busy energy, as it were, about it¬ self. For what will it learn by intellectual percep¬ tion ? For prior to this perception, it exists that which it is to itself. For again, knowledge is a certain desire and as it were, an investigating discovery. Hence, that which is without any difference 1 in itself with respect to itself, is quiescent, and in¬ vestigates nothing respecting itself. But that which evolves itself, will also be multitudinous.

1 For διάφορον here, it is necessary to read α διάφοροί'.

p. 433

XI. Hence this intellect becomes manifold; when it wishes to understand that which is beyond intellect. Endeavouring, therefore, to come into contact with it as with that which is simple, it falls from it always receiving another multiplied nature in itself. Hence, it originates from f it not as in¬ tellect, but as sight not yet seeing. But it proceeds from it containing in itself that which it has mul¬ tiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another thing, possessing at the same time a certain phan¬ tasm in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving another thing in itself, which causes it to be multi¬ tudinous.

from it containing in itself that which it has mul¬ tiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another thing, possessing at the same time a certain phan¬ tasm in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving another thing in itself, which causes it to be multi¬ tudinous. For again, it has an impression * of the vision [of that whieh is beyond itself], or it would never become the recipient of it. Thus, therefore, it becomes manifold from the one ; and thus as in¬ tellect it sees itself, and then becomes sight per¬ ceiving. This, however, is then intellect when it possesses ; and as intellect it possesses.3 But prior

1 Instead of err αντω in this place, both the sense and the; version of Ficinus require that we should read απ' αυτόν .

α This impression is tke o?7e o f intellect, the summit and as it were flower of its nature, and a vestige of the ineffable. For by seeing the ineffable, it becomes stamped as it were with its super-essential nature.

3 Conformably to this, Aristotte says of intellect in his
Metaphysics, evepyei be βχων, i. e. ** It energizes possessing/’’

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434'

\ to this, it is desire alone, and a formless sight. This intellect, therefore, projects itself towards that which is beyond intellect : and when it receives it, it becomes [perceptive] intellect. But it is always the recipient [of the ineffable], and always be¬ comes intellect, essence, and intelligence, when it perceives intellectually. For prior to this it was not intelligence, in consequence of not possessing the intelligible ; nor intellect, because it was not yet intellective. That, however, which is prior to these, is the principle of these, but not as inherent in them. For the first principle, or the from which , is not inherent in that of which it is the principle, but the things of which a thing consists, are inherent in that thing. That, however, from which each thing is derived, is not each thing, but is different from all things. Hence, it is not some one of all things, but is prior to all things ; so that on this account, it is also prior to intellect. For again, all things are within intellect ; so that for this rea= son likewise, it is prior to intellect. If, also, the natures which are posterior to it have the order of all things, and on this account likewise it is prior to all things, it is not proper that it should be a certain one of those things to which it is prior.

p. 435

You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect.
Hence, neither must you call it the good \ if the
good signifies some one of all things.

is prior to all things, it is not proper that it should be a certain one of those things to which it is prior.

p. 435

You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect. Hence, neither must you call it the good \ if the good signifies some one of all things. But if it sig¬ nifies that which is prior to all things, let it be thus denominated. If, therefore, intellect is intellect because it is multitudinous, and the intellection of itself as it were intervening, though it is from itself, multiplies itself, it is necessary that the nature which is perfectly simple, and the first of all things, should be beyond intellect. For if it possessed intelligence, it would not be beyond, but would be intellect. But if it were intellect, it would also be multitude.

XII. What however hinders [it may be said, the first principle of things], from being thus multi¬ tude, so long as it is one essence ? For multitude here is not composition ; but the energies of it are multitude. If, however, the energies of it are not essences, but it proceeds from capacity into energy, it will not be multitude indeed, vet it will be bnperfect in essence before it energizes. But if the essence of it is energy, and the energy of it is mul¬ titude, its essence will be as multitudinous as its energy. We admit, however, that this is the casep. 436 with intellect, to which we attribute the intellection of itself ; but we do not assert this of the principle of all things. For it is necessary that prior to mul¬ titude there should be the one , from which multitude proceeds ; since in every number the one is first. Our opponents, however, may say, that this is in¬ deed the case in number® For the things which are in a consequent order to unity are composi-

«I tions ; but what necessity is there in beings, that there should be a certain one from which the many proceed P To this we reply, that the many without the one would be divulsed from each other, one thing casually proceeding to another, in order to the composition of multitude. Hence, they also say, that energies proceed from one intellect which is simple ; so that they now admit there is some* thing simple prior to energies. And in the next place, they should know that energies which are always permanent are hypostases. Energies, how¬ ever, being hypostases, are different from that from which they proceed ; since this indeed remains simple, but that which proceeds from it, is in itself multitude, and is suspended from its simple cause.