Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

Open to allPlotinus; trans. MacKenna, Taylor376 segments · 126 pp

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page 32

ne¬ rable manners , in conjunction with the possession of wisdom , and will not endeavour to become inso¬ lent and proud ; but will possess confidence accom¬ panied with reason , much security and caution , and great circumspection .*

There are four lines more in this section in the original ; hut the meaning of them is so very obscure, that I have not attempted to translate them.

p. 108

XV. What these assertions, however, effect iri the souls of those that hear them, persuading them to despise the world , and the things that are in it, ought not by any means to be concealed from us. For there are two sects of philosophers with re¬ spect to the attainment of the end of life, one of which places the pleasure of the body as the end ; but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the desire of which is derived and suspended from God. The manner, however, in which this is ac¬ complished, must be elsewhere discussed. And Epicurus, indeed, taking away providence, exhorts us to pursue pleasure and delight, as the only things which then remain. But the doctrine of the Gnos¬ tics, as still more juvenile than this, blames the domination of providence, and providence itself, despises all human laws, and virtue which has ex¬ isted in every age, and considers temperance as ridiculous, in order that nothing beautiful and good may be seen to subsist among men. Together with temperance also it subverts justice which is connascent with it in manners, and which derives its perfection from reason and exercise ; and in short, it subverts every thing by which a man may become a worthy character. Hence, nothing else is leftp. 109 for them to pursue but pleasure, and their own concerns and utility, and not that which is com¬ mon to other men ; unless some one among them happens to be superior to these assertions. For none of the abovementioned particulars are consi¬ dered as beautiful by them, but something else whatever it may be which they pursue ; though they ought to endeavour to correct those with whom they are well acquainted, applying themselves from a divine nature to human concerns. For it is the province of this nature which despises the pleasure of the body, to know what is beautiful and good. But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all excited to supernal natures. This is testified by their never saying any thing about virtue, and by their entirely omitting the discussion of things per¬ taining to it.

to know what is beautiful and good. But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all excited to supernal natures. This is testified by their never saying any thing about virtue, and by their entirely omitting the discussion of things per¬ taining to it. Nor do they say what virtue is , or how many virtues there are , or direct their atten¬ tion to the numerous and beautiful assertions which may be surveyed in the writings of the ancients , or to the means of acquiring and possessing virtue , and of cultivating and purify ing the soul For it is to no purpose to say , look to God , unless you also teach how we are to look to him. For what hinders , some one may say , but that a man may look to Godp. 110 who does not abstain from any one pleasure , and who suffers his anger to be without any restraint ; such a one recollecting indeed the name of God , but being held in bondage by all the passions , and not at all endeavouring to expel them ? Virtue , there¬ fore, indeed proceeding to the end [i. e. to its per¬ fection ,] and being ingenerated in the soul in con¬ junction with wisdom , will present God to the view , But to speak of God without true virtue , is to utter nothing but a name .

XVI. Again , to despise the zvorld, and the Gods , and other beautiful natures that are con¬ tained in it, is not to become a good man. For every bad man will in the first place despise the Gods ; and no one is completely bad till he does despise them . Hence, if he is not bad in every thing else, from this very thing he will become so. For the honour which the Gnostics say is paid by them to the intelligible Gods, is utterly incongruous . For he who loves any thing, is delighted with every thing which is allied to the object of his love. For you also love the children of the father whom you love. But every soul is the daughter of the father of the universe. And the souls in the mundane

Ill

spheres, are intellectual, and good, and are united to intelligible essences much more than ours . For how could this world be separated from the intelli¬ gible world ; or the Gods in it, from the intelligi¬ ble Gods ? But these things have been discussed by us before. Now, however, we must say, that those who despise things allied to the intelligible Gods, have no knowledge of those Gods, except what is merely verbal.

ld ; or the Gods in it, from the intelligi¬ ble Gods ? But these things have been discussed by us before. Now, however, we must say, that those who despise things allied to the intelligible Gods, have no knowledge of those Gods, except what is merely verbal. For how can it be pious to assert as they do, that providence does not extend to terrene affairs, and to every thing whatever it may be ? How also is this consonant to their own doctrine ? For they say that divinity providentially attends to them alone. Whether, therefore, did he pay attention to them while they were with super¬ nal natures, or does he also attend to them during their existence here P For if the former, how came they to descend ? But if the latter, how is it that they are still upon the earth ? How, likewise, does it happen that divinity is not present in the earth ? For whence does he know that they are here, and that being here and revolting from him, they have become evil ? But if he has a knowledge of souls that have not become evil, he will also know those that have, in order that he may be able to distinp. 112guish the former from the latter. He will, there¬ fore, be present to all things, and will be in this world, whatever the mode may be of his subsistence in it. So that the world will participate of him. But if he is absent from the world, he will also be absent from you ; and you will not have any thing to say either about him, or the natures posterior to him. But whether a certain providence proceeds from divinity to you, or whatever you may think fit to assert respecting it, the world certainly derives its subsistence from thence, and is not, nor ever will be, deserted by him. For the providence of divinity is in a much greater degree extended to wholes than to parts ; and the former of these par¬ ticipate of him more abundantly than the latter. And much more does he providentially attend to the soul of the world. This is evident from the existence of the world, and from the wisdom of the mode in which it exists. For xvho among those that are stupidly proud , is so orderly and wise as the universe? Indeed, to compare the one with the other is ridiculous, and is attended with great absurdity. Hence, when the comparison is made for any other purpose than that of argument, it is attended with impiety.

Commentary
page 32 ·

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There is commentary on pages 4, 5.