Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

d who calls upon us to know ourselves. And since we wish to in¬ vestigate and discover other things, it is but just top. 320 enquire what this is which investigates, especially since we desire to apprehend that which is lovely in the objects of contemplation. For in every intellect there is that which is twofold ; 1 so that in partial intellects it is reasonable to admit that one has [the intelligible] in a greater, but another in a less degree. It is likewise requisite to consider, how souls become the receptacles of the Gods * but this, indeed, we shall discuss when we investi¬ gate how soul subsists in body. Now, therefore, again, let us return to those who assert that our souls also are derived from the soul of the universe. For perhaps they will say it is not sufficient [in order to establish this hypothesis,] that our souls extend as far as the soul of the universe, nor that they are similarly intellectual with it ; since parts are of a similar species with their wholes. They will, likewise, adduce Plato % as the patron of this opinion, when proving that the universe is animated, he says : a As our body is a part of the body of the universe, thus also our soul is a part of the soul of the universe.** This, too, is confirmed by the assertion, that we follow the circulation of the

* viz. The intelligible and the intellectual,

% See his Philebus and Timaeus.

p. 321

universe. And it is clearly asserted and demon» strated that our manners and fortunes are thence derived ; and that as we are generated within the world, we receive our soul from the universe in which we are comprehended. Farther still, as each part of us partakes of our soul, so likewise w?e for the same reason, since we have the relation of parts to the whole, participate as parts of the soul of the universe. The assertion [of Plato ’] likewise; that every soul pays a guardian attention to every thing inanimate, has the same signification, and does not leave any thing else externally of soul, after the soul of the universe. For it is this soul which pays attention to every thing inanimate.

II. In answer to these things, therefore, in the first place it must be said, that those who admit souls to be of a similar species, because it is granted that they come into contact with the same things, and ascribe to them a common genus, exclude them from ranking as parts of one soul, and will rather make one and the same soul, and each to be every soul. But making one soul, they will also

8 In the Phaedru-s.

Plot.

e into contact with the same things, and ascribe to them a common genus, exclude them from ranking as parts of one soul, and will rather make one and the same soul, and each to be every soul. But making one soul, they will also

8 In the Phaedru-s.

Plot.

322- suspend it from something else, which no longer being something pertaining to this thing or that, but neither belonging to the world, or to any other thing, will effect the very same thing, as is effected by [the life] of the world, and of any animated being whatever. For it rightly happens that not every soul is something belonging to another thing, since soul is an essence ; but that there should be a cer¬ tain soul which is wholly exempt from a subordi¬ nate nature ; and that such souls as belong to something else, are from accident at certain times connected with that which is inferior to themselves. Perhaps, however, it is necessary to show more clearly how a part in such souls is to be considered. Part, therefore, belonging to bodies, whether the body is of the same or of a different species, must be dismissed ; observing thus much alone, that when part is asserted of bodies consisting of similar parts, the part is according to bulk, and not accord¬ ing to form ; such for instance as whiteness. For the whiteness which is in a part of milk, is not a part of the whiteness of all the milk ; but it is the whiteness indeed of a part, and not a part of the whiteness. For whiteness is entirely without mag¬ nitude, and is void of quantity. This, therefore,p. 323 thus subsists. When, however, in things which are not bodies we speak of a part, we either assume it in such a way as in numbers, as when we say that two is a part of ten ; (but let this be consi¬ dered as asserted in mere numbers alone) or as when we speak of the part of a circle and a line ; or as a theorem is a part of science. In monads and figures, indeed, it is necessary in the same manner as in bodies, that the whole should be diminished, by a division into parts, and that the several parts should be less than the wholes [of which they are the parts.] For being quantities, and having their existence in quantity, and also not being the same quantity, they necessarily become greater and less. A part, therefore, cannot after this manner be asserted of soul. For it is not quantity in such a -way as the decad is the whole, but the monad a part of the decad. Many other absurdities also will happen [from admitting that the soul is quantity] ; nor are ten things one certain thing.

r this manner be asserted of soul. For it is not quantity in such a -way as the decad is the whole, but the monad a part of the decad. Many other absurdities also will happen [from admitting that the soul is quantity] ; nor are ten things one certain thing. Either, likewise, each of the monads will be soul, or soul will consist of all inanimate things. Besides, the part of the whole soul is admitted to be oi the same kind with the whole ; but it is not necessary in continued quantity, that the partp. 324 should he such as the whole. Thus, for instance, the parts of a circle are not of the same species with the circle, nor the parts of a triangle with the triangle ; at least, all the parts in these, in w hich a part may be assumed, are not similar [to the whole.] For all the parts of a triangle are not triangles ; [and so in other figures] but there will be a differ¬ ence between the form of some of the parts and and that of the w hole. Soul, however, is acknow¬ ledged to be of a similar form. In a line, likewise, a part of it is still a line, but here also there is a difference in magnitude. Butin soul, if the differ¬ ence between that soul which is partial, and that which ranks as a whole, should be considered as a difference in magnitude, soul wrould be a certain quantity and a body ; since in this case, it would receive the difference so far as it is soul, from quantity. All souls, however, are admitted to be similar and wholes. It appears, likewise, that neither is soul divided after the same manner as magnitudes ; nor do even our opponents admit that the w hole of the soul can be divided into parts ; since if this were the case, the w hole would be de¬ stroyed. And unless the first soul was every soul, it would be a name alone ; just as if it should bep. 325 said, when wine is distributed into many amphorae, that the portion of it in each amphora, is a part of the whole wine. Shall we say, therefore, that part is to be assumed in the soul, in the same manner as a theorem is a part of science ? the whole science, indeed, nevertheless remaining ; but the separation into parts, being as it w^ere the utterance and energy of each. In a thing of this kind, how¬ ever, each possesses the w hole science in capacity, but the whole nevertheless continues to be the whole. If, therefore, a part in the whole soul and other souls is to be thus assumed, the whole soul, of which things of this kind are parts, will not be the soul of a certain thing, but will itself subsist from itself.