Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

world]. But no being perishes, since the intellects which are in the intelligible do not perish, because they are not corporeally distributed into one thing, but each remains possessing in difference a same¬ ness of subsistence, in which its very being consists.

p. 331

After this manner, therefore, souls also being sue-

* cessively suspended according to each intellect, being likewise reasons of intellects, though more evolved than an intellectual essence, and becoming as it were much from that which is few , and being in contact with it, they are now willing to be divided by each of those more impartible essences, yet are not able to proceed to the very extremity of division. For they preserve their sameness and difference, and each remains one, and at the same time all are one. We have, however, summarily shown, that all souls are from one soul, and that all of them are divisible and at the same time indip. 9visible. The soul, also, which abides [on high], is the one reason of intellect, and from this soul par¬ tial and immaterial reasons are derived, in the same manner as there, [i. e. in the same manner as partial intellects are derived from one intellect which ranks as a whole].

VI. Why, however, did the soul of the world being of a uniform nature make the world, but not the soul of each individual, though it likewise contains all things in itself? For we have before shown that productive power may exist at one andp. 332 the same time in many things. Now, however, the reason of this must be assigned. For perhaps the manner may be known by us in which the same thing in different subjects either does or suffers a certain thing, or is with respect to it both an agent and a patient. Or rather let us consider how and why the soul of the universe made the world, but other souls govern a certain part of the world. Perhaps, however, it is not at all wonderful, that of those who possess the same science, some should rule over many, but others over few. But why, it may be said, is this the case ? To this it may be answered, that the difference of souls is greater, so far as one of them does not depart from the soul of the universe, but abiding there has a body sur¬ rounding it; but other souls, body now existing, and their sister soul having dominion, are allotted an appropriate destiny, this soul preparing for them proper habitations. It may also be said, that the soul of the universe beholds that intellect which ranks as a whole, but that other souls rather behold their own intellects which are of a partial nature.

ted an appropriate destiny, this soul preparing for them proper habitations. It may also be said, that the soul of the universe beholds that intellect which ranks as a whole, but that other souls rather behold their own intellects which are of a partial nature. Perhaps, however, these souls also are able to make the universe ; but the soul of the world having made it, this is no longer possible to other souls, productive energy having commenced from the first soul. But the same doubt will arise if any other soul first began to fabricate. It is better, however, to say that the soul of the wrorld rather than other souls fabricated the universe, because it in a greater degree adheres to intelligibles. For the power of those souls is greater that more vigor¬ ously tend to the intelligible world. For, preserv¬ ing themselves in that secure region, they fabricate with facility ; since it is the property of a greater power, not to suffer in the things which it produces. But power remains suspended from the supernal region. Abiding, therefore, in itself, it produces [other things] acceding. But other souls which proceed from the one soul, depart from it into the

« profundity [of a material nature]. Perhaps, also, that which is most abundant in them, being drawn downward, draws them likewise into an inferior condition, their own decisions conspiring with the downward impulse. What, however, is said in the Timaeus of mixture in a second and third degree, must be considered as signifying that some souls are nearer to, but others more remote from the soul of the world ; just as in our sbuls, all of them are not similarly disposed with reference to superp. 334nal natures, but some are united to them, others through [ardent] desire accede near, and others accomplish this in a less degree, because they do not energize with the same powers* For some, indeed, energize with a first, others with a second, and others with a third power, all souls neverthe¬ less possessing all powers.

VII. And thus much concerning these parti¬ culars. What is said in the Philebus, however, may lead us to suspect that other souls are parts of the soul of the universe. But the meaning of o what is there asserted, is not what some one may fancy, but was useful to Plato in demonstrating that the world is animated. This, therefore, he renders credible by saying that it is absurd to assert that the universe is inanimate, and that we who have a part of the body of the universe, have a soul.

e may fancy, but was useful to Plato in demonstrating that the world is animated. This, therefore, he renders credible by saying that it is absurd to assert that the universe is inanimate, and that we who have a part of the body of the universe, have a soul. For how can a part have a soul, if the uni¬ verse is inanimate ? The opinion of Plato, however, is especially manifest in the Timaeus ; where the Demiurgus having generated the soul of the uni¬ verse, afterwards produces other souls, mingling them in the same crater in which he had mingled the soul of the world, and making them to be of ap. 335 similar species with it, but assigning them a differ·» ence in a second and third degree. Nor is what he asserts in the Phaedrus wonderful, that every soul pays a guardian attention to that which is inanimate. For what is it except soul which go¬ verns, fashions, arranges, and produces the nature of body ? Nor must it be said, that one soul is naturally adapted to do this, but another not. The perfect soul, therefore, says he, revolves on high, not verging downward, but fabricates, riding in the world as it were as in a vehicle. Every other per¬ fect soul, also, governs the universe in a similar manner. But when he speaks of the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion, he evidently makes a dif¬ ference between such a soul as this, and that of the universe. And when he adds, that souls follow the circulation of the universe, derive their manners from thence, and suffer from it, this does not at all

* indicate that our souls are parts of the soul of the world. For soul is sufficiently able to represent many things in itself, from the nature of places, and water, and air. And to this ability, the habi-

* tations of different cities, and the temperature of bodies, also contribute. And if we should grant that since we are in the universe w’e have somep. 336thing from the soul of the world, and that we suffer from the celestial circulation, yet we shall oppose to these things another soul, [i. e. the rational soul] and which by its resistance especially demonstrates itself to be a different soul. To the assertion, also, that we are generated within the world, we reply that the foetus in the womb of the mother has a soul different from that of the mother, and which accedes to it externally.1

VIII. Such, therefore, is the solution of these particulars ; the sympathy of souls being no impe¬ diment to our arguments. For since all of them originate from the same source as the soul of the universe, they are co-passive.