Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

s which are always permanent are hypostases. Energies, how¬ ever, being hypostases, are different from that from which they proceed ; since this indeed remains simple, but that which proceeds from it, is in itself multitude, and is suspended from its simple cause. For if they subsist, that from which they proceed at the same time in a certain respect energizing,p. 437 there also there will be multitude. But if they are first energies producing that which is secondary, nothing prevents that which is prior to the energies from abiding in itself, and from conceding energies to that which is second, and which consists of energies. For that which is prior to energies is one thing, but the energies which proceed from it another ; because from that not energizing, [these derive their subsistence]. For if this were not the case, intellect would not be the first energy. For [that which is entirely simple] did not as it were desire that intellect should be generated, and after® wards intellect was generated, this desire subsisting between the simple principle, and its offspring in¬ tellect. Nor in short, did this principle desire. For thus it would be imperfect, and the desire would not yet have that which it wished to obtain * Nor again, does it partly obtain the object of its wish, and partly not. For there is nothing to which the extension [of its desire is directed]. But in¬ deed, if any thing subsists after it, it subsists in consequence of this principle abiding in its accus¬ tomed habit. It is necessary, therefore, in order that something else may subsist, that this principle should be every where quiescent in itself, For ifp. 438 not, either it will be moved prior to being moved, and will perceive intellectually prior to intellectual perception, or its first energy will be imperfect, being an impulse alone. To what, therefore, can it thus be impelled ? For either we must admit that the energy flowing as it were from it, is ana¬ logous to the light proceeding from the sun, which energy is every intelligible and intellectual nature, and that this principle being established at the summit of the intelligible world reigns over it, with¬ out separating from itself, that which is unfolded into light from it ; or we must admit that there is another light prior to this light, which emits its splendor, perpetually abiding in the intelligible. For that wdiich proceeds from this principle is not separated from it, nor again, is the same w ith it.

d into light from it ; or we must admit that there is another light prior to this light, which emits its splendor, perpetually abiding in the intelligible. For that wdiich proceeds from this principle is not separated from it, nor again, is the same w ith it. Nor is it a thins; of such a kind as not to be essence* Nor is it, as it were, blind; but it sees and know^s itself, and is primarily gnostic. The principle it¬ self, however, as it is beyond intellect, so likewise it is beyond knowledge. And as it is not in want of any thing, it is not in want of knowledge ; but knowledge subsists in the nature which is next to this. For to know is one certain thing ; but this principle is one without the addition of certain .

p. 439

For if it was a certain one , it would not be the one itself \ For itself is prior to a certain or some par¬ ticular thing.

XIII. Hence, it is in reality ineffable* For of whatever you speak, you speak of as a certain thing. But of that which is beyond all things, and which is beyond even most venerable intellect* it is alone true to assert that it has not any other name [than the ineffable], and that it is not some one of all things. Properly speaking, however, there is no name of it, because nothing can be asserted of it. We, however, endeavour as much as possible to signify to ourselves something respecting it. But when we say doubting, it has therefore no percep¬ tion nor intellection of itself, and consequently does not know itself, we ought to consider this, that when we assert these things, we should convert ourselves to their contraries. For we make it to be multitudinous, when we admit that it is knowable and has knowledge : and by attributing intel¬ lection to it, we make it to be in want of intelli¬ gence. But if it subsists together with intellection, intellectual perception will be superfluously added to it. For in short, intellection appears to be thep. 440 co-sensation of the whole [of that which is intellec¬ tive] many things concurring in one and the same, when any thing itself intellectually perceives itself, in which also intellection properly so called con¬ sists. Each of these many, howeveiy is itself one certain thing unattended with investigation. But if intelligence is of that which is external, it will be something indigent, and not properly intellectual perception. That, however, which is perfectly simple, and truly self-sufficient, is not in want of any thing. But that which is secondarily self-sufficient, being in want of itself, is in want of the intellectual perception of itself.

nd not properly intellectual perception. That, however, which is perfectly simple, and truly self-sufficient, is not in want of any thing. But that which is secondarily self-sufficient, being in want of itself, is in want of the intellectual perception of itself. And that which is indigent with respect to itself, produces from the whole of itself the self-sufficient, becoming suffi¬ cient from all [the particulars of which it consists], dwelling w-ith itself, and being conversant with it¬ self by intellection ; since co-sensation also, is the sensation of a certain multitude, as its name testi¬ fies. Intelligence, likewise, which is prior to sense, converts that w'hich is intellective, and which is evidently multitudinous, to itself. For if it should

/ alone say this, I am being , it w7ould say this, as having discovered that it is so. And it would make this assertion reasonably. For being is mulp. 441titudinous ; since when it extends itself to that which is simple, and says, I am being, it does not meet either with itself, or with being. For it does not speak of being as of a stone, when it speaks of it truly ; but by one word it pronounces many things.1 For this existence, which is truly exist¬ ence, is not spoken of as having nothing more than a vestige of being ; since this is not being, and therefore may be said to have the relation of an image to its archetype. Hence, true being con¬ tains in itself multitude. What then ? will it not intellectually perceive each of the many it contains ? May we not say, that if you wish to assume the solitary and alone, you will not have intellectual perception ? Existence itself, however, is in itself multitudinous. And though you should speak of something else, that something else has existence. If, however, this be the case, if there is something which is the most simple of all things, it will not have an intellectual perception of itself. For if it had, [it would also have a subsistence somewhere]. a

1 Instead of αλλ’ ονκ ειρηκε μιη. ρησει πολλά ill this place, it is necessary to read αλλ’ ουν ειρηκε κ . λ.

α The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the version of Ficinus. After ei γαρ

Neither, therefore, does it intellectually perceive itself, nor is there any intellectual perception of it,

XIV. How, therefore, can we speak of it? W e are able indeed to say something of it, but we do not speak it. Nor have we either any know¬ ledge, or intellectual perception of it.