Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ntelligible world, it must be said, that such things as intellect derives from the first principle, are all of them most excellent. But the above-mentioned particulars are not among the number of these, nor does intellect consist of the forms of such particulars. Soul, however, which is derived from intellect, receives from matter other things [besides what she receives from intellect], and such particulars as the above are in the num¬ ber of these. The discussion of these, however, will be rendered clearer by recurring to the doubt, how multitude proceeds from the one . In the mean time it is evident that such composite natures as are casual are not derived from intellect, but from a concurrence of sensibles in themselves, and do not subsist in forms. Those things, also, which are produced from putrefaction, are the progeny of a soul which is perhaps incapable of effecting any thing else ; for if this were not the case, it would produce something conformable to nature. It produces, therefore, where it is able. But with

ψεωί και των χαλεπών» u Ubi vero quaeritur nunquid ibi sit species eorum etiam quae ex putrefactione Hunt, dijficHiumque , et admodum molest orump. 308 respect to the arts* such of them as are referred to things natural to man, are comprehended in [the soul of] man. The art also, which is universal, is prior to other arts, and soul itself is prior to uni¬ versal art, or rather this must be asserted of the life which is in intellect, before it became soul, and which is necessary to the generation of soul. And this life it is requisite to denominate soul itself.

p. 309

ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL.

I. In investigating the essence of soul, if we show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in incorporeal natures ; and likewise if we omit what is said of its being the entelecheia ,* or perfection of the body, as not true, as the words [taken literally] imply, and as not manifesting what the soul is | and if also we should say that it is of an intelligible nature, and a divine allotment, perhaps we shall assert something perspicuous concerning its essence. At the same time, however, it will be better to pro» ceed still further than this. For this purpose,

1 The cause, according to Aristotle, by which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded , is entelecheia , or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.

which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded , is entelecheia , or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.

p. 310

therefore* we shall make a division into a sensible and intelligible nature, and place soul in the intelli¬ gible. Hence, let it be at present admitted that it ranks among intelligibles ; and let us in another way investigate that which is proximate to, or the peculiarity of, its nature. We say, therefore, that some things are primarily partible, and in their own nature dissipable ; but these are such as have no part the same, either as another part, or as the whole ; and in which it is necessary that the part should be less than all and the whole. These, however, are sensible magnitudes and masses, each of which has an appropriate place, nor is it possible among these, that the same thing should be in many places at once. But there is another essence opposed to this, which in no respect admits of a separation into parts, since it is without parts, and therefore impartible. It likewise admits of no in» terval, not even in conception, nor is indigent of place, nor is generated in a certain being, either according to parts, or according to wholes, because it is as it were at one and the same time carried in all beings as in a vehicle ; not in order that it may be established in them, but because other things are neither able nor willing to exist without it. Itp. 311 likewise possesses an essence which subsists accord¬ ing to sameness, and is the foundation 1 of all fol¬ lowing natures, being as it were a centre in a circle, the lines drawn from which and terminating in the circumference, nevertheless permit it to abide in itself For they possess from the centre their generation and being, participate of the point, and have for their principle that which is impartible. They also proceed, suspending themselves from the centre. This, therefore, [of which the centre in a circle is an image] being primarily impartible in intelligibles, and the leader among beings, and again that which is in sensibles being in every respect partible, -—this being the case, prior to that which is sensible, but which nevertheless is something near to and in it, there is another certain nature, which is partible indeed, yet not primarily so like bodies, but becomes partible in bodies.

in every respect partible, -—this being the case, prior to that which is sensible, but which nevertheless is something near to and in it, there is another certain nature, which is partible indeed, yet not primarily so like bodies, but becomes partible in bodies. Hence, when bodies are divided, the form which is in them is also divided, though it still remains a whole in each of the divided parts ; the same thing in this case becoming many, each of which is perfectly distant from the other, in consequence of the form

* It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the word στήριγμα is wanting in this place in the original.

p. 312

becoming entirely partible. Of this kind are colours, and all qualities, and each morphe , which is capable of being wholly at one and the same time in many things, that are separated from each other, and wThich has no part suffering the same thing with another part. Hence this must be admitted to be in every respect partible.

Again, besides the nature which is perfectly in¬ divisible, there is another essence proximately sus-

V?

pended from it, and· which has indeed from it the impartible, but by a progression from thence, hast¬ ening to another nature, is established in the middle of both ; viz. in the middle of that which is impar¬ tible and primary, and that which is divisible about bodies, and is inherent in bodies. This nature does not subsist after the same manner as colour and every quality, which are indeed every where the same in many masses of bodies, yet the quality which is in one mass, is entirely separate from the quality in another, so far as one mass is also sepa¬ rate from another. And though the magnitude should be one, yet that which is the same in each part, has no communion whatever so as to produce co-passivity, because this sameness is at the same time attended with [a predominant] difference.

p. 313

For the sameness is passion, and is not itself also essence. That, however, in this middle nature which accedes to an impartible essence, is itself essence, and is ingenerated in bodies, about which also it happens to be divided ; yet it does not suffer this,' till it gives itself to bodies. When, therefore, it is inherent in bodies, though it should be inherent in the greatest body, and which is every where most extended, yet though it gives itself to the whole, it does not depart from the unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same manner as body. For body is one by continuity, bpt one part of it is different from another, and is situated in a different place.