Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

siderations. If the heaven is in the sensible place that which is most excellent, it will be proximate to the extremities of intelligibles. Hence, the celestial bodies are first animated from thence, and participate of them, as being more adapted to participation. But a ter¬ restrial body is the last of bodies, is naturally adapted to participate of soul in a less degree, and is more remote from an incorporeal nature. All the celestial souls indeed illuminate heaven, and impart as it were much of themselves, and the first procession from themselves to it, but other things become fulgid through posterior natures. The souls, however, which descend below the heavens, illuminate another inferior nature, but their condi¬ tion is not ameliorated by proceeding to a greater extent. For there is something which is as it were a centre ; but after this is a circle shining from the centre ; and after this, another circle, which is a light emanating from a light. External to these, however, there is no longer another circle of light, but that which is posterior to them is indigent of its proper light, through the want of a foreign splendor. But let this be a rhombus, or rather ap. 363 sphere, of such a kind as to participate of the second of these circles, to which it is the next in order, and through proximity to which it becomes resplendent. The great light, therefore, [i. e. in¬ tellect] illuminates abiding, and the light which emanates from it proceeds according to [or is cha¬ racterized by] ’reason. But the other things co¬ illuminate, some indeed abiding, but others being abundantly attracted by the splendor of that which is illuminated. In the next place, since the illu¬ minated natures require much guardian attention, like ships in a storm at sea, the pilots of which incessantly watch over them, and neglecting their own concerns, forget that they are frequently in danger of perishing together with the ships ; thus also these souls are abundantly hurried away from their own concerns, and afterwards are detained in the bonds of enchantment, being held in durance through their attention to nature. But if each animal was such as the universe, having a body suf¬ ficient and perfect, and free from the danger of passivity, in this case, the soul which is said to be present with body, would not be present with it, but entirely abiding on high would impart life to the body [which is suspended from it].

ving a body suf¬ ficient and perfect, and free from the danger of passivity, in this case, the soul which is said to be present with body, would not be present with it, but entirely abiding on high would impart life to the body [which is suspended from it].

p. 364

XVIIL Again, shall we say that the soul em¬ ployed the discursive energy of reason, before she came into body, and will also after her departure from it ? Or shall we say that a reasoning process is employed by her here, in consequence of her

\ being involved in doubt and filled with care, through which she becomes debilitated in a greater degree ? For through a diminution of intellect, she requires the discursive energy of reason in order to be suffi¬ cient to herself; just as reasoning is requisite in the arts, through the artists being involved in doubts. But when there is no difficulty, then art subdues [its subject matter] and operates. If, however, souls live in the intelligible world without reasoning, how can they be any longer rational? In answer to this, it may be said, that they are still rational, because they are able to employ a reason¬ ing process whenever circumstances render it ne¬ cessary. It is necessary, however, to assume a ratiocination of this kind ; since if some one should consider the discursive energy of reason as a dispo¬ sition always subsisting from intellect in souls, and a stable energy which is as it were an evolution of intellectual light, and if in the intelligible souls also use the reasoning power, yet as it appears to me,p. 365 we must not think that voice is employed by them there, so -long as they entirely subsist in the intel¬ ligible world. But when they have bodies in the heavens, theydo not use the dialect which they em¬ ploy here through indigence or ambiguity ; but performing every thing in an orderly manner, and according to nature, they neither command any thing to be done, nor consult about it. They also mutually know the objects of their knowledge through a consciousness of perception ; since even here likewise we know many things through the eyes, pertaining to those that are silent. There , however, every body is pure , and each inhabitant is as it were an eye . Nothing likewise is there con¬ cealed, or fictitious, but before one can speak to another, the latter knows what the former intended to say. But there is no absurdity in admitting that daemons and souls that dwell in the air use voice ; for such as these are animals.

XIX.

e is there con¬ cealed, or fictitious, but before one can speak to another, the latter knows what the former intended to say. But there is no absurdity in admitting that daemons and souls that dwell in the air use voice ; for such as these are animals.

XIX. Shall we however say that the impartible and partible, are to b& considered according to the same thing [in the soul,] as if they were mingled to¬ gether; or that the impartible is to be assumed according to one thing, but the partible as some·?

p. 366

thing successive, and another part of the soul? Just as we say the rational part is one thing, but the irrational another. This, however, will be known, when w'e have explained what we say each of these is. The impartible, therefore, is simply as¬ sumed by Plato, but the partible not simply ; [for he says that the soul is a medium between an essence impartible] and an essence which is divi¬ sible about bodies, and that the soul is not on this account generated. It is requisite, therefore, to consider after what manner the nature of body is indigent of soul for the purposes of living ; and to see that it is necessary the soul should every where be present with the body, and also with the whole of it. Every sensitive power indeed, if it perceives through the whole body, arrives at the whole by being divided. For being every where in the body, it may be said to be divided ; but appearing every where a whole, it may be said that it is not entirely distributed into parts ; but that it becomes partible about bodies. If, however, some one should say that the soul is not divided in the other senses, but in the touch alone, to this we reply, that the soul is also divided in the other senses, since it is the body which receives it, but that it is less divided than inp. 367 the touch. The physical and augmentative powers also of the soul, are divided in a similar manner. And if desire dwells about the liver, but anger about the heart, the same thing must also be assert* ed of these. Perhaps however, these were not as¬ sumed in that mixture ; or perhaps they were as¬ sumed, but after another manner, and these were produced from some one of the assumed parti¬ culars. But the reasoning power and intellect, do not give themselves to body ; for their work is not effected through corporeal instruments ; since these are an impediment when they are employed in contemplations. Hence the impartible is diffe¬ rent from the partible, and they are not mingled as one thing, but as a whole consisting of parts, each of which is pure, and separate in power.