Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

arrives, it then also is; nor is it the past . For nothing there has passed away, but all things abide in the present now ; since they are things of such a kind, as to be satislied with themselves thus subsisting. But each of them is intellect and being. And the whole is every intellect, and every being. Intellect, therefore, derives its subsistence as intellect, from the intellection of being.4 But being subsists as being,

® Conformably to this, Aristotle also, in his Metaphysics says of intellect, “ that it energizes possessing,” ενεργεί be εγων»

% Instead of ο μεν ουν vovs , Kara to roetv v<piaras3 ro or, it is necessary to read as in the above translation, © μεν ovy vovs, Kara to yoetv vfioras ro oy.

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through becoming the object of intellectual percep¬ tion to intellect, and through imparting to it, intel¬ lection and existence. There is, however, another cause of intellection, which is also the cause of existence to being. Of both therefore at once, there is another cause. For both these are consubsistent, and never desert each other. But being two, this one thing [resulting from both] is at once intellect ; and is being, intellective, and intelligible. It is intellect, indeed, so far as it is intellective ; but being, so far as it is intelligible [or the object of perception to intellect.] For intellectual percep¬ tion could not subsist, difference and sameness not existing. Intellect, therefore, being, difference and sameness, are the first of things. But it is likewise necessary to assume together with these, motion and permanency. And motion, indeed, is neces¬ sary if being intellectually perceives ; but perma¬ nency in order that it may remain the same ; and difference, in order that it mav be intellective and intelligible. For if you take away difference from it, then becoming one it will be perfectly silent. It is necessary, however, that intellective natures should be different from each other ; and that they should also be the same with each other, since theyp. 265 subsist in the same thing, and there is something common in all of them. Diversity, likewise, is otherness. But these becoming many produce number and quantity. And the peculiarity of each of these produces quality, from all which, as prin° ciples, other things proceed.

V. This exuberant God, therefore, exists in the soul which is here, being conjoined to him by things of this kind, unless it wishes to depart from him.

d the peculiarity of each of these produces quality, from all which, as prin° ciples, other things proceed.

V. This exuberant God, therefore, exists in the soul which is here, being conjoined to him by things of this kind, unless it wishes to depart from him. Approaching therefore to, and as it were becoming one with him, it enquires as follows : Who is he that, being simple and prior to a multitude of this kind, generated this God ? Who is the cause of his existence, and of his being exuberant, and by whom number was produced ? For number is not the first of things ; since the one is prior to the duad. But the duad is the second thing, and being generated by the one , is defined by it. The duad, however, is of itself indefinite. But when it is defined, it is now number. And it is number as essence. Soul also is number. For neither corporeal masses nor magnitudes are the first of things. For these gross substances which sense fancies to be beings, are things of a posterior nature. Nor ls the moisturep. 266 which is in seeds honourable, but that contained in them, which is not visible. But this is number and reason [or a productive principle]. What are said therefore to be number and the duad in the intelli¬ gible world, are reasons and intellect. But the duad indeed is indefinite, when it is assumed as analogous to a subject. Number, however, which proceeds from it and the one , is each form of things ; intellect being as it were formed by the species of things which are generated in it. But it is formed in one manner from the one 9 and in another from itself, in the same manner as sight which is in energy. For intelligence is sight perceiving, both being one.

VI. How, therefore, does intelligence see ; what does it see ; and, in short, how does it subsist ; and how is it generated from the one , so that it may see ? For now indeed the soul perceives the neces¬ sity of the existence of these things. It desires, however, to understand this which is so much spoken of by the wise men of antiquity, viz. how from the one being such as we have said it is, each thing has its subsistence, whether it be multitude, or the duad, or number ; and why the one did notp. 267 abide in itself, but so great a multitude flowed from it, as is seen to have an existence, and which we think should be referred to the one.

s, each thing has its subsistence, whether it be multitude, or the duad, or number ; and why the one did notp. 267 abide in itself, but so great a multitude flowed from it, as is seen to have an existence, and which we think should be referred to the one. We must say, therefore, as follows, invoking God himself \ not with external speech , but with the soul itself, ex¬ tending ourselves in prayer to him , since we shall then be able to pray to him properly , when we approach by ourselves alone to the alone. It is necessary, therefore, that the beholder of him, being in himself as if in the interior part of a temple, and quietly abiding in an eminence beyond all things, should survey the statues as it were which are esta¬ blished outwardly, or rather that statue which first shines forth to the view, and after the following manner behold that which is naturally adapted to be beheld# With respect to every thing that is moved/ it is necessary there should be something to which it is moved. For if there is nothing of this kind, we should not admit that it is moved. But if any thing is generated posterior to that to which the moveable nature tends, it is necessary that it should always be generated in consequence

* Instead of ffa vra τφ ι ανουμινω in this place, it is necessary to read em Tram τψ κίνονμςνω.

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of that prior cause being converted to itself. Let, however, the generation which is in time be now removed from us who are discoursing about eternal beings. And if in the course of the discussion we attribute generation to things which exist eternally, let it be considered as indicative of cause and order. Hence, that which is from thence generated, must be said to be generated, the cause not being moved. For if something was generated in consequence of that cause being moved, the thing generated after the motion would be the third, and not the second from the cause. It is necessary, therefore, the cause being immoveable, that if any thing secondary subsists after it, this second nature should be pro¬ duced, without the cause either verging to it, or consulting,1 or in short being moved. How, there¬ fore, and what is it necessary to conceive about that abiding cause ? We must conceive a surrounding splendor, proceeding indeed from this cause, but from it in a permanent state, like a light from the sun shining, and as it were running round it, and being generated from it, the cause itself always abiding in the same immoveable condition.