Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

may be one.®

* Instead of και την ^ν^ην ev ου OeXovres in this place, it is requisite to read και την ψνχην ev eivat OeXovres*

p. 485

We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad. For that which is after this manner one, is the principle of quantity, which could not subsist unless essence had a prior exist¬ ence, and also that which is antecedent to essence* It is necessary therefore to project the dianoetic power to these ; but we should consider the monad and a point as having an analogical similitude to the one , on account of their simplicity, and their dying from multitude and division,

VI. How, therefore, can we speak of the onef and how can we adapt it to intellectual concep¬ tion ? Shall we say that this may be accomplished, by admitting that it is more transcendently one than the monad and a point? For in these, in¬ deed, the soul taking away magnitude and the multitude of number, ends in that which is smallest, and fixes itself in a certain thing which is indeed impartible, but which was in a partible nature, and is in something different from itself. But the one is neither in another thing, nor in that which is partible. Nor is it impartible in the same way as that which is smallest. For it is the greatest of allp. 486 things, not in magnitude, but in power. So that it is without magnitude in power. For the natures also which are [immediately] posterior to it, are im¬ partible in powers, and not in bulk. The prin¬ ciple of all things likewise must be admitted to be infinite, not because he is magnitude or number which cannot be passed over, but because the power of him is incomprehensible.1 For when you conceive him to be intellect or God, lie is more [excellent] than these. And again, when by the dianoetic power you equalize him with the o)ie, or conceive him to be God, by recurring to that which is most united in your intellectual perception, he even transcends these appellations. For he is in himself, nor is any thing accidental to him. By that which is sufficient to itself also the unity of his nature may be demonstrated. For it is neces¬ sary that the principle of all things should be most sufficient both to other things, and to itself, and that it should also be most un-indigent. But every thing which is multitudinous and not one, is indi¬ gent ; since consisting of many things it is not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be one. But

5 For περϊΧηπτφ here, it is necessary to read αχ€ριληπτφ<

p. 487

4 he one is not in want of itself.

ry thing which is multitudinous and not one, is indi¬ gent ; since consisting of many things it is not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be one. But

5 For περϊΧηπτφ here, it is necessary to read αχ€ριληπτφ<

p. 487

4 he one is not in want of itself. For it is the one . Moreover, that which is many, is in want of a£ many things as it is. And each of the things that are in it, as it subsists in conjunction with others, and is not in itself, is indigent of other things ; and thus a thing of this kind exhibits indigence, both according to parts and according to the whole. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be something which is most sufficient to itself, it is necessary there should be the one , which alone is a thing of such a kind, as neither to be indigent with reference to itself, nor with reference to another thing.® For it does not seek after any thing in order that it may be, nor in order that it may be in an excellent con¬ dition, nor that it may be there established. For being the cause of existence to other things, and

1 As, however, a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause; hence the one , so far as it is a principle or cause, will be indigent of the subsistence of these. “ Indeed,” as Damascius says, “ how is it possible it should not be indigent so far as it is the one ? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things.” Hence there is something even beyond the one , which has no kind of indigence whatever, which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent. See the Introduction to my Plato, .and jthe additional notes to the 3rd Volume of it.

{p. 488 not deriving that which it is from others, nor its happiness, what addition can be made to it exter¬ nal to itself? Hence its happiness, or the excel¬ lency of its condition, is not accidental to it. For it is itself [all that is sufficient to itself]. There is not likewise any place for it. For it is not in want of a foundation, as if it w ere not able to sustain itself. For that which is established in another thing is inanimate, and a falling mass, if it is with¬ out a foundation. But other tilings are established on account of the one , through w hich also they at the same time subsist, and have the place in which they are arranged. That, however, which seeks after place is indigent.

d a falling mass, if it is with¬ out a foundation. But other tilings are established on account of the one , through w hich also they at the same time subsist, and have the place in which they are arranged. That, however, which seeks after place is indigent. But the principle is not indigent of things posterior to itself. The princi¬ ple, therefore, of all things is unindigent of all things. For that which is indigent, is indigent in consequence of aspiring after its principle. But if the one was indigent of any thing, it would cer¬ tainly seek not to be the one ; so that it would be indigent of its destroyer. Every thing, however, w hich is said to be indigent, is indigent of a good condition, and of that which preserves it. Hence to the one nothing is good, and, therefore, neither is the wish for any thing good to it. But it is super -p. 489 good . And it is not good to itself, but to other things, which are able to participate of it. Nor does ihe one possess intelligence, lest it should also possess difference ; nor motion. For it is prior to motion, and prior to intelligence. For what is there which it will intellectually perceive ? Shall we say itself? Prior to intellection, therefore, it will be ignorant, and will be in want of intelligence in order that it may know itself, though it is suffi¬ cient to itself. It does not follow, however, that because the one does not know itself, and does not intellectually perceive itself, there will be ignorance in it. For ignorance takes place where there is diversity, and when one thing is ignorant of another. That, however, which is alone neither knows anv thing, nor has any thing of which it is ignorant. But being one, and associating with itself, it docs not require the intellectual perception of itself," since neither is it necessary, in order that you may preserve the one , to adapt to it an association with itself. But it is requisite to take away intellectual perception, an association with itself, and the knowledge of itself, and of other things. For it is not proper to arrange it according to the act of perceiving intellectually, but rather according top. 490 intelligence. For intelligence does not perceive intellectually, but is the cause of intellectual per* ception to another thing. Cause, however, is not the same with the thing caused. But the cause of all things is not any one of them. Hence neither must it be denominated that good which it imparts to others ; but it is after another manner the good , in a way transcending other goods.

VII.