Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

y only. The reasonings, likewise, of philo¬ sophy must be inserted in him, through which he will be led to a belief of truths of which he is igno¬ rant, thougli he [occultly] possesses them. What these reasonings however, are, will be hereafter un¬ folded,

II. But the lover, into which the musician may be changed, and being changed will either remain [in that character] or will pass beyond it, has in a certain respect a recollection of beauty. Being however separated from it, he is incapable of learn¬ ing what it is. But as he is struck by the beautiful objects which present themselves to the sight, he is seized with astonishment about them. He therefore must be taught not to be abjectly asto¬ nished about one beautiful body, but he must be led by the exercise of the reasoning power to all beautiful bodies, and he who does this must exhibit to him that which is one and the same in all of them, and inform him that it is different from and is derived elsewhere, than from bodies, and is rather inherent in other things, such as beautiful pursuits, and beautiful laws. For the lover willp. 23 now become accustomed to incorporeal natures. He likewise must be led to the beauty which is in the arts, in sciences, and the virtues, and after¬ wards to that which is one and the same in all these ; and he must be taught after what manner beauty is inherent in each of them. But after the virtues, he must now ascend to intellect, and being itself, and there commence the progression on high*

III. The philosopher, however, is naturally prompt, and as it were, winged, and does not re¬ quire a separation [from sensible objects,] like the other characters ; since he is excited to the super¬ nal region, but is dubious, and therefore is only in want of one that may point out the way. The path, therefore, must be shown to him, and he must be liberated, since he is naturally willing, and was formerly freed [from the fetters of a corporeal na¬ ture.] Hence, he must be instructed in the ma¬ thematical disciplines, in order that he may be accustomed to the perception of and belief in an incorporeal essence. For he will easily admit its subsistence, as he is desirous of learning. As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he mustp. 24 be led to the perfection of tiie virtues ; and after the mathematics, he must be taught dialectic rea¬ sonings, and in short, must be rendered skilful in dialectic,

IV.

he is desirous of learning. As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he mustp. 24 be led to the perfection of tiie virtues ; and after the mathematics, he must be taught dialectic rea¬ sonings, and in short, must be rendered skilful in dialectic,

IV. What, then, is the dialectic which ought to be delivered in addition to the former particu¬ lars ? It is, indeed, a habit enabling its possessor to reason about every thing, to know what each thing is, and in what it differs from other things, what the common something is which it partici¬ pates, where each of these subsists, if a thing is, w hat it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non-beings [which are not nothing] but different from beings. This, also, discusses the good , and that which is not good ; such things as are under the good , and such as are under the contrary to it ; and what that is which is eternal, and that which is not a thing of this kind. All these likewise it dis¬ cusses scientifically, and not from opinion. Rest¬ ing, also, from the wandering about a sensible nature, it establishes itself in the intelligible world, and there has its employment, dismissing falsehood, and nourishing the soul in what is called the plain of truth, employing for this purpose the division of

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Plato, and also for the separation of forms* It likewise employs this division for the purpose of defining what a thing is, and in order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which results from these, till it has proceeded through the whole of an intelligible na¬ ture ; and again, by an analytic process it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first* Then, however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and being no longer busily employed, but becoming one, it sur¬ veys what is called logic, which is occupied about propositions and syllogisms, — just as if giving to another art, the knowledge of writing ; some of which it considers as necessary, and prior to art. But it forms a judgment of these* as well as of other things, and thinks that some of them are use¬ ful, but others superfluous, and pertaining to the method by which these are discussed*

V. Whence, however, does this science derive its principles ? May we not say that intellect im¬ parts clear principles to the soul that is able to re¬ ceive them ? Afterwards, the soul compounds the things consequent to these principles, and connects and divides them, till it arrives at a perfect intel¬ lect.

nciples ? May we not say that intellect im¬ parts clear principles to the soul that is able to re¬ ceive them ? Afterwards, the soul compounds the things consequent to these principles, and connects and divides them, till it arrives at a perfect intel¬ lect. For, as Plato says, this science is the purest part of intellect and [intellectual] prudence. It is necessary, therefore, since it is the most honourable habit of those things that are in us, that it should be conversant with being, and the most honorable nature ; and that prudence, indeed, should be con¬ versant with being, but intellect with that which is beyond being. What, then, is philosophy ? That which is most honorable. Is philosophy, therefore, the same as dialectic ? Or is not dialectic the most honorable part of philosophy ? For it must not be fancied that it is the instrument of the philosopher ; since it does not consist of mere theorems and rules, but is conversant with things, and has beings as it were for its subject matter. Nevertheless, it pro¬ ceeds in a path to beings, possessing things them¬ selves together with theorems. It knows, however, that which is false and sophistical accidentally, something else being the cause of these ; and it forms a judgment of them as of that which is foreign, knowing the false by the truths it contains in itself, when it is adduced by any one, because it is con¬ trary to the rule of truth. Propositions, therefore, are not the object of its knowledge ; for these arep. 27 letters. But, knowing truth, it knows that which is called a proposition. And universally, it knows the motions of the soul, what the soul admits, and what it rejects, and whether it rejects that which it admits, or something else. Likewise, whether dif¬ ferent or the same things are adduced ; applying itself to them in a way resembling sense/ But it assigns to another power an accurate discussion of these particulars.

VI. This, therefore, is an honourable part; since philosophy has also other parts. For it speculates about nature, receiving assistance from dialectic, in the same manner as the other arts use arithmetic. Philosophy, however, proximately de¬ rives assistance from dialectic. And, in a similar manner, it speculates about manners, surveying them through dialectic, but adding habits, and the exercises from which habits proceed. The rational virtues also have habits, and what are now as peculiarities, which they derive from thence. And the other virtues, indeed, have their reasonings in pecu¬ liar passions and actions ; but prudence is a certain

*

1 i. c.