Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ng, and every beautiful spectacle. Forp. 480 fcvery thing beautiful is posterior to the supreme* and is derived from him, in the same manner as all diurnal light is derived from the sun. Hence Plato says, he is neither effable, nor to be described by writing. We speak however, and write about him, extending ourselves to him, and exciting others by a reasoning process to the vision of him ; pointing out, as it were, the way to him w ho wishes to behold something [of his ineffable nature]. For doctrine extends as far as to the way and the progression to him. But the vision of him is now the work of one who is solicitous to perceive him. He, however, will not arrive at the vision of him, and will not be affected by the sur¬ vey, nor w ill have in himself as it w^ere an amatory passion from the viewr, (which passion causes the lover to rest in the object of his love) nor receive from it a true light, which surrounds the whole soul with its splendor, in consequence of becoming nearer to it ; he, I say, will not behold this light, who attempts to ascend to the vision of the supreme while he is drawn dow nwards by those things which are an impediment to the vision. He will likewise not ascend by himself alone, but will be accom¬ panied by that which will divulse him from the onetp. 481 or rather he will not be himself collected into one* For the one is not absent from any thing, and yet is separated from all things ; so that it is present* and yet not present with them. But it is present with those things that are able, and are prepared to receive it, so that they become congruous, and as it were pass into contact with it, through simili¬ tude and a certain inherent power allied to that which is imparted by the one . When, therefore, the soul is disposed in such a w>ay as she was when she came from the one , then she is able to perceive it, as far as it is naturally capable of being seen. He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither* but either on account of the abovementioned obstacle is deprived of this vision, or through the want of reason which may conduct him to it, and impart faith respecting it ; such a one may consider him¬ self as the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and should endeavour by sepa¬ rating himself from all things to be alone. But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient* he should conceive as follows :

V.

y consider him¬ self as the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and should endeavour by sepa¬ rating himself from all things to be alone. But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient* he should conceive as follows :

V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance* and are held together by corpo- Plot, 2 Hp. 482 real causes, is very remote from God, and the con¬ ception of the one . Our arguments, likewise, are not addressed to these, but to those who admit that there is another nature besides bodies, and who ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be well acquainted with the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its being derived from intellect ; from which also parti¬ cipating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these things, however, he should admit the subsistence of another intellect, different from that which reasons, and which is denominated rational. He should likew ise consider reasonings to subsist now as it were in interval and motion, and sciences to be such-like reasons in the soul, with an [evolved] and manifest subsistence ; in consequence of intellect which is the cause of sciences being now infused into the soul. Hence in this ease, the soul has as it were a sensible perception of intellect, through apprehend¬ ing it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself the intelligible world, a tranquil intellect, and a quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a multitude without separation, and again a separate multitude. For it is neither separated like the reasons [i. e, forms or ideas in the human soul]

p. 483

which are perceived by our intellect one at a time/ [and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused mul¬ titude. For each of the forms contained in it pro¬ ceeds separate from the rest ; in the same manner as in the sciences, where all things subsisting in an impartible nature, at the same time each is separate from the rest. This multitude, therefore, subsisting at once is the intelligible world, which is immediately united to the first principle of things, and which the same reason that demonstrates the exist¬ ence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the onei and the principle of all things, is simple.

trates the exist¬ ence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the onei and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence that which is prior to the most honourable thing among beings/ if it is necessary there should be

1 In the original, owe γαρ διακεκριται ως οι Χογοι οι ηδη καθ' εν νοούμενοι , which Ficinus not understanding has erroneously translated as follows: “ Neque enim discernitur sicut rationes in probatione solcnt, sed tanquam rationes jam secundum unum quiddam excogitante." For the human intellect perceives only one form or idea at a time ; but a divine intellect sees all forms at once.

1 Instead of το δη ττρο τον εν τοι$ ου δ' τιμιωτατον here, it is necessary to read το δη ττρο τον cv rois ονσιν τιμιωτατον*

p. 484

- r something prior to intellect, which wishes indeed to be one, yet is not one, but has the form of one, be-6 cause intellect is not in itself dispersed, but is truly present with itself, and does not, in consequence of its proximity to the one , divulse itself, though in a certain respect it dares to depart from the one that, I say, which is prior to intellect and is the oney is a prodigy, and is not being, lest here also the one should be predicated of another thing, to wffiich no name is in reality adapted. But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may appropriately be called in common one} yet not as being first something else* and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known ; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence. And intellect leads to essence. The nature also of the one is such, that it is the fountain of the most excellent things, and a power generating beings, abiding in itself without diminution, and not subsisting in its progeny. But we denominate it the one from ne^ cessity, in order that we may signify it to each other by a name, and may be led to an impartible con¬ ception, being anxious that our soul may be one.®

* Instead of και την ^ν^ην ev ου OeXovres in this place, it is requisite to read και την ψνχην ev eivat OeXovres*

p. 485

We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad.