Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
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instruments ; since these are an impediment when they are employed in contemplations. Hence the impartible is diffe¬ rent from the partible, and they are not mingled as one thing, but as a whole consisting of parts, each of which is pure, and separate in power. If, how» ever, that which becomes partible about bodies^ has the impartible from a more sublime power, this very same thing may be both impartible and partible, as being mingled from the partible, and the power which proceeds into it from on high.
XX. It is requisite, however, to consider whe¬ ther these, and what are called the other parts of the soul are in place, or these in short are not, but the other parts are,, and if they are where they are^p. 368 or whether none of them is in place. For if we do not assign a certain place to the several parts of the soul, but admit that each of them is no where, and thus make them to be no more within, than without the body, we shall render the body inanimate, and shall not be able to show how those works are effected which are performed through the corporeal organs. Or if we admit that some of the parts of the soul are in place, but others not, we shall not appear to grant those parts to be in us which we exclude from place, so that neither shall we admit
Λ that the whole of our soul is in us. In short, there* fore, we must neither assert that any one of the parts of the soul, nor that the whole of it is in body. For place is that which comprehends, and is com· prehensive of body ; and where each thing is that is divided, there it is situated in such a way that the whole is not in any thing indiscriminately. Soul, however, is not body, and is not rather that which is comprehended than that which compre¬ hends. Nor yet is it in body as in a vessel ; for if it were, the body would become inanimate, whe¬ ther it comprehended the soul as a vessel, "or as place ; unless it should be said that the soul is col¬ lected in itself, and by a certain distribution trans¬ mits something of itself into its vessel the body, and thus as much as the vessel participates* so much will be taken away from the soul. Place* however, properly so called* is incorporeal, and not body. So that in what will it be indigent of soul ?
Body also, not by itself, but by the boundary of
* itself, will approximate to soul. Many other objections, likewise, may be urged against him who asserts that soul is in place.
is incorporeal, and not body. So that in what will it be indigent of soul ?
Body also, not by itself, but by the boundary of
* itself, will approximate to soul. Many other objections, likewise, may be urged against him who asserts that soul is in place. For place will always be co-introduced with soul ; and [it may still be asked] what will that be which introduces together with itself place ? If place also is interval, much less will soul be in the body as in place. For it is necessary, that interval should be a vacuum. Body, however, is not a vacuum, but perhaps that will be a vacuum in which body is ; so that body will be in a vacuum. Moreover, neither will soul be in the body as in a subject. For that which is in a subject, is a passion of that in which it is, as colour and figure. But soul is separable from the body. Nor yet, is soul ip the body, as a part in the whole : for soul is not a part of the body. But if some one should say that soul is a part as in the whole animal, in the first place indeed, the same doubt will remain how it is in the whole. For it
* # is not proper to conceive that it subsists either as
Plot. 2 A
p. 370
.wine in a vessel of wine, or as a vessel in a vessel y nor in the same manner as a thing is in itself. Nor again, will it be in body as a whole in the parts. For it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole; but the body parts. Neither is it as form in matter : for the form which is in matter, is inse¬ parable from matter. And matter now existing, form afterwards accedes to it. But soul produces the form in matter, being itself something different from material form. If, however, it should be said that soul is not a generated, but a separate form, it will not yet be manifest how this form is in body ; and soul will be separate from body. How then is it said by all men, that the soul is in the body ? Shall wre say it is because not the soul but the body is visible ? Perceiving therefore the body, and con¬ ceiving it to be animated because it is moved and has sensible perception, we say that the body has the soul. Hence, therefore, we say that the soul is in the body. If, however, the soul were visible and sensible, so as to be perceived to be full of life* to comprehend entirely the body in life, and to ex¬ tend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that in the more principal nature that which is not suchp. 371 subsists, in that which contains, the thing contained, and that which flows in and to ex¬ tend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that in the more principal nature that which is not suchp. 371 subsists, in that which contains, the thing contained, and that which flows in that which does not flow* i
XXI. What then shall we say, if some one should ask us how the soul is present with the body, without giving us any information himself on the subject ? And also if he should ask us whether the whole soul is similarly present, or a different part is differently present with the body ? Since, therefore, none of the above-mentioned modes of the subsistence of one thing in another1 is adapted to the subsistence of the soul in the body ; but the soul is said to be in the body in such a way as the pilot in a ship, this is well said so far as pertains to the power by which the soul is able to separate itself from the body ; yet it does not entirely exhi¬ bit to us the mode which we are now investigating. For the pilot, so far as he is a sailor, will be from accident a pilot in the ship. But if the soul is present with the body in the same manner as the pilot alone with the ship, how is this effected ? For
% the pilot is not in all the ship, in the same manner as the soul is in all the body. Shall we, therefore,
I · . * J 1 V ’■ · * ’ * say, that the soul is in the body, in the same way as art is in the instruments of art ? For instance, as aft in the rudder, if the rudder was animated, so that the piloting art is within it, moving it artifi¬ cially. Now, however, there is this difference be¬ tween the two, that art operates externally. If* therefore, we admit that the soul is in the body, Conformably to the paradigm of the pilot within the rudder, as in a natural instrument ; for he thus will move it, in whatever he wishes to effect ; shall we make any accession to the object of our investi¬ gation ? Or shall we again be dubious how the soul is in the instrument ? And though this mode is dif¬ ferent from the former modes, yet we still desire to discover [something farther], and to accede still nearer to the thing proposed*
* And these modes are enumerated by Aristotle in his Physics. ’
XXII. Shall we therefore say, that when the
•j * soul is present with the body, it is present in the same manner as light is with the air ? For again, this when present is [in reality] not present. And being present through the whole, is mingled with bo part of it. It is also itself permanent, but the air flows by it.