Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

first separate body from the man, viz. from yourself. And if after this, you separate the soul which fashions the body, and as much as possible take away sense, desire and anger, and other trifles of this kind, as very much verging

\ to the mortal nature. For then, that which re¬ mains of the soul, is what we have denominated the image of intellect, and which preserves some¬ thing of its light; so as to resemble the light proxi¬ mate to the sphere of the sun which emanating from, diffuses its light about the sun. No one therefore, will admit that light to be the sun, which proceeds from, and shines about it. For this light originates from the sun, and permanently surrounds it ; but another light always proceeds from another prior to it, until it arrives as far as to us and the earth. All the light, however, which is about the suri, must be admitted to be situated in somethingp. 427 else, in order that there may be no interval void of body after the sun. But soul is a light derived from, and subsisting about intellect. It also is sus¬ pended from intellect, which it surrounds, and is not in any other thing. Nor is there any place in which it is received ; for neither is intellect in place. Hence, the light of the sun indeed, is in the air ; but soul of this kind is so pure, that it is visible of itself, so that it is seen by itself, and by another soul similarly pure. Soul indeed, must reason about, [in order to perceive] intellect, and must investigate from itself what the nature of it is. But intellect beholds itself without reasoning about itself. For it is always present with itself. But we are present with ourselves and with intellect when we tend to it. For our life is divided, and consists of many lives. But intellect is not at all in want of another life, or of other things ; but what it imparts, it imparts to others, and not to itself. For it is not indigent of things inferior to itself ; nor, since it possesses the universe, does it confer on itself that which is less. Nor does it contain first natures in itself as vestiges ; or rather, it does not contain, but is itself these very things. If, however, some one is incapable of having such a primary soul, which perceives intellectually withp. 428 purity, let him assume a doxastic soul, and after¬ wards, from this ascend [to intellect.] But if he cannot even assume this, let him employ sense, bringing with itself more dilated forms : I mean sense in itself, together with the things which it is able to contain, and which now exists in forms» If some one however, wishes 2ascend [to intellect.] But if he cannot even assume this, let him employ sense, bringing with itself more dilated forms : I mean sense in itself, together with the things which it is able to contain, and which now exists in forms» If some one however, wishes to descend, let him proceed to the generative power, and as far as to its effects. Afterwards, let him from hence ascend from the last to the last forms, or rather to those that are the first.

X. And thus much concerning these particulars. If, however, not 1 only forms that are produced, are in intellect, for they are not the last of things, [when they are considered as having an intellectual subsistence ;] but their productive forms are the first of things, whence also they are first ; — if this be the case, it is necessary, that the producing cause of forms should also be there, and that both the productive cause and the forms produced should be one. For if this is not admitted, intellect will again be in want of something else. What then, will that which is beyond this be again in want ?

1 ov is omitted in the original.

Or is not this, indeed, which is indigent intellect ? Will not, therefore, that which is beyond intellect see itself? Or must we not rather say, that this is not at all in want of vision. But of this hereafter. Now, however^ we shall resume what we were be¬ fore discussing. For the speculation is not about a casual thing. Again, therefore, we must say that this intellect is in want of the vision of itself ; or rather that it possesses the perception of itself. And in the first place, it sees that it is manifold. In the next place it sees that it is the perception of something else [i. e. of the intelligible,] and hence, that it is necessarily perceptive of the intelligible.

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It likewise sees that the essence of itself is vision.

For in consequence of there being a certain other thing, it is necessary there should be vision ; since if there were nothing else, vision would be in vain. Hence, it is necessary that in intellect there should be more things than one, in order that there may be vision. It is also necessary that vision should concur with the visible ; and that what is seen by intellect should be multitude, and not entirely one. For that which is entirely one has not any thing about which it may energize? but being alone and solitary, it is perfectly quiescent. For so farp. 430 as it energizes, it is another and another.