Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

the case, instead of the life which is there, it is necessary there should be another life of the discursive power of the mundane soul, homonymous as it w^ere to the life of eternity ; and instead of intellectual motion, that there should be the motion of a certain part of the soul. It is also necessary, that instead of an invariable sameness and permanency of sub¬ sistence, there should be that wdiich does not abide in the same, but alw?ays has another and another energy. Likewise, that instead of an essence which is without interval and one, there should be an image of the one , and which possesses unity in con¬ tinuity of succession. That instead of that which is now infinite, and a whole, there should be that which proceeds ad infinitum, according to what is perpetually successive. And that instead of an at-once-collected whole, there should be that which is a whole according to parts, and is always about to be a whole. For thus it will imitate that which is now wholly what it is, and which is at-oncecollected, and infinite, if it wishes its being to conp. 211sist in perpetual acquisition ; since it will thus also imitate the being of eternity. It is necessary, however, not to assume time externally to soul* as neither is eternity in the intelligible world external to being. Nor again, must it be considered as any thing consecutive, or posterior to soul, as neither is eternity to being. But it must be beheld within, and subsisting together with soul, in the same man¬ ner as eternity with being.

XII. Here, however, it is necessary to under¬ stand, that this is the nature of time, viz. that it is the length of such a life as we have before men¬ tioned, proceeding in equable and similar muta¬ tions, which themselves proceed in a silent course; this length also possessing a continuity of energy. If, therefore, we again in words make this power to revert, and the life of it to cease which it now pos¬ sesses, and wThich is unceasing, and will never end, because it is the energy of a certain ever-existing soul, not directed to itself, nor in itself, but em¬ ployed in producing and generating if, therefore, we suppose this power no longer energizing, but ceasing from this energy, and also this part of the soul converted to real being and eternity, andp. 212 abiding in quiet, what will there any further be besides eternity? What will any longer be another and another, where all things abide in one ? And what will be prior or posterior, or more extended ? Where, likewise, will the soul any further betake itself to any other thing than that in 2re any further be besides eternity? What will any longer be another and another, where all things abide in one ? And what will be prior or posterior, or more extended ? Where, likewise, will the soul any further betake itself to any other thing than that in which it is ? Or rather, neither will it betake itself to this. For in this case, it must have first departed from it, in order that it may accede to it ; since neither is it the sphere itself [of the universe] which had not an existence prior to time. For this sphere exists, and is moved in time. And though time should stop, this sphere still continuing to energize, we should nevertheless measure the duration of its permanency, as long as the permanency of eternity is external to it. If, therefore, this sphere becom¬ ing quiescent and united, time is taken away, it is evident that the commencement of its motion, round the earth, and this its life, generate time. Hence, also, it is said [in the Timas us of Plato,] that time was generated together with the universe, because soul produced it in conjunction with the universe. For in an energy of this kind, this world was generated. And this energy indeed is time, but the universe is in time. If, however, some onep. 213 should say, that the circulations of the stars are also denominated by Plato times, he should recol¬ lect that he says these were generated for the pur¬ pose of rendering time manifest and distinct, and that the measure of it might be conspicuous to us. For since it was not possible for time itself to be bounded by soul, nor for each part of it to be measured by us, since it is invisible and incompre¬ hensible, and especially since this is impossible to those who do not know how to numerate,— hence the Demiurgus made day and night, through which mankind were enabled to» apprehend two things by their difference ; from which, as Plato says, they arrived at the conception of number. Afterwards receiving the interval produced by the motion of the sun from the east to the east again, they appre¬ hended what was the quantity of time, the form of the motion being equable ; adhering to which, we use a thing of this kind as a measure of time. For time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure ; and what would it say if it measured ? Will it say this thing is as much in quantity as I am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that according to which the measure subsists r Has it not therefore an existence in order that it may measure, but is not a measure ? Hence the mea¬ sured motion of the universe will be 3much in quantity as I am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that according to which the measure subsists r Has it not therefore an existence in order that it may measure, but is not a measure ? Hence the mea¬ sured motion of the universe will be according to time And time will not be the measure of motipn, according to that which it is, but according to accident, so that being something else prior to this, it renders the quantity of the motion manifest. One motion also being assumed in so much time, and being frequently enumerated, leads to a concep tion of the quantity of time that is past. So that if some one should say that motion and circu¬ lation, after a certain manner, measure time as much as possible, as manifesting in their quantity the quantity of time, which cannot in any other way be assumed or understood, he indeed will not adduce an absurd manifestation of time. Hence , that which is measured by circulation , viz. which is manifested , and not generated by it , will be time . And thus the measure of motion is that which is measured by a definite motion, and is measured by it, as being different from it. For if that which measures was one thing, and that which is measured another, but is measured accidentally ; in this case, it would he just as if some one should say that what is measured by a cubit is magnitude, but should not say what that is which defines the magp. 215nitude. It would also be just as if some one not being able to render motion itself manifest on account of its indefinite nature, should say that motion is that which is measured by place. For assuming the place which motion passes through, he will say that the quantity of the motion is equal to the quantity of the place.

XIII. Circulation, therefore, renders time in which it is performed manifest. It is necessary^ however, that time should no longer alone be that in which something is performed, but that prior to this it should be what it is, namely, that in which other things are moved and at rest, in an equable and orderly manner ; and that from a certain thing of an orderly nature, it should become apparent, and shine forth to our conceptions, yet not be gene¬ rated by this thing, whether it is at rest, or in mo¬ tion. It becomes, however, more apparent when this thing is in motion. For motion contributes more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion of a thing is more known than the quantity of its rest.