Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ld thus denomi-

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nate it, he will be near to the true definition 1 of it. For what is afterwards added, viz. that it is all things at once, and that nothing of it is consumed, will be an exposition of the assertion, that it is now infinite life.

VI. Because, however, such a nature as this, thus all-beautiful and perpetual, subsists about the one , proceeding from and with it, and in no respect departing from it, but always abides about and in the one , and lives according to it, hence I think it is beautifully and with a profundity of decision, said by Plato, that “ eternity abides in one,” 1 that he might not only lead it to the one which is in itself, but that he might also in a similar manner lead the life of being about the one . This, there¬ fore, is that which we investigate, and that which thus abides is eternity. For this very thing, and

1 This definition of eternity is justly admired by Proclus in his 3d book On the Theology of Plato, of which see my trans¬ lation. Boetius, likewise, as I have elsewhere observed, has adopted this definition in lib. 5. De Consol. Philosoph.

* Plato, however, does not by the one in this place, mean the ineffable principle of things, but the one of being, or the summit of the intelligible order, as is shown by Proclus in the above mentioned work.

p. 190

which thus abides, which is the energy of a life abiding from itself, subsisting with and in the one , and which neither in existing nor living is false and fictitious, will certainly be eternity. For to be truly, is never not to be, nor to be otherwise. But the former of these is to be invariably the same ; and the latter is to be without diversity. Hence it has not in any respect, another and another. You must not, therefore, conceive it to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is any thing of prior and pos¬ terior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the is, is the truest of all the things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life ; — if this be the case, again that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. But when we say that it is always, and that it is not at one time being, and at another time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus speak for the sake of perspicuity ; since the term always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incor¬ ruptible 1 nature.

ot at one time being, and at another time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus speak for the sake of perspicuity ; since the term always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incor¬ ruptible 1 nature. And farther still, it signifies that

1 After του άφθαρτου in the Greek, the words πλανώ αν την φυχψ', ets εκβασιν τον πλειονοε follow, which are to me uiiiiifp. 191 it never fails. Perhaps, however, it would be better to call it only being. But though being is a name sufficient to essence, yet since some are of opinion that generation also is, essence, it is requi¬ site for the sake of discipline to add the term al¬ ways. For one thing is not being, but another perpetual being ; as neither is a philosopher one thing, but a true philosopher another. Because, however, some persons are only philosophers in appearance, the addition of a true philosopher be¬ came necessary. Thus, likewise, the always was added to being, and being to the always . So that it was called axon ; on which account the always was assumed, in order that the conjunction of being with the always , might indicate that which is truly being. The always , likewise, must be contracted into a power devoid of interval, and which besides what it now possesses, is not in want of any thing. But it possesses every thing. Hence it is every thing and being, and is not indigent of any thing.

telligible. Something, I conceive, is omitted ; but ί am not able to conjecture what the omission is. The version of these words by Ficinus is certainly nonsense ; for it is, " animum potest reddere vagabundum per quendam in plura exitum et proven! um.”

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Nor is a nature of this kind, full indeed in one re¬ spect, but deficient in another. For that which exists in time, though it may seem to be as perfect as is sufficient to body, yet it is perfect through soul, and is in want of something future, because it is deficient in time of which it is indigent ; so that it exists together with time, if it is present with it, and being imperfect, runs in conjunction with it. On this account, therefore, it is equivocally said to be a perfect being. That, however, which is a thing; of such a kind, as neither to be in want of futurity, nor to be measured by some other time, nor to be in futurity infinite, and this infinitely, but now possesses that which it ought to be ; — -this is that after which our intellectual conception

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aspires ; the being of which is not derived from a certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all quantity.

n futurity infinite, and this infinitely, but now possesses that which it ought to be ; — -this is that after which our intellectual conception

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aspires ; the being of which is not derived from a certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all quantity. For it is fit, since it is not of a definite quantity, that it should not at all come into contact with quantity, lest the life of it being divided, should lose its pure impartibiiity ; but that it should be both in life and essence impartible. When, however, it is said in the Timasus that the demiurgus was good, this must be referred to the conception of the universe, signifying that what isp. 193 beyond the universe, does not originate from a cer¬ tain time ; so that neither is the world allotted a certain temporal beginning, since the cause of its existence is the source of priority. At the same time, however, Plato thus speaking for the sake of perspicuity, blames afterwards this expression was goody as not altogether rightly employed in things which are allotted what is called and is intellec¬ tually conceived to be, an eternal subsistence^

VII. Do we, therefore, bear witness to the things of which we now speak, as to things foreign from our nature ? But how is this possible ? For how can intellectual perception be effected, except by contact ? And how can we come into contact with things that are foreign to us ? It is necessary, therefore, that we also should participate of eter¬ nity. Since, however, we exist in time, how is this possible ? But we shall know what it is to be in time, and what it is to be in eternity, when we have discovered what time is. We must, therefore, descend from eternity to time, and the investigation of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to that which is above, but we must now speak de¬ scending, yet not profoundly, but our descent must

Plot . N

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be such as that of time· If, indeed, nothing had been said concerning time by ancient and blessed men, it would be necessary that connecting from the beginning what follows with eternity, we should endeavour to speak what appears to us to be the truth on this subject, and to adapt our opinion to the conception of it which we possess. Now, however, it is necessary first to assume those asser¬ tions which especially deserve attention, and to consider if what we say is concordant with some one of them. But perhaps the assertions concerning time, ought in the first place to receive a three¬ fold division.