Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

t that life and soul are nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is, and how it subsists. For they are compelled to fly to this when they admit that there is another efficacious nature besides bodies. If therefore not every spirit is soul, because there are myriads of inanimate spirits, but a spirit subsisting after a cer¬ tain manner is according to them soul, we ask themp. 228 whether they say that such a spirit and this habi¬ tude is something belonging to beings, or nothing. But if indeed it is nothing, it will be a name alone. And its subsistence after a certain manner will be also merely a name, and thus it will be an accident to beings. Hence, according to them nothing but matter will have an existence, and soul, deity, and every thing [except matter] will be merely names. If, however, habitude is something pertaining to beings, and different from a subject and from mat¬ ter, and subsists indeed in matter, but is itself im¬ material, because it is not again composed from matter -if this be the case, it will be a certain reason [or productive principle] and will not be body, but of another nature. Farther still, from the following considerations it will be no less mani¬ fest that it is impossible for soul to be any body whatever. For it would either be hot or cold, or hard, or soft, or moist, or firm, or black, or white, and all such different qualities as are in different bodies. Apd if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone heat ; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause things to be light ; if heavy, it will alone render them heavy ; if black, it will blacken ; and if white,p. 229 will cause them to be white. For it is not the pro¬ vince of fire to refrigerate, nor of cold to produce heat. But soul produces different effects in diffe¬ rent animals, and contrary effects in the same ani¬ mal ; fixing some things, but diffusing others. And some things indeed it causes to be dense, but others rare, black, white, light and heavy ; though from the nature of one body it ought to produce one quality only, and not different qualities. But now it produces many qualities.

V. With respect to motions also, why are different motions produced by the soul, and not one only, there being but one [natural] motion of every body ? But if they assign deliberate choice as the cause of some motions, and reasons [or pro¬ ductive principles] as the causes of others, these indeed are rightly assigned.

produced by the soul, and not one only, there being but one [natural] motion of every body ? But if they assign deliberate choice as the cause of some motions, and reasons [or pro¬ ductive principles] as the causes of others, these indeed are rightly assigned. Deliberate choice, however, does not pertain to body, nor reasons, since they are different, but an elementary body is one and simple. Nor can such a body be full of productive power, except so far as this is imparted to it by that which makes it to be hot or cold. But how can it belong to body to increase at cer¬ tain times, and to a certain extent, since it is

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* τ' » Τ *ί naturally adapted to be increased, except so far as the power of augmenting is assumed in the bulk of matter, and is subservient to that which through it produces the increase P For if soul being body in¬ creases, it is necessary that it should also be in¬ creased, viz. by the addition of a similar body, in order that it may be of an equal bulk vuth that which is increased by it. And that which is added will either be soul, or an inanimate bod) . And if indeed it is soul, whence and how is it introduced, atid how is it added ? But if that which is added is inanimate, how is this animated, how does it accord with the preceding soul, and become one with it, and how does it entertain the same opinions with the former soul ? Will not this added soul, as being foreign, be ignorant of what the other knows P And in the same manner as with another mass belonging to our frame, there will be an efflux from, and an influx into it, and nothing will continue the same.. How, therefore, shall we remember ? And how shall we recognize such things as are appropriate to us, since we shall never employ the same soul ? Moreover, if soul is body, since the nature of body is divided into many parts, each of the parts will not be the same with the whole. If, therefore.

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soul was a magnitude of a certain quantity, if this quantity should become less, it would no longer be soul ; just as the being of every quantity is changed by ablation, from what it was before. But if some one of those things which have magnitude, being diminished in bulk, should remain the same in quality, so far indeed as it is body, and so far as it is quantity, it is different from what it was ; but through quality which is different from quantity it is able to preserve itself the same.

magnitude, being diminished in bulk, should remain the same in quality, so far indeed as it is body, and so far as it is quantity, it is different from what it was ; but through quality which is different from quantity it is able to preserve itself the same. What, there¬ fore, will those say who contend that the soul is body ? In the first place, indeed, with respect to each part of the soul which is in the same body, is each part soul in the same manner as the whole soul ? And again, is this the case with the part of a part ? For if this is admitted, magnitude will con¬ tribute nothing to the essence of the soul ; though it is necessary that it should if soul is a certain quantity. The whole soul, likewise, is every where present with the body ; but it is impossible for the same corporeal whole to be in many things at the same time, or for a part of it to be the same as the whole. And if they say that each of the parts is not soul, then according to them, soul will consist of things inanimate. Besides, if the magnitude ofp. 232 each soul is definite, it will no longer be soul, if it is either extended or diminished. When, there¬ fore, from one copulation and one seed, twins are begotten, or as in other animals many offspring are produced, most of the seed being distributed into many places, where also each part of the seed is a whole, how is it possible this should not teach those who are willing to learn, that where the part is the same w ith the whole, this in the very essence of itself transcends the nature of quantity ; and ought from necessity to be without quantity. For thus alone it can remain the same, quantity being withdrawn, since it has no need of eittier quantity or bulk, its essence being something different from either. Hence soul and reasons [or productive principles] are void of quantity.

VI. But that if soul is body, it will not be pos¬ sible to perceive either sensibly or intellectually, or to know scientifically, and that there will neither be virtue, nor any thing beautiful [in human con¬ duct,] will be manifest from the following consi¬ derations. Whatever is able to have a sensible perception of any thing, ought itself to be one, and to apprehend every thing by one and the samep. 233 power. This will also be the case, if many things enter through many organs of sense, or there are many qualities about one thing, and likewise when there is a variegated appearance such as that of the face, through one thing.