Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

er possible, that matter should be corrupted. For into what, and how can it be corrupted ? But is not matter [it may be said] co-passive, since quali¬ ties in their mixture with each other suffer, and matter receives in itself myriads of heats and colds, Plot. Kp. 146 and in short infinite qualities, and is distinguished by these, and has them as it were connaseent and mingled with each other ? For each of these is not separate from the rest, and matter is left in the middle of them. Unless perhaps some one should place it external to them. But every thing which is in a subject, is in such a manner present with the subject, as to impart something to it from itself.

IX. It must therefore be assumed, that one thing is present with another, and that one thing is in another, not according to one mode only. But sometimes together with being present, it causes that with which it is present to be better or worse, accompanied with permutation ; as is seen to be the case in the bodies of animals ; and at another time, it makes it to be as it were better or worse, without that being passive with which it is present, as is said to be the case in the soul. Sometimes, also, this takes place in such a way as when a figure is imprinted in wax, where there is neither any pas¬ sion, so as to cause the wax to be something else when the figure is present with it, nor any defect in the wax, when the figure is destroyed. Light, also, does not produce a change in quality of the figure about that which is illuminated. Nor does a stone, when it becomes cold, possess any thing besides frigidity, from that through which it is cold, while it remains a stone. And what does a line [viz. the extension of length] suffer from colour ? Nor, in my opinion, does a superficies suffer any thing from it, but perhaps the subject body. Though what can this suffer from colour ? For it is Hot pro¬ per to say that a thing suffers when something is [merely] present with it ; nor when it is invested with form. If, however, some one should say that mirrors, and in short diaphanous substances, suffer nothing from the images that are seen within them, he will not adduce an unappropriate paradigm. For the forms which are in matter are images, and matter is still more impassive than mirrors. Hence heat and cold are ingenerated in it, but do not heat [or refrigerate] it. For to be heated and refrige¬ rated, pertains to quality leading the subject from one quality to another.

are in matter are images, and matter is still more impassive than mirrors. Hence heat and cold are ingenerated in it, but do not heat [or refrigerate] it. For to be heated and refrige¬ rated, pertains to quality leading the subject from one quality to another.

It is requisite, however, to consider, whether fri¬ gidity is not the absence and privation [of heat] : but qualities entering together into matter, many of them act on each other, or rather are contrarily affected. For what can fragrance effect in sweetp. 148ness ; or colour in figure ? Or what can that which belongs to one genus effect in another ? Whence especially credibility may be obtained, that a thing may be in that which is different from it, without injuring by its presence that with which it is pre¬ sent. As, therefore, that which is injured is not injured by any thing of a casual nature, so neither does that which is changed and which suffers, suffer by any thing indiscriminately. But contraries only suffer from contraries, other things being unchanged by others ; so that those things in which there is no contrariety, do not suffer by any thing of a contrary nature. Hence, it is necessary if any thing suffers, that it should not be matter, but something which is a composite of matter and form, or in short, that it should be at one and the same time many things. But that which is alone, and sepa¬ rate from other things, and which is entirely simple, will be impassive to all things, and will be inclosed in the middle of all things, acting on each other ; just as when in the same house certain persons strike each other, neither does the house suffer any thing from the blows, nor the air which is in it. But the forms which are in matter, perform such things as they are naturally adapted to perform.

p. 149

Matter itself, however, is much more impassive than such qualities in it, which by not being con¬ traries are impassive with reference to each other.

X. In the next place, if matter suffers, it is necessary that it should possess something from the passion, and that this should either be the passion itself, or that it should be disposed differently from what it was before the passion was produced in it. Hence, another quality acceding after the former, the recipient will no longer be matter, but matter with a certain quality.

s should either be the passion itself, or that it should be disposed differently from what it was before the passion was produced in it. Hence, another quality acceding after the former, the recipient will no longer be matter, but matter with a certain quality. If, however, quality 1 itself should fail, leaving something of itself of an effec¬ tive nature, the subject will in a still greater degree become something else ; and proceeding after this manner, the subject will be something besides [mere] matter, and will be manifold and multiform. Hence, it will no longer be the universal recipient, since it will be an impediment to the multitude of things which accede to it, and matter will no longer remain, and therefore will not be incorruptible. So that if it is necessary that matter should be as it r s Quality is that which imparts what is apparent in matter, and which is the object of sense.

p. 150

was from the first, it ought thus to be always the same, since to assert that it has been changed is not to preserve it the same. Farther still, if in short every thing which is changed in quality ought, remaining in the same form, to be changed accord¬ ing to accidents, and not essentially ; — if, therefore, it is requisite that what is changed in quality should remain, and that part of it which suffers is not that which remains, one of two things is necessary, either that matter when changed in quality should depart from itself, or that not departing from itself it should not be changed in quality. If, however, some one should say, that it is changed in quality, yet not so far as it is matter ; in the first place, in¬ deed, he cannot assign what that is according to which it is so changed ; and in the next place, he must confess that thus also matter itself is not changed in quality. For as in other things which are forms, it is not possible that they can be essen¬ tially changed in quality, since their essence con¬ sists in this, [i. e. in being forms,] thus also, since the being of matter is to exist as matter, it cannot be changed in quality so far as it is matter, but it must necessarily remain what it is. And as there form itself is unchanged in quality, so likewise here it is necessary that matter itself should he immutable.

XI. Whence, also, I think that the divine Plato, [in the Timseus] having formed the same conception rightly says, that the tilings which enter into and depart from matter, are imitations of be¬ ings ; the words entering into and departing , not being used by him in vain.