Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ently reprehended." But as I do not see what connection they have with the words immediately preceding them, 1 have not inserted' them in the translation.

p. 97

region beneath, but another proceeded locally to this region, and becoming near to it, illuminated it. But if this soul illuminated, abiding in itself, and not at all operating for this purpose, why did this soul alone illuminate, and not those natures also which are more powerful than it in the order of beings ? If, however, they say that this soul, in con¬ sequence of forming a rational conception of the wrorld, illuminated it from the discursive energy of reason, why did it not at one and the same time illuminate and make the world, but instead of this waited for the generation of images ? In the next place, this rational conception of the world, which is called by them a foreign land, and which was produced as they say by greater causes, did not occasion the makers of it to verge downward. Be¬ sides, how did it happen that matter being illumi¬ nated, made psychical images, but not the nature of bodies ? For the image of soul, would not be at all in want of darkness or matter ; but that which was generated wrould when generated follow its maker, and be suspended from him. Again, whe¬ ther is this illumination from a reasoning process, essence, or as they say, a conception ? For if it is essence, what is the difference between it, and that Plot . Gp. 98 from which it proceeds ? But if it is another species of soul, and this rational, perhaps it is vegetable and generative. If, however, this he the case, how will it any longer be true that it made the world in order that it might be honoured for so doing ; and how did it make it through arrogance and audacity, and in short, through imagination ? And still more absurd is it, that it should have made the world through a reasoning process. Why, also, was it requisite, that the fabricator of the world should have made it from matter and an image ? But if this illumination is a conception, in the first place it must be shown whence the name derives its ori¬ gin ; and in the next place how it produces, unless it imparts to the conception a fabricative power. But how can there be production with a fiction ? They will say, that this thing is first, and another is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted with¬ out any authority.

next place how it produces, unless it imparts to the conception a fabricative power. But how can there be production with a fiction ? They will say, that this thing is first, and another is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted with¬ out any authority. Why, also, wras fire the first thing produced, [and afterwards other things ?]

XI L After what manner, likewise, did this image wdien just produced attempt to fabricate ? Was it through a recollection of what it previously knew ? But in short it had not then an existence,p. 99 neither itself, nor the mother which they assign to it, in order that it might know this. In the next place, is it not wonderful, since they came into this world, not as images of souls, but as true souls, that scarcely one or two of them being raised from the world, and recovering their recollection, have been able to remember something of what they for¬ merly saw ; and yet this image, as soon as it was generated, formed a conception, though as they say, obscurely, of supernal natures ? Or that this should have been the case with the mother of it, who is a material image ; and that it should not only have formed a conception of these natures, and of both this and the intelligible world, but should also have learned what the things are from which the sensible universe was generated* Whence did it conceive that fire should first be produced, and think that this was necessary? For why did it not conceive this of something else ? But if it was able to produce fire from the conception of it, why did it not produce the world from a conception of the world ? For it is in a similar manner requisite, that the production of the world should be simulta¬ neous with the conception of it. For both fire and the world were comprehended in the conception ofp. 100 them ; since this image fabricated entirely in a more physical way, and not like the arts. For the arts are posterior both to nature and the world. And even now, in the individuals which are gene¬ rated by natures, fire is not first produced, after¬ wards each particular, and in the next place the mixture of these, but the enclosure and circum¬ scription of the v/hole animal, impressed in the menstrual effluxions. Why, therefore, might not matter be there circumscribed in the impression of the world, in which impression, earth and fire and the rest of things were comprehended ? But per¬ haps they would thus have made the world, in con^ sequence of employing a more true soul.

therefore, might not matter be there circumscribed in the impression of the world, in which impression, earth and fire and the rest of things were comprehended ? But per¬ haps they would thus have made the world, in con^ sequence of employing a more true soul. The artificer of the world, however, knew not how to make it in this manner, though he foresaw the de¬ finite magnitude of the heavens, the obliquity of the zodiac, the motion of the bodies under it, and [the central position of] the earth ; and all this in such a way as to possess the causes through which they thus subsist ; though such foreknowledge could not belong to an image, but entirely proceeded from a power derived from the best of things, and which they also though unwillingly acknowledge. For the illumination diffused through the darkness,p. 101 compels them to assent to the true causes of the world. For why was it requisite to illuminate, if it was not entirely necessary ? For this necessity was either according to nature, or preternatural. And if, indeed, it was according to nature, this illu¬ mination always existed ; but if it w'as preter¬ natural* then among supernal beings that which is irregular had a subsistence, and evils existed prior to this world. Hence, this world is not the cause of evil, but supernal beings are the causes of evils to the world. And evil to the soul is not from the universe, but the evils that are here are derived from soul. And thus by a reasoning process we are led to refer the world to the first of things. But if matter also is the cause of evil, whence does it appear that it is so ? For soul verging downward, saw', as they say, the darkness, and illuminated it. Whence, therefore, did the darkness originate ? For if they say that soul verging downward pro¬ duced it, then it will follow that the darkness did not exist prior to this downward tendency of the soul. Nor will the darkness itself be the cause of this tendency, but the nature of soul. This, how¬ ever, is the same thing as to attribute the cause top. 102 precedaneous necessities. So that the cause is from the first of beings.

XIII. He therefore who blames the nature of the world, does not know what he does, nor whi¬ ther this audacity of his tends. This, however, arises from the Gnostics not knowing the succes¬ sive order of things, viz.