Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

perly applied to matter, but rather fire in genera¬ tion, or becoming to be. For it is not the same thing for fire to be in generation, and for a thing to be ignited. For to be ignited is indeed effected in another thing, in which there is also passivity. But how can that which is a part of fire, be itself ignited ? For this would be just the same as if some one should say, that the statue proceeded through the brass, or fire through matter, and besides this ignited it. Farther still, if that which accedes is reason or a productive principle, how will it ignite P Shall we say on account of figure ? But that which ignited already consists both of matter and figure. How, therefore, can it consist of both, unless it becomes one from both ? Or shall we say that though it becomes one, yet not from two things having passions in each other, but acting upon other things ? Does this, therefore, arise from thep. 157 agency of both, or from one of them causing the other not to Ay away ? When, however, a certain body is divided, how is it possible that matter also should not be divided ? And matter when it is di¬ vided being passive, how is it possible it should not suffer by this very passion? Or what hinders us from asserting for the same reason that matter is corrupted ? Since when body is corrupted, it must be shown why matter likewise is not corrupted. In answer to this, however, it may be said, that what suffers and is divided is a magnitude of a definite quantity, but in that which is not magnitude, the passions of magnitude are not ingenerated. And, in short, the passions of body are not inherent in that which is not body ; so that those who make matter to be passive, must also admit it to be body.

XIII. It is likewise requisite that they should attend to the manner in which they say matter flies from form. For how can it fly from stones and rocks by which it is comprehended ? For they will not say that it sometimes flies from form, and some¬ times does not. For if it flies by its own will, why does it not always fly from it ? But if it abides frojn

•fp. 158 necessity, there is not any time in which it is not invested with a certain form. The cause, however, must be investigated why each matter has not al¬ ways the same form, and this must be in a still greater degree investigated in the forms which enter into matter.

ty, there is not any time in which it is not invested with a certain form. The cause, however, must be investigated why each matter has not al¬ ways the same form, and this must be in a still greater degree investigated in the forms which enter into matter. How, therefore, is matter said to fly from form ? Is it by its own nature, and al¬ ways ? But what else will this be, than that never departing from itself, it so possesses form as if it never possessed it, or if this is not admitted, they will not be able to assign any probable reason in defence of what they assert. Plato also calls matter the receptacle and nurse of all generation. And the receptacle and nurse indeed, are different from generation ; but that wdiich is changed in quality is in generation. Since, likewise, the receptacle and nurse are prior to generation, they will also be prior to alliation. Add too, that they will preserve mat¬ ter in an impassive state ; as also will the assertion that each thing has an apparent subsistence in that in which it is ingenerated, and that it departs from thence as from a receptacle and seat. The impas¬ sivity of matter, likewise, is preserved by the asser¬ tion that it is the place of forms ; for this does not ascribe any passiort to it, but investigates anotherp. 159 mode of subsistence. What, therefore, is this mode ? Since, indeed, a nature of this kind ought not to be any one of, but to fly from every essence of beings, and to be entirely different from them ; for they are reasons or productive principles, and have a real existence ; — this being the case, it is necessary that matter in consequence of this differ¬ ence should preserve the safety which it is allotted, and should not only be unreceptive of beings, but also if there is a certain imitation of them, that it should even be destitute of familiarity with this re¬ semblance. For thus it will be entirely different from beings, since otherwise, being conversant with a certain form, and becoming something else in conjunction with it, it would cease to be different from beings, and to be the receptacle of all things ; for it would not be the recipient of any thing. It is necessary, however, that matter should remain the same, while forms enter into it, and that it should be impassive during their egress from it, in order that they may always enter into and depart from it. But that which enters, enters as an image, and not being itself real, enters into that which is void of truth and reality.

ter into it, and that it should be impassive during their egress from it, in order that they may always enter into and depart from it. But that which enters, enters as an image, and not being itself real, enters into that which is void of truth and reality. Does it, therefore, truly enter ? But how is it possible it should be truly rep. 160ceived by that to which it is not in any respect lawful to participate of truth, in consequence of its being false ? Hence, it falsely proceeds into that which is false, and becomes similar to an object in a mirror, as long as the object is beheld within it. For with respect to matter, if you take away [real] beings, none of those things which are now seen in the sensible region, would for the smallest space of time be apparent. The mirror, therefore, of which we have just spoken, is perceived by us ; for it is itself a certain form. Matter, however, not being itself any form, is not itself seen ; for other¬ wise, it would be requisite that it should be seen by itself prior to the forms that it apparently con¬ tains. But it suffers something of the same kind as the air when illuminated, which is then also in¬ visible, because it could not be seen without being illuminated. Hence the objects which are seen in mirrors, are believed not to have an existence, or to have it in a less degree, because that which con¬ tains them is visible, and itself remains while the objects depart. But matter is not itself perceived, neither when it has, nor when it is without forms. If, however, it was possible for the objects from which mirrors are filled to remain without being

Ιδί seen, yet no one would doubt the reality of the objects which are seen in them. Hence, if there is something in mirrors, sensibles also will be in mat¬ ter. But if there is nothing [in reality] in mirrors, but objects have only an apparent subsistence in them, in matter also it must be said, forms have a resemblance of subsistence. The cause of this appearance, likewise, must be ascribed to the hypo¬ stasis of beings, of which beings themselves always truly participate, but non-beings not truly ; since it is not proper that they should subsist in such a manner as they would, if they had an existence, and being had not.

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XIV. What then* matter not existing, would nothing have a subsistence ? Nothing except beings ; 1 just as neither would an image have any existence, unless there was a mirror, or something of this kind. For that which is naturally adapted to subsist in another thing, cannot exist when that thing is not.