Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

still, if sense indeed is the perception of sensibles, intellection is the perception of intelligibles. If, however, they are not willing to admit this, yet there will be in us intellections of certain intelligibles, and apprehen¬ sions of things without magnitude. How, there¬ fore, will intellect if it is magnitude, understand that which is not magnitude, and by that wdiich is partible that which is impartible? Shall we say it will understand it by a certain impartible part of itself? But if this be the case, that which under¬ stands will not be body. For there is no need of the whole in order to come into contact with the object of its intellection ; since contact according to one certain thing is sufficient. If, therefore, they admit that the first intellections, which is true, are entirely liberated from body, it is necessary that the nature which intellectually perceives the form separate from body of each thing, should know either real being, or that which is becoming to be. But if they say that intellections are ofp. 239 forms inherent in matter, yet they are then only apprehended when by intellect they are separated from body. For the separation [i. e. abstraction] of a circle and triangle, of a line and a point, is not effected in conjunction with flesh, or in short, with matter. Hence it is necessary that the soul also, in a separation of this kind, should separate itself from the body. And therefore it is necessary that it should not be itself body. I think, likewise, that the beautiful and the just are without magnitude, and consequently the intellection of these is un¬ attended with magnitude. Hence, these approach¬ ing to us are apprehended by that which is imparti¬ ble in the soul, and in the soul they reside in the impartible. How also, if the soul is body, can temperance and justice be the virtues of it, which are its saviours, so far as they are received by it ?

IX. There must, therefore, be another nature which possesses existence from itself, and such is every thing which is truly being, and which is neither generated, nor destroyed. For without the subsistence of this, all things would vanish into non-entity, and this perishing, would not afterwards be generated ; since this imparts safety to all otherp. 240 things, and also to the universe which through soul is preserved and adorned. For soul is the princi¬ ple of motion, with which it supplies other things, itself moving itself, and imparting life to the ani¬ mated body. But it possesses life from itself, which it will never lose, because it is derived from itself.

preserved and adorned. For soul is the princi¬ ple of motion, with which it supplies other things, itself moving itself, and imparting life to the ani¬ mated body. But it possesses life from itself, which it will never lose, because it is derived from itself. For all things do not use an adventitious life, or there would be a progression of life to infi¬ nity. But it is necessary there should be a certain nature primarily vital, w hich is also necessarily in¬ destructible and immortal, as being the principle of life to other things. Here, likewise, it is requisite that every thing divine and blessed should be esta¬ blished, living from itself, and existing primarily being, and primarily vital, void of essential muta¬ tion, and being neither generated nor destroyed. For whence could it be generated, or into what could it perish ? If, likewise, it is necessary that the appellation of being should truly belong to this nature, it is requisite that it should not at one time exist, and at another not ; just as a colour which is of itself white, is not at one time wrhite, and at ano¬ ther not white. If, however, whiteness was [real] being, together with being white, it would likewise always be. But now it possesses whiteness alone.

p. 241

That, however, to which being is present which is from itself, and is primarily being, will always have a subsistence. Hence, this which is primarily and perpetually being, ought not to be destitute of life, like a stone, or a piece of wood, but to be vital, and enjoy a pure life, in that part of itself which is alone permanent. But that part of it which is mingled with a subordinate nature is an impediment to its possession of the best of things, yet it does not through this lose its nature, but resumes its ancient condition, when it recurs to things which are [truly] its owm.

X. That soul, however, is allied to a more di¬ vine and eternal nature, is evident from its not being body as w^e have demonstrated, -and also because it has neither figure nor colour. Moreover, this likewise may be shown from the following considerations. It is acknowledged by all of us, that every divine nature, and which is truly being, enjoys an excellent and wise life. This, therefore, being admitted, it is necessary to consider in the next place, what the nature is of our soul. We must assume the soul, however, not receiving in the body irrational desires and angers, and other pas- Plot . Qp. 242 sions, but as abolishing all these, and as much as possible having no communication with the body.

place, what the nature is of our soul. We must assume the soul, however, not receiving in the body irrational desires and angers, and other pas- Plot . Qp. 242 sions, but as abolishing all these, and as much as possible having no communication with the body. For such a soul as this will perspicuously show that evils are an addition to the soul, and are ex¬ ternally derived ; and that the most excellent things are inherent in it when it is purified, viz. wisdom and every other virtue, which are its proper posses¬ sions, If, therefore, the soul is such when it re¬ turns to itself, how is it possible it should not be¬ long to that nature which we say is possessed by every thing eternal and divine ? For wisdom and true virtue being divine, cannot be inherent in any vile and mortal thing ; but that which is of this kind is necessarily divine, as being full of divine goods, through an alliance and similitude of essence to a divine nature. Hence, whoever of us resembles a soul of this description, will in soul itself differ but little from superior beings ; in this alone being in¬ ferior to them, that he is in body. On which account, also, if every man was such, or if the mul¬ titude employed souls of this kind, no one would be so incredulous as not to believe that our soul is entirely immortal. Now, however, men perceiving that the soul of the greater part of the human race is defiled with vice, they do not reason about it,p. 243 either as a divine or an immortal thing. But it is necessary, in considering the nature of every things to direct our attention to the purity of it ; since whatever is added, is always an impediment to the knowledge of that to which it is added. Consider the soul, therefore, by taking away [that which is extraneous] ; or rather, let him who takes this away survey himself, and he will believe himself to be immortal, when he beholds himself in the intel¬ ligible wrorld, and situated in a pure abode. For he will perceive intellect seeing not any thing sen¬ sible, nor any of these mortal objects, but by an eternal power contemplating that which is eternal ; every thing in the intelligible world, and itself also being then luminous, in consequence of being en¬ lightened by the truth proceeding from the good \ which illuminates all intelligibles with reality. By such a soul as this, therefore, it may be properly said,

Farewell, a God immortal now am 1/ having ascended to divinity, and earnestly striving to become similar to him.