Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

us and Proclus, was universally adopted by all the succeeding Platonists>p. 401 itself. And this again in another, as far as to in¬ tellect. But not in place. For no one o.f these was in place. And much less is intellect in place; so that neither is soul. Hence, soul being no where, in that which is no where it is thus also every where. But if soul proceeding to the super¬ nal realms, should stop in its progression in that which is between, before it has entirely arrived at the summit, it will have a middle life, and will be established in that part of itself. Intellect, how¬ ever, is all these, and yet it is not. It is, indeed, because they are from it ; and again, it is not, be¬ cause abiding in itself, it gave them to exist Hence, there is an abundant life in the universe, which is as it were extended into length, and has each of its parts in a successive order. The whole, however, is in continuity with itself, but the parts are distinguished by a proper difference, that which is prior not being destroyed in that which is pos¬ terior. What then is the soul which is ingenerated in plants ? And does it generate nothing else than that in which it is ? How this is effected, however, must be considered by us, assuming for this pur¬ pose another principle*

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I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely simple ? Or is it also possible for that which is not a composite, to have the intellection of itself? For that which is said to perceive itself intellectually because it is a composite, and because by one of the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if by sense we should apprehend the form * of ours The word used here by Plotinus is μορφή , which, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.

selves, and the other nature of the body, will not have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known, unless that which understands other things that are with itself, understands also itself ; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz* that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another* It is necessary, there¬ fore, to admit that the 2derstands other things that are with itself, understands also itself ; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz* that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another* It is necessary, there¬ fore, to admit that the intellectual perception of itself is the province of a simple nature, and how this is effected must, if possible, be considered ; or we must abandon the opinion that there is some¬ thing which truly intellectually perceives itself. To abandon, however, this opinion is not easy, since the rejection of it is attended with many absurdi¬ ties. For if we do not admit that to assign this power to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to ascribe it to the nature of intellect is perfectly ab¬ surd ; viz. if we grant that it has indeed a know¬ ledge of other things, but has no knowledge and science of itself. For sense, and not intellect, will have an apprehension of things external ; and if you are willing to grant it, this will also be the case with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whe¬ ther intellect has a knowledge of these or not, it isp. 404 fit to consider. It is evident, indeed, that intellect knows such things as are intelligible. Does it, therefore, know these alone, or also itself that knows these ? And does it thus far know itself, that it knows these alone, but does not know what itself is ? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some things belonging to itself, but it will not know what itself is ; or it will both know the things which are its own, and itself. And what the mode of this knowledge is, and how far it extends, must be con» sidered.

II. In the first place, however, we must inquire concerning the soul, whether the knowledge of it* self is to be attributed to it, what the gnostic power of it is, and how it subsists. With respect to the sensitive power, therefore, of the soul, we must immediately say that its energy is directed to ex¬ ternals alone. For though there is a co-sensation of things which inwardly take place in the body, yet here the apprehension is of things which are external to sense : for then there is a sensation of the passions which are in the body. But the power in the soul which reasons, and which forms a judg¬ ment of the phantasms adjacent from sense, collectsp. 405 and divides them, surveys the impressions as it were which are derived from intellect, and pos¬ sesses about these the same power [as intellect]. It likewise assumes intelligence, as knowing and adapting new and recently acceding impressions to those in itself which are ancient.