Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

elligible is a certain energy, since it is neither power, nor void of life, nor againp. 416 is its life adventitious, nor its intellection in some¬ thing different from itself, as in a stone, or a cer¬ tain inanimate thing, and it is also the first essence. If, therefore, it is energy, and the first energy, in¬ telligence likewise will be most beautiful, and will be essential intelligence. For intelligence of this kind is most true, is the first, and subsists prima¬ rily, and will therefore be the first intellect. For this intellect is not in capacity, nor is this one thing, but intelligence another; since thus again, the essential of it would be in capacity. If, there¬ fore, it is energy, and the essence of it is energy, it will be one and the same with energy. Since, however, being and the intelligible are one and the same with energy, all will be at the same time one, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. If, therefore, the intelligence of it is the intelligible, but it is the intelligible, hence it will itself intellec¬ tually perceive itself. For it will perceive itself by intelligence, which it is, and will understand the intelligible which also it is. According to each of these, therefore, it will intellectually perceive itself, both so far as it is intelligence, and so far as it is the intelligible, and will understand by intelligence, which it is,

p. 417

VI. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is something which properly and principally itself intellectually perceives itself. This however, when it is in soul, intellectually sees in one way, but in intellect more principally. For soul, indeed, knows itself, that it is the progeny of another thing ; but intellect knows that it is from itself, and what its nature is, and who it is ; and this by a natural con¬ version to itself. For beholding beings it beholds itself and beholding is in energy ; and the energy is itself. For intellect and intelligence are one. With the whole of itself also it perceives the whole, and not a part by a part. Does, therefore, reason demonstrate it to be a thing of such a kind as to have an energy which is merely an object of belief ; or is it indeed necessary that it should be such as it is, but that it should not have persuasion ? For necessity indeed is in intellect , but persuasion in soul . Hence we investigate as it seems, rather for the purpose of persuading ourselves, than to behold truth in a pure intellect.

at it should be such as it is, but that it should not have persuasion ? For necessity indeed is in intellect , but persuasion in soul . Hence we investigate as it seems, rather for the purpose of persuading ourselves, than to behold truth in a pure intellect. For as long as we con¬ tinued on high, and adhered to th® mature of intel¬ lect we were satisfied, energized intellectually, and contemplated, collecting all things into one. For it was intellect that then energized, and spoke of Plot. % D

4J8 itself. But soul was quiet, yielding to the energy of intellect. When, however, we descended hither, we were desirous of producing persuasion in the soul, wishing to behold the archetype in an image. Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite to teach our soul, how its intellect once beheld itself ; and to teach that part of the soul this, which is in a certain re¬ spect intellectual, and which we assume to be dianoetic ; by this appellation latently signifying, that it is a certain intellect, or that it is a power through intellect, and that it derives its subsistence from intellect. It is fit, therefore, that this part should know, that it also knows such things as it sees, and such things as it says. And if it were the things which it says, it would after this manner know itself. Since, however, the things which it sees are present with, or are supernally imparted to it from that re» gion whence it also originates, it happens to this part likewise since it is reason, and receives things allied to itself, that by an adaptation of the vestigies which it contains, it is enabled to know itself. It may, therefore, transfer the image to true intel¬ lect which is the same with the things that are truly the objects of intellectual perception, and which have a real and primary subsistence. For it is notp. 419 possible that such an intellect as this should be external to itself. Hence, if it is in and with itself, and is [truly] that which it is, it is intellect. But intellect can never be deprived of intellect; so that the knowledge of itself is necessarily present with it; and this because it is in itself, and its employ¬ ment and essence consist in being intellect alone. For this is not a practical intellect, as looking to that which pertains to external action, and which in consequence of not abiding in itself, is a certain knowledge of externals. There is, however, no necessity if intellect is practic, that it should know itself ; but this is the province of that intellect which is not engaged in practical affairs.

, and which in consequence of not abiding in itself, is a certain knowledge of externals. There is, however, no necessity if intellect is practic, that it should know itself ; but this is the province of that intellect which is not engaged in practical affairs. For ap¬ petite is not in pure intellect ; but this being ab¬ sent, the consequent conversion to itself, not only demonstrates that the knowledge of itself is reason¬ able, but also necessary. For otherwise what would be the life of it, when liberated from action, and established in intellect ?

VII. It may however, be said, that pure intel¬ lect beholds deity. But if it is acknowledged that it knows God, he who grants this, must also neces¬ sarily admit that it knows itself For such thingsp. 420 as it possesses from deity it knows, and also what he imparts, and what he is able to impart. But learning and knowing these things, it will likewise through this know itself. For divinity is one of the things imparted, or rather he is all that is imparted. If, therefore, intellect also knows him, and learns the powers that he possesses, it will likewise know itself to be generated from thence ; and that it de¬ rives from him all that it is able to receive. If, however, it is unable to see him clearly, since to see is perhaps the very thing that is seen, on this account especially that which remains to it, will be to see and know itself, if to see is to be the very thing itself which is seen. For what else can we confer upon it? By Jupiter, quiet. The quiet of intellect however, is not mental alienation, but is the tranquil energy of intellect, withdrawing itself from other things ; since to other natures also that are at rest from other employments, their own proper energy remains ; and especially to those things whose existence is not in capacity, but in energy. Where, therefore, existence is energy, and there is nothing else to which energy is directed, there energy is directed to itself. Hence intellect perceiving itself, is thus with itself, and has itsp. 421 energy directed to itself. For if something else is suspended from it, that something else is in itself, because its energy is directed to itself. For it is necessary that it should first be in itself, and after¬ wards that its energy should be directed to some¬ thing else, or that something else should proceed from it, assimilated to it : just as fire, which is first in itself, and has the energy of fire, and thus is ena¬ bled to produce the vestigie of itself in something else.