Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

not mean to assert that they are to be found in sensibles ; for they have a separate subsistence ; but that they are external to sensibles, and external after the same manner in man also, as the three which we have been considering are external to all heaven. This, however, is such a man as Plato calls the inward man. Our soul, therefore, is like¬ wise something divine, and of a nature different from sensibles, such as is the whole nature of souL But the soul is perfect which possesses intellect With respect to intellect, however, one kind is a reasoning intellect, but another imparts the power of reasoning. He, therefore, will not err who places in the intelligible order of things this reason¬ ing intellect of the soul, which is not in want of any corporeal organ to the subsistence of its disp. 280cursive energy, but which possesses the energy of itself in purity, in order that it may reason purely, in as great perfection as possible» For we must not inquire after a place where we may establish it, but it must be arranged external to all place. For thus that which is from itself, the external, and the immaterial subsist, when they are alone, and have nothing from a corporeal nature. On this account, also, Plato in the Timaeus says, u that the Demiurgus surrounded the body of the universe with soul,” indicating that part of the mundane soul which abides in the intelligible. Concerning our soul, likewise, concealing his meaning, he says, in the Phaedrus, that it sometimes hides its head in the heavens, and sometimes elevates it beyond them.1 The exhortation, too, in the Phaedo, to separate the soul from the body, does not relate to a local separation, which is effected by nature, but insinuates that the soul should not verge to imagi¬ nations, and to an alienation from itself, by a ten¬ dency to body. He also indicates that we should elevate the remaining [i. e. the irrational] form ofp. 283 the soul, and lead it on high together with the superior part of it; and that the part which is established in the sensible region, and is alone the fabricator and plastic maker of body, should like» wise be engaged in an employment of this kind.

1 I have followed the version of Ficinus in this place, as the original is obviously defective : for there is nothing more than, επ' i be ημών ere κρυπτών, €7r ακρα ειρηκε τρ κεφάλρ.

άλρ.

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the soul, and lead it on high together with the superior part of it; and that the part which is established in the sensible region, and is alone the fabricator and plastic maker of body, should like» wise be engaged in an employment of this kind.

XL Since, therefore, the soul reasons about things just and beautiful, and inquires by a reasoning process whether this thing is just, and that is beautiful, it is necessary there should be something stably just, from which the reasoning of the soul originates ; or how could it reason ? And if the soul at one time reasons about these things, but at another time not, it is necessary there should be an intellect in us^ which does not reason about, but always possesses the just. It is likewise necessary that we should contain the principle and cause of intellect, and God ; the latter of these not being divisible, but abiding, yet not in place, [but in him¬ self,] and again being surveyed in each of the mul¬ titude of things that are able to receive him. They receive him, however, as something different from themselves ; just as the centre of a circle is in itself, but each of the lines in the circle has its sum¬ mit terminating in the centre, and the several linesp. 282 tend with their peculiarity to this. For by a thing of this kind which is in us/ we also touch, associate with, and are suspended from deity. But we are established in it more or less according as we converge to it in a greater or less degree.

XII. How, therefore, does it happen, since we possess things of such great dignity, that we do not apprehend them, but for the most part are sluggish with respect to such like energies ? And there are some who do not energize about them at alb In¬ tellect, indeed, and that which, prior to intellect, is always in itself, are always employed in their own energies. Soul, likewise, is thus that which is al¬ ways moved. For not every thing which is in the soul is now sensible ; but it arrives to us wdien it proceeds as far as to sense. When, however, each thing in us energizing, does not impart itself to the sensitive power, it does not yet proceed through the whole souh Hence we have not yet any know¬ ledge of the energy, because we exist in conjunc¬ tion with the sensitive power, and are not a part of the soul, but the whole soul.

es not impart itself to the sensitive power, it does not yet proceed through the whole souh Hence we have not yet any know¬ ledge of the energy, because we exist in conjunc¬ tion with the sensitive power, and are not a part of the soul, but the whole soul. And farther still,

1 This is called by Proclus, the one , flower, and summit of the soul, and is that in which our truest being consists**p. 283 each of the psychical animals in us, always energizes essentially according to its peculiarity ; but we then only recognize the energy, when there is a participation and apprehension of it. It is neces¬ sary, therefore, in order that there may be an apprehension of things which are thus present, that the animadversive power should be converted to the interior of the soul, and there fix its attention. Just as if some one waiting to hear a voice which is pleasing to him, should separate himself from other voices, and excite his hearing to the percep¬ tion of the more excellent sound, when it approaches. Thus, also, here it is necessary to dismiss sensible auditions, except so far as is necessary, and to preserve the animadversive power of the soul pure, pud prepared to hear supernal sounds,

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ON

INTELLECT, IDEAS,'

AND

[REAL! BEING.

I. Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect and are necessarily first conver¬ sant with sensibles, some proceeding no farther pass through life, considering these as the first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil, and whatever is plea¬ sant is good ; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other* Those too among

E For a more ample discussion of Ideas than is contained in this treatise of Plotinus, see the Introduction and Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato, and the notes to my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, in which the reader will find the treasures of antiquity on this subject unfolded.

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them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from plea¬ sure to a more worthy pursuit.