Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ibe to it neither levity or gravity, neither density or rarity, or figure ; and therefore, neither must we ascribe to it magnitude. For magnitude itself is one thing, and to be great another. And figure itself is one thing, and that which is figured another. It is necessary, however, that it should not be a composite; but simple, and one certain thing in its own nature. For thus it will be desti¬ tute of all things. And he who imparts morphe to it, will impart morphe as something different from matter. He will also profer, as it were, magnitude and all things from the things which exist ; for otherwise, he would be subservient to the magni¬ tude of matter, and his production would not pos¬ sess the quantity which he wished it should, but that which matter is capable of receiving. To assert, however, that the will of the artificer con¬ curs with the magnitude of matter, is fictitious. But if the maker is prior to matter, in this casematter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it to be, and will with facility be brought to all things, and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it hasp. 44 magnitude, it is also necessary that it should have figure, so that it will be still more difficult to be fashioned by the artificer. Form, therefore, enters matter, bringing all things with it. But every form possesses magnitude, and the quantity which it contains is accompanied with reason [i. e. with a productive principle] and subsists under this. Hence, in every genus of things, quantity is defined together with form. For there is one magnitude of a man, and another of a bird. And it would be absurd to suppose, that the introduction of quantity to the matter of a certain bird, is any thing else than adding to it its proper quality. Nor must it be said that quality is a productive principle, but that quantity is not form, since it is both measure and number.

IX. How then can any thing w hich ranks among beings be apprehended, which has no magnitude ? Perhaps every thing which is not the same with a certain quantity. For being and a certain quantity are not the same ; since there are many other things besides a definite quantity. And, in short, it must be admitted that every incorporeal nature is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal ;

since quantity itself is not a quantum, [or a certain quantity] but that is a quantum which participates of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that quantity is form.

dmitted that every incorporeal nature is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal ;

since quantity itself is not a quantum, [or a certain quantity] but that is a quantum which participates of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that quantity is form. As, therefore, a certain white thing is produced by the presence of whiteness ; but that which produces a white colour in an animal, and other various colours, is not a various colour, but a various productive principle ; thus also, that which produces a definite quantity, is not a definite quantity, but a quantum itself, or quan¬ tity itself, or a productive principle. Does quan¬ tity, therefore, acceding, evolve matter into magni* tude ? By no means. For it was not contracted into a small space ; but it imparts magnitude which prior to this was not, in the same manner as it imparts quality which had not a prior existence*

X. What, therefore, is that which is void of magnitude in matter ? What, also, do you conceive that to be which is in a certain way void of quality ? And what is the intellection and the perception of it by the reasoning power ? Shall we say it is inde¬ finiteness ? For if the similar is perceived by the similar, the indefinitaalso will be apprehended by the indefinite. Reason, therefore, will becomep. 46 bounded about the indefinite ; but the intuition of it will be indefinite. If, however, every thing is known by reason and intelligence, but here, reason indeed says what it is requisite to say about it, and wishing to become intelligence, is not intelligence, but, as it were, a privation of intellect, — if this be the case, the phantasm of matter will rather be spurious, and not genuine, being composed of an imagination which is not true, and another kind of reason. And perhaps Plato, looking to this, says, [in the Timasus] that matter is apprehended by a spurious reasoning. What, therefore, is the inde¬ finiteness of the soul ? Is it an all-perfect ignorance, such as the absence [of knowledge ?] Or does the indefinite consist in a certain negation 1 in conjunc¬ tion with a certain affirmation ; and is it like dark¬ ness to the eye, obscurity being the matter of every invisible colour? Thus, therefore, the soul also, taking away whatever in sensibles resembles light, and not being able to bound what remains, is simi¬ lar to the eye placed in darkness, and then becomes

1 In the original η εν καταψασα. tivl , but it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read, -η er αποφασει σνν KaTatyaaet nyi .

embles light, and not being able to bound what remains, is simi¬ lar to the eye placed in darkness, and then becomes

1 In the original η εν καταψασα. tivl , but it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read, -η er αποφασει σνν KaTatyaaet nyi . This emendation the sense also requires and is adopted in the above translation.

p. 47

in a certain respect the same with that which, as it were, it sees. Does it therefore see ? Perhaps it sees matter as something deformed, and as void of colour, and void of light ; and besides this, as not having magnitude, since if it had, it would be invested with form. When, therefore, the soul un¬ derstands nothing, is she not affected in the same manner as when she sees matter ? By no means. For when she understands nothing, she says nothing, or rather, she suffers nothing. But when she beholds matter, she suffers such a passion as when she receives the resemblance of that which is formless ; since also when she understands things that have figure and magnitude, she understands them as composites. For she understands them as things diversified, and in short as possessing quali¬ ties. Hence, she understands the whole, and at the same time both, and her intellection or sensa¬ tion of the inherent properties is clear and manifest But her perception of a formless subject is ob¬ scure ; for it is not form. When, therefore, in the whole and composite, she receives the subject to¬ gether with its inherent properties, and analyze® and separates them, then she understands obscurely that which reason leaves, darkly that which is dark.

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and sees intellectually, not understanding. And since matter itself does not remain formless, but in [sensible] things is invested with form, the soul -also immediately impresses it with the form of things, being pained with the indefinite, as if afraid of being placed out of the order of beings, and not enduring to stop any longer at nonentity.

XT. But why is it requisite there should be something else besides magnitude and all qualities, to the composition of bodies ? Or is it not necessary there should be that which is the recipient of all things ? It will not therefore be bulk. For if it were bulk, it would also be magnitude. But if it is without magnitude, it will not have a place where it may receive [all other things.] For being void of magnitude, what advantage would it derive from place, if it neither contributes to form and quality, nor to interval and magnitude ? the two latter of which appear to be derived to bodies from matter, wherever it may be.