Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

¬ out fluctuation, which imitates as much as possible its father ; and with respect to our soul, that onep. 70 part of it always abides on high,1 that another part of it is conversant with sensibles, and that another has a subsistence in the middle of these. For as there is one nature in many powers, at one time the whole soul tends upward in conjunction with the most excellent part, of itself, and of the uni¬ verse, * but at another time, the worse part being drawn down, draws together with itself the middle part. For it is not lawful that the whole of it should be drawn downward. This passion also happens to the soul, because it did not abide in that which is most beautiful, where the soul which does not rank as a part [continually] abiding, and of which we are not a part, imparts to the whole

1 This is one of the peculiar dogmas of Plotinus, which is however opposed, and 1 think very justly by Prod us, in the last Proposition of his Elements of Theology. “ For if,’’ (as he there says) “ something pertaining to the soul remains on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellec¬ tually, without transition, or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul. And if with transition, then from that which always, and from that which sometimes energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, is impossible.

α From the version of Ficinus, it appears that instead of του ovtos in this place, we should read του παντός.

p. 71

body of the universe, as much as it is able to re¬ ceive from it. At the same time also, this soul remains free from all solicitude, not governing the world by the discursive energy of reason, nor cor¬ recting any thing [in itself ;] but by the vision of that which is prior to itself, adorning the universe with an admirable power. For the more it looks to itself, the more beautiful and powerful it be¬ comes, and possessing these excellencies from the intelligible world, it imparts them to that which is posterior to itself, and as it is always illuminated, it always illuminates.

III. Being therefore always illuminated, and continually possessing light, it imparts it to the natures that are in a consequent order. And these are always contained and irrigated by this light, and enjoy life through it, as far as they are able. Just as if a fire being placed in a certain middle, what¬ ever is capable of receiving heat, should be heated by it as much as possible ; though the fire is limited by measure.

d irrigated by this light, and enjoy life through it, as far as they are able. Just as if a fire being placed in a certain middle, what¬ ever is capable of receiving heat, should be heated by it as much as possible ; though the fire is limited by measure. But when the powers not being measured, are never-failing, how is it possible that they should have an existence, and yet nothing should participate of them ? It is, however, necesp. 72sary that every thing should impart itself to some¬ thing else ; or the good will not be good, nor intel¬ lect be intellect, nor soul be soul ; unless after that which lives primarily, there is also that which has a secondary life, as long as that exists which is pri¬ marily vital. Hence it is necessary that all things should be perpetually consequent to each other, and should be generated by other things, because they depend on others for their subsistence. Things therefore that are said to be generated, were not generated at a certain time, but were and will be rising into existence ; nor will they be corrupted, those things excepted which they contain, into which they may be resolved. But that which has nothing into which it can be resolved, will not be corrupted. If, however, some one should say that things which are in generation may be resolved into matter, we reply, and why may not matter also be dissolved ? But if it is said that matter may be disr solved, we ask what necessity there was that it should be generated ? If they say it was necessary, and therefore it was generated, we reply, and it is also now necessary. But if it should be left alone, divine natures would not be every where, but would be circumscribed in a certain place, as if surroundedp. 73 with a wall. If, however, this is impossible, mat¬ ter is perpetually 1 2 illuminated [by divinity.]

IV. But if they say that soul suffering as it were a defluxion of its wings, made the world, we reply, that this does not befal the soul of the uni¬ verse. If also they say this soul is deceived and in error, they should assign the cause of its decep¬ tion and error. When likewise was it deceived ? For if from eternity, it will for the same a reason remain in error. But if it began at a certain time to be deceived, why was it not deceived prior to that time ? We, however, do not say that the tendency of the soul downward produced the world, but rather the non-tendency of it. But if it tends downward, it is evident that this must arise from its forgetfulness of what the intelligible world contains.

r to that time ? We, however, do not say that the tendency of the soul downward produced the world, but rather the non-tendency of it. But if it tends downward, it is evident that this must arise from its forgetfulness of what the intelligible world contains. And if it is forgetful of these, how did it fabricate the world ? For whence can it make, except from the things which it saw there ? But if it fabricates recollecting the things that are there, it

1 It appears that aei is wanting here in the original.

2 Instead of κατα τον αυτών λογον , it is necessary to read κατα τον αυτόν λογον.

p. 74

has not in short, any tendency downward. For it does not possess nor see them obscurely, if it is without this tendency. And why, if it has any re¬ collection of them, should it not wish to return thither ? For what can it suppose will happen to itself from fabricating the world ? For it is ridi¬ culous to assert that it made the world, in order that it might be honoured, and is an opinion derived from the makers of statues. If, likewise, soul fa¬ bricated by a reasoning process, and did not natu¬ rally possess a producing power, how did it make this world ? When also will it destroy the world ? For if it repented having made it, why does it defer its destruction ? But if it does not yet repent, neither will it ever, as being now accustomed to it, and becoming through time more friendly towards it. If, also, it defers the destruction of the world on account of partial souls, waiting for their union with it, these souls ought not to have descended again into generation, having experienced in a former descent, the evils which are here ; so that prior to the present time they would have ceased to descend. Nor must we grant them that this world was produced in an evil condition, because there are many molestations in it. For this arisesp. 75 from forming too exalted an opinion of this sensible world, and conceiving it to be the same with that which is intelligible, and not the image of it. For what more beautiful image of it could have been generated ? What other fire could be a better image of the fire which is there, than the tire which is here ? Or what other earth than this, of the earth which is there ? What sphere, also, could be more accurate and venerable, or more orderly in its mo¬ tion [than that of this sensible universe,] after the comprehension which is there of the intelligible world in itself? And what other sun after the intel¬ ligible sun, can be prior to this which is the object of sight ?

V.