Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

of horse. If, however, it should be said, that horse is generated in a certain great bulk and of a certainp. 167 extent, and that the magnitude remains, we reply that it is not the magnitude of the horse, but the magnitude of the bulk which there remains. Nevertheless, if this bulk is fire or earth, on the departure of fire or earth, the magnitude of fire or of earth will also depart. Matter, therefore, will neither enjoy figure, nor magnitude ; for otherwise it would not be something else from fire, but re¬ maining fire, it would not become fire. Hence, matter having now become as we see, as great in extent as the universe, if the heavens should cease $o exist, and all they contain, together with these, all magnitude would likewise depart from matter, and at the same time all other qualities, and matter would be left that which it was before, preserving no one of the things which had a prior subsistence about it. In the natures, however, which suffer by the presence of certain things, something is still left in the recipients, when those things depart ; but this is no longer the case with natures that do not suffer. Thus the air which is surrounded with light, retains nothing of the light when it departs. But if some one should wonder how it is possible, that a thing should become great which does not possess magnitude ; it may also be doubted howp. 168 that can become hot which has not heat. For it is not the same thing in matter, to he matter and to be magnitude ; since magnitude is immaterial, in the same manner as figure is immaterial. And if we preserve matter, we must assert that it is all things by participation. But magnitude is one of all things. In bodies, therefore, which are compo¬ sites, there is magnitude together with other things, yet it is not indefinite ; since in the definition of body magnitude also is included. But in matter, even indefinite magnitude is not included ; for it is not body.

XVII. Neither, again, will matter be magni¬ tude itself. For magnitude is form, but not the recipient of form ; and magnitude subsists by itself. If matter, likewise, cannot adapt to itself the imita¬ tions of beings,1 on this account also it is not mag¬ nitude. Since, however, that which is placed in intellect or in soul, wishes to be great, it imparts to those things which by proceeding as it were, en¬ deavour to imitate it, by the desire of, or motion towards it, the ability of impressing the same pas-

* For αντων here, it is necessary to read οντων»

p. 169

sion in another thing.

be great, it imparts to those things which by proceeding as it were, en¬ deavour to imitate it, by the desire of, or motion towards it, the ability of impressing the same pas-

* For αντων here, it is necessary to read οντων»

p. 169

sion in another thing. That which is great, there¬ fore, running in the progression of the phantasy so as to cause the smallness of matter to run in con¬ junction with it, occasions matter also to appear great, though it is not filled by the co-extension. For this greatness of matter is falsely great, since by not having the power to be great, and being ex¬ tended towards magnitude, it becomes amplified by the extension. For since all beings produce in other things, or in another thing the representation of themselves as in mirrors, each of the agents is in a similar manner 1 great ; and the universe also is great in this way. The magnitude, therefore, of each productive principle, as of that of a horse or any thing else concurs with the particular thing to which the productive principle pertains. And every appearance, indeed, of things as in a mirror is great in consequence of being illuminated by greatness itself. Each portion of them, likewise, becomes something great, and all things at once present themselves to the view from every form of which magnitude is one. From each form, also, there is, as it were, an extension to every thing and to all

* Instead of ws avro here, it is accessary to read ωσαυτωζ.

1.70 things, and this is to be compelled in form. Power, too, produces as much in bulk as bulk is capable of receiving ; so that what is [in reality] nothing, appears to be all things. Hence colour which proceeds from what is not colour, and the quality in sensibles which is derived from what is not quality, have an equivocal appellation from their producing causes. Magnitude, also, proceeds from that which is not magnitude, or from that which is homonymously magnitude ; these 1 being surveyed as having a subsistence between matter itself, and form itself. And they become apparent, indeed, because they are derived from form themselves. They have, however, a false subsistence, because that in w?hich they are apparent is not [truly.] But each of them becomes extended into magnitude, being attracted by the power of the things which are seen in matter, and which make for themselves a place. There is, however, an attraction to all things, yet not by violence, because the universe is matter.

.] But each of them becomes extended into magnitude, being attracted by the power of the things which are seen in matter, and which make for themselves a place. There is, however, an attraction to all things, yet not by violence, because the universe is matter. But each thing attracts according to the power which it possesses ; and derives from the representation of magnitude itself, the ability of

1 viz. Colour, quality, and magnitude.

*>p. 171 making matter so great as it appears to be. Hence the magnitude which is here is the phantasm of it which is apparent. Matter, however, being com» pelled to concur with this attraction, at once im¬ parts itself wholly and every where ; for it is the matter of the universe, and not some particular matter. But that which is not of itself some par» ticular thing, may on account of something else be¬ come contrary to what it was, and having become contrary, no longer is [what it was] ; since if it were, it w ould cease to be changed.

XVIII. If some one, therefore, possessing an intellectual conception of magnitude, should have this conception attended with a power not only of subsisting in itself, but also of proceeding as it were externally, and the powder should receive a nature not existing in the intellectual perceiver, nor having a certain form, nor a certain vestige of magnitude or of any other form, what would he produce through this power ? Not a horse, or an ox. For other powers would produce these. Or shall we say, that since this power proceeds from a great father, nothing else [besides matter] is able to re¬ ceive this magnitude, and that its possession of itp. 172 will only be imaginary, and not real. Hence, to that which does not so obtain magnitude, as to be in its own nature the great itself, it remains for it to be apparently only as much as possible great. But this is not to be deficient, and not to proceed to many things in many places ; but to possess in itself kindred parts, and not to leave any thing des¬ titute of itself. For it is not possible that in a small bulk, there should still be an equal image of magnitude, since it is an image of greatness ; but so far as it aspires through its hope, it accedes as far as it is possible for it to accede, and running in conjunction with that which is not able to leave it, it causes that to be great w hich is not great, yet not so as to appear to he the magnitude which is seen in bulk.