Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

prehends species, and as whole comprehends parts. The powers of seeds, likewise, bring with them an image of what we have said. For in the whole seed, all things are without separa¬ tion, and the reasons [or productive principles] are as it were in one centre. That there is one pro¬ ductive principle likewise of the eye, and another of the hand, is known from what is sensibly gene¬ rated from them. With respect, therefore, to the powers in seeds, each of them is one wrhole pro¬ ductive principle, together with the parts compre¬ hended in it. And that which is corporeal indeed in the seeds, possesses a certain quantity of matter which is as it were moist ; but the productive prin¬ ciple itself is according to the whole of its form, and the same thing is also reason, generating a certain thing by the form of a soul, and which is the image of another more excellent soul. Some, however, de¬ nominate this principle which is inserted in the seeds, nature ; which being thence excited from things prior to itself, in the same manner as light from fire, changes and gives form to matter ; effect-

* τπιΐ'τα is omitted the original.

p. 297

ing this, not by impulsion, nor by employing levers [or any other mechanical power], but by imparting seminal productive principles.

VII. The sciences, however, of sensibles, which are in the rational soul, if it is proper to say that there are sciences of these, since the appellation adapted to them is that of opinion, in consequence of being posterior to sensible things, are the images of them. But the sciences of intelligibles, which are truly sciences, and which descend from intellect into the rational soul, understand indeed nothing sensible ; but so far as they are sciences, are each of the things which are the objects of their percep¬ tion ; and possess internally the intelligible and intelligence. This, however, is because intellect is inward, which is primary natures themselves, is eternally present with itself, and exists, in energy. It likewise does not extend itself to the objects of its perception as if it did not possess them, or as if it acquired them externally, or obtained them by a discursive process, as if they were not already pre~ sent with it (for these are the passions of soul) ; but it stands firmly in itself, being at once all things, and does not energize intellectually in order that itp. 298 may give subsistence to every thing. For it does not, when it intellectually perceives God, become God, nor when it understands motion does it be¬ come motion.

mly in itself, being at once all things, and does not energize intellectually in order that itp. 298 may give subsistence to every thing. For it does not, when it intellectually perceives God, become God, nor when it understands motion does it be¬ come motion. Hence, if the assertion that forms are intellections signifies, that when intellect un¬ derstands this particular form it then becomes that form, it is not true. For it is necessary that the object of intellection should be prior to this intel¬ lectual perception. Or how would intelligence arrive at the perception of it? For it cannot be fortuitously, nor does intelligence extend itself to* wards the intelligible in vain.

VIII. If, therefore, intelligence is truly one, that form which is the object of its perception and idea itself are one. What therefore is this ? In¬ tellect and an intellectual essence, each idea not being different from intellect, but each is intel¬ lect. And, in short, intellect is all forms ; but each form is each intellect; just as the science which ranks as a whole is all the theorems [of the several sciences]. Each theorem, however, is a part of whole science, not as separated by place ; but each possesses powder in the whole. This in¬ tellect, therefore, is in itself, and possesses itself inp. 299 quiet, being always exuberantly full. Hence, if intellect were conceived to subsist prior to being, it would be requisite to say that intellect, by ener¬ gizing and intellectually perceiving, generated and perfected beings. But since it is necessary to con¬ ceive being to be prior to intellect, it is requisite to admit that beings are established in that which is intellective, but that energy and intelligence are posterior to beings ; just as the energy of fire is posterior to fire. Hence, since beings are esta¬ blished in intellect, they possess in themselves their own energy. Being, likewise, is energy ; or rather, both are one. Hence, too, both being and intel¬ lect are one nature ; and on this account also, beings, the energy of being, and an intellect of this kind, are one. Such intellections, also, are form, and the morphe and energy of being. In conse¬ quence, however, of these being divided by us, we conceive some of them to be prior to others. For the intellect which makes this division, is different from them. But impartible intellect and which does not divide, is being and all things.

IX.

eing. In conse¬ quence, however, of these being divided by us, we conceive some of them to be prior to others. For the intellect which makes this division, is different from them. But impartible intellect and which does not divide, is being and all things.

IX. What then are the things in this one in¬ tellect, which we divide in our conceptions of it ?

p. 300

For it is necessary to exhibit them quiescent, and to survey them proceeding from thence, as if from science subsisting in unity. This world, therefore, being an animal comprehending in itself all animals, and possessing its existence, and the quality of its existence from something different from itself, that also from which it is derived being referred to in¬ tellect — this being the case, it is necessary that the archetypal universe should be in intellect ; and that this intellect should be the intelligible world, which Plato [in the Timasus] says exists in that which is animal itself. For as where there is reason [or a productive principle] which is a certain animal, and where also there is at the same time matter which receives the spermatic reason, it is necessary that an animal should be generated ; after the same manner, an intellectual nature being pre¬ sent, which is all-powerful, and has nothing to im¬ pede its energy, (nothing existing between this, and that which is able to receive it) it is necessary that the recipient should be adorned, and that intellect should adorn. And that, indeed, which is adorned, possesses distributed forms, here man, and there the sun. But in the adorning cause all things are in one.

p. 301

X. Such things, ‘therefore, as are forms in the sensible world, are derived from the intelligible world ; but such things aS are not forms do not originate from thence. Hence, nothing preter¬ natural is there ; as neither is there in the arts any thing which is a deviation from art, or lameness in the seeds of animals. For lameness of the feet which takes place in the generation of an animal, arises from the productive seminal principle not vanquishing [the seminal matter]. But the injury which the form sustains is a casual circumstance. According qualities, therefore, and quantities, num¬ bers and magnitudes, habitudes, actions and pas¬ sions, which are according to nature, and motions and permanencies both universal and particular, are among the number of things which are in the intelligible world. Instead of time, however, eter¬ nity is there. But place is there intellectually, being the [impartible] subsistence of one thing in another.