Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

book which we have inscribed ‘Against the Gnostics/ leaving the rest to our judgment.”

After this testimony of Porphyry, it is singular, as Fabricius observes, that Plotinus should not even once use the word Gnostics, in any part of his treatise against them. But as he was a man sparing of words beyond all other writers, he was perhaps satisfied with the inscription which he knew would be given to the book by Porphyry, and being wholly attentive to the conceptions of his own wonderful mind, did not busy him» self with a repetition of names. Wherever this word, therefore, occurs in the following translation, it is inserted by me for the sake of perspicuity.

p. 65

which is not the first is not simple ; and since it has nothing in itself, but is one alone, and the nature of what is called the oney is the same with the good; for it is not first something else, and afterwards one, — nor is the good something else, and afterwards the good; — this being the case, when we say the one , and when w^e say the good , it is necessary to think that we speak of one and the same nature ; not predicating any thing of it, but manifesting it to ourselves as much as possible. It is also called the first , because it is most simple ; and sufficient to itself, because it does not consist of many things. For if it did, it would be sus¬ pended from the things of which it consists. It likewise is not in any thing else, because every thing which is in another, is also derived from another. If, therefore, it is neither from, nor in another, and has not any composition in its nature, it is necessary that there should not be any thing superior to it. Hence, it is not requisite to pro¬ ceed to other principles, but having admitted this, and next to this intellect which is primarily inteF lect, we ought afterwards to place soul, as the next in rank. For this is the order according to nature, neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the Plot. Ep. 66 intelligible. For those who admit fewer than these, must either say that soul and intellect are the same, or that intellect and that which is first are the same. It has, however, been frequently demon¬ strated by us, that these are different from each other.

It remains, therefore, that we should consider at present, if there are more than these three, what the natures are which exist besides these. For since the principle of all things subsists in the way we have shown, it is not possible for any one to find a more simple and elevated principle.

uld consider at present, if there are more than these three, what the natures are which exist besides these. For since the principle of all things subsists in the way we have shown, it is not possible for any one to find a more simple and elevated principle. For they [the Gnostics] will not say 1 that there is one principle in capacity, but another in energy ; since it is ridiculous in things which are in energy, and immaterial, to make many natures by dividing into capacity and energy. But neither in the natures posterior to these, is it to be supposed that there is a certain intellect established in quiet, but that another is as it were moved. For what is the quiet of intellect, what the motion and language of it ? And what will be the leisure of one intellect, and

* Instead of ου yap bet, here, it is necessary to read ου yap δη9p. 67 the work of the other ? Tor intellect always pos¬ sesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, being constituted in a stable energy. But motion direct¬ ed to, and subsisting about it, is nowT the employ¬ ment of soul Reason also proceeding from intel¬ lect into soul, causes soul to be intellectual, and does not produce a certain other nature between intellect and soul. Moreover, neither is it neces¬ sary to make many intellects on this account, that one of them perceives intellectually, but another sees that it sees intellectually. For if in these, to perceive intellectually is one thing, but another to perceive that it sees intellectually, yet there must be one intuitive perception in these which is not in¬ sensible of its own energies. For it would be ridi¬ culous to form any other conception than this of true intellect. But the intellect will be entirely the same, which perceives intellectually, and which sees that it sees intellectually. For if this were not the case, the one would be alone intelligent but the other would perceive that it was intelligent, and the former would be different from the latter. If, however, they say that these two [only] differ from each other in conceptions, in the first place indeed,p. 68 they will be deprived of many hypostases ; and in the next place it is necessary to consider, whether any conception of ours can admit the subsistence of an intellect which is alone intelligent, and which does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.

n intellect which is alone intelligent, and which does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.

When, therefore, that which is truly intellect intellectually perceives itself in its intellections, and the intelligible of it is not externally posited, but intellect itself is also the intelligible, it necessarily follows that in intellectual perception it possesses itself, and sees itself. But seeing itself, it perceives itself not to be void of intelligence, but intelligent. So that in primarily energizing intellectually, it will also have a perception that it sees intellectually, both being as one ; nor can there be any concep¬ tion of duplicity there. If, likewise, always per¬ ceiving intellectually it is that which it is, what place can there be for the conception w hich sepa¬ rates intellectual perception from the perceiving that it sees intellectually P If, however, some onep. 69 should introduce a third conception to the second, which asserts that it perceives that it sees intellec¬ tually, and should say that it understands, (i. e. sees intellectually) that what understands under¬ stands, the absurdity is still more apparent. And why ma}r not assertions of this kind be made to in¬ finity ? The reason, likewise, proceeding from in¬ tellect which may be adduced, and from which afterwards another reason is generated in the soul, so as to become a medium between intellect and soul, deprives the soul of intellectual perception,* if it does not derive this reason from intellect, but from some other intermediate nature* Hence it would possess an image of reason, but not reason itself. And in short, it would not have a know¬ ledge of intellect, nor would it be intelligent.

II. Hence it must not be admitted that there are more principles than these [in the intelligible world,] nor must these superfluous conceptions be adopted, which have no place there ; but it must be said that there is one intellect always subsisting with invariable sameness, and in every respect with¬ out fluctuation, which imitates as much as possible its father ; and with respect to our soul, that onep. 70 part of it always abides on high,1 that another part of it is conversant with sensibles, and that another has a subsistence in the middle of these.